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Abstract
This report is based on a series of papers written between 1980 and
2005 on the origin of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, which was
known to one of the authors in the late 1970s already, as well as to a
number of other physicists, who independently tried without success
to inform their governments and the public.
It is concluded that at no point did the Western governments effectively
try to stop Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, which suggests that its
existence was useful as a foreign policy tool, as is confirmed by its
use as a major justification to wage two wars on Iraq.
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Preface: From 1979 to 2005
The existence of this report is due to a simple event: The visit to CERN (the
European center for nuclear research) in Spring 1979 of a few Iraqi engineers who
showed a considerable interest in the construction details of a unique large magnet,
which at the time was the key component of the NA10 experiment at CERN, in
which Andre Gsponer was working as a physicist.
Because of his unexpected discovery one year earlier of the relevance of
particle accelerator technology such as developed at CERN to classified particle
beam weapons research, which led him to study a lot of technical papers on
the military implications of particle accelerator technology, Gsponer immediately
understood that the only plausible explanation for Iraq’s interest in large magnets
was to use them as “calutrons,” i.e., as electromagnetic isotope separators, to enrich
uranium in view of making an atomic bomb — just like the American did in 1945
to produce the U-235 of the Hiroshima bomb.
Following this shocking realization of the crucial (but untold) importance of
particle accelerator technology to the proliferation and further development of
nuclear weapons, Gsponer left CERN in 1980 to work on technology assessment
with the hope of contributing to nuclear disarmament by publishing his conclusions
on the feasibility of calutrons, particle beam weapons, antimatter weapons, etc.
This report consists of five papers and a postface, presented in the order in
which they were published or released. They are authored by one or several
people whose names are mentioned on the title page of this report, but whose
responsibility extends only over those papers which bare their name.
Paper 1 by Suren Erkman is a newspaper article published in Le Journal de
Gene`ve of 22-23 April 1995. It briefly explains the relation of CERN to the
origin of Iraq’s calutron program and announces the forthcoming publication of a
comprehensive technical report on this subject, i.e., Paper 2. Erkman’s article is in
French and it is expected that an English translation will be available for a future
edition of this report.
ix
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Figure 1: The magnet of the NA10 experiment at CERN is one of which Iraq
took inspiration to design its electromagnetic uranium-enrichment facilities. The
equipment on the photograph is about 20 m long and more than 6 m high. The
magnet is at the center, between the two yellow posts.
Preface xi
Paper 2 by Andre Gsponer and Jean-Pierre Hurni, released on 19 October
1995, is a technical assessment of high-current electromagnetic isotope separation
(EMIS) technology for uranium and plutonium enrichment (i.e., calutrons), and
a detailed account of the circumstances and significance of the 1979 discovery at
CERN of Iraq’s definite interest in calutron technology. Numerous attempts made
since that time to forewarn of the nuclear weapons proliferation impact of particle
accelerator technology are recalled.
Paper 3 by Andre Gsponer, Jean-Pierre Hurni, and Stephan Klement (a physi-
cist and lawyer specialized in nuclear law), released on 12 February 1997, is a
development of 2.5.3 of Paper 2. Its purpose is to show that the legal framework
created in order to provide a legal basis for the operation of UNSCOM (the United
Nations Security Council Special Commission) in Iraq also constitutes a unique
legal precedent because it defines for the first time what is actually meant by
“proliferation prone nuclear activities,” and what a truly “nuclear-free zone” (i.e.,
exempt of any nuclear facility, reactor, or weapon) should be.
Paper 4 by Andre Gsponer, first posted on internet on 31 July 2001, i.e., ten
years after the first Gulf War and only a few weeks before the 11th September
2001 events, is a discussion of the fate of Papers 1, 2, and 3. It is shown that
whereas these papers had only little visible impact, the correctness and pertinence
of their content was amply confirmed by a number of additional facts, including the
interactions of the authors with the IAEA, and similar attempts by other physicists
who like Gsponer tried to inform their governments and the public.
Paper 5 by Andre Gsponer, first published here, is a continuation of Paper 4.
It relates, in particular, how in April 2003 (as soon as he could after the begin-
ning of the US-led invasion of Iraq) Jafar Dhia Jafar, the former Head of Iraq’s
nuclear weapons program, got in contact was Gsponer in order to try to come to
Switzerland. Jafar believed that Switzerland was neutral in the war against his
country, and that Geneva was the best place in the world to give evidence against
the false claim that Iraq had resumed its nuclear weapons program — which was
used as one of the main arguments in the case for war on Iraq. However, after
considerable efforts by Gsponer, it was found that Jafar could not come to Geneva
because Switzerland was not neutral, as a result of decisions pleasing to the United
States made by the Swiss government prior to the invasion of Iraq.
The final paper in this report is a postface by Andre Gsponer, in which he
uses his first hand experience of the Swiss and Iraqi nuclear weapons programs,
to express a very pessimistic judgment on the true nature of Western democracy,
as well his strong disillusions about the real impact of public-spirited initiatives
such as his 25 years of work at GIPRI and ISRI to produce high quality technical
information on nuclear weapons non-proliferation and disarmament.
xii Preface
Paper 1
Atomic Bomb: Iraq Went through
CERN
by Suren Erkman, published in the weekend edition of Le Journal de Gene`ve,
Saturday 22 - Sunday 23 April 1995, pages 1 and 5.
1.1 NUCLEAR WEAPONS — A Researcher Blew
the Whistle!
In the 1970s, the Iraqis visited CERN several times to gather information as part
of their atomic bomb program.
In the 1970s, the Iraqis visited CERN several times to gather information as
part of their atomic bomb program.
In the 1970s, the head of the Iraqi atomic bomb program, Jafar Dhia Jafar, made
several trips to CERN in Geneva while working at the Imperial College London.
On at least one occasion in 1979, he dispatched one of his engineers to CERN to
gather technical information about a particular type of magnet. Among several
possible ways to obtain enriched uranium, the Iraqis had decided to use and perfect
calutrons, a technique that involves using powerful magnets to separate the atoms
of uranium 235 (of military interest) from the atoms of uranium 238 (poorly fissile)
that make up natural uranium. For this reason they were specifically interested in
the types of magnets developed for one of CERN’s experiments. In the end, the
Iraqis chose a design other than CERN’s for the magnets in their calutrons, but the
visits reveal that they were already exploring this uranium enrichment technique
1
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Figure 1.1: Poster announcing the paper on Iraq’s calutrons.
some fifteen years ago. A researcher from Geneva, who at the time tried in vain to
alert the scientific and disarmament communities, is now going public about the
visitsat the moment when the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
is being renegotiated in New York. (Editor’s Note: See articles by Suren Erkman
on page 5.)
1.2 Geneva: Cradle of the Iraqi Bomb
Iraq gathered technical information in Geneva with an atomic bomb in mind. The
head of Iraq’s military nuclear program himself made several trips to CERN, the
European Laboratory for Particle Physics.
One day in 1979, an Iraqi engineer arrived at CERN, the European Laboratory
for Particle Physics in Geneva. Although he was not involved in one of CERN’s
research projects, his visit was not out of the ordinary, the European laboratory
being a place for sharing scientific information that is open to all regardless of
nationality. He approached one of the physicists working on the NA10 experiment
and asked questions about details of the construction of the highly specialized
magnet that is the key component of the equipment in the experiment. The
physicist, who was in charge of the magnet, mentioned the visit to one of his
colleagues, Andre Gsponer, a young researcher who was concerned by the role of
scientific research in the arms race.
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1.2.1 Jafar Dhia Jafar’s Connections
After a quick analysis, Gsponer concluded that, in all likelihood, the Iraqis were
obviously interested in producing enriched uranium using a technology known
as “electromagnetic isotope separation.” In principle, the technique involves
separating, with the help of a powerful magnet, the atoms of uranium 235 (of
military interest) from the atoms of uranium 238 (poorly fissile) that make up
natural uranium. The technique has been around for many years; the United States
used it between June 1944 and July 1945 to make the nuclear charge for the bomb
dropped on Hiroshima. The machine, developed at the University of California,
is known as a “calutron,” a contraction of “California University Cyclotron.”
The details of the technique, which in some aspects is rudimentary, were made
public between 1946 and 1956. Of the several possible methods for obtaining
enriched uranium, the Iraqis had decided to use calutrons, but after modernizing
and perfecting them. This is why they were interested specifically in magnets like
those developed for the NA10 experiment at CERN.
The Iraqis did not come to Geneva by accident. CERN has always been
considered as the world’s center of excellence in large magnet technology. Above
all, the head of Iraq’s bomb program, Jafar Dhia Jafar, had made several visits to
CERN during the 1970s while he was working at the Imperial College London.
Between 1967 and 1976, he published 12 scientific articles on research carried out
at the synchrotrons of Birmingham and CERN.
Naturally, Jafar used personal contacts made during his long stays in Europe
to send his researchers to collect crucial information from the best sources. This
is how the Iraqi engineer was explicitly sent by Jafar to question the researcher
responsible for the NA10 magnet. However, says the latter, who wishes to remain
anonymous, the visit did not have any particular significance because “the infor-
mation the engineer was given is available in public scientific literature. To my
knowledge, he didn’t get access to the original engineering plans or to specific
processes developed by CERN to make the magnet.”
1.2.2 Proliferant Technology
When the Gulf War broke out, Jafar Dhia Jafar, who now lives under high-level
protection in Baghdad, officially took over the positions of Deputy Minister of
Industry and Military Industrialization, Vice President of the Iraqi Atomic Energy
Commission, and Director of Reactor Physics at the Center for Nuclear Research in
Tuwaitha. (A compilation of information about Jafar Dhia Jafar, including mention
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Figure 1.2: Journal de Gene`ve, page 1: “Atomic bomb: Iraq went through CERN.”
of his time at CERN, can be found in William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem’s
Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World,
Simon & Schuster, New York, 1994. Unfortunately, the book has many technical
errors.)
For his part, Andre Gsponer took the incident very seriously. He left CERN
and in 1980 become the first director of GIPRI, the Geneva International Peace
Research Institute, that he founded in 1979. His aim was to conduct a rigorous
assessment of the possible military consequences of research carried out in the
fields of nuclear and particle physics. In 1980, during the second review confer-
ence of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in Geneva,
he authored a document in which he stateed that the technology used for elec-
tromagnetic separation, which had seen many technical advances, had potentially
become a very proliferant technology, and he specifically mentioned Iraq.
After having tried in vain to awake the interest of the disarmament community
about the issue, and after having been warned by experts about the dangers of
disclosing such information for him and his former colleagues at CERN, Gsponer
decided to no longer refer publicly to Iraq’s keen interest in calutron technology.
He left Switzerland in 1987 and returned to his first love: theoretical research in
fundamental physics.
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Figure 1.3: Journal de Gene`ve, page 5: “Geneva, cradle of the Iraqi bomb.”
1.2.3 The Calutrons Are Confirmed
However, in 1991, after the Gulf War, Gsponer was startled to see the images
coming out of Iraq — more precisely, the pictures of calutrons used in the Iraqi
bomb program! Andre Gsponer gathered all available information about calutrons
in scientific literature and in reports from UN missions to Iraq. He is now finishing
a technical study of calutrons in which he describes in detail how Iraq intended to
manufacture the enriched uranium needed for a bomb (Andre Gsponer and Jean-
Pierre Hurni, Calutrons: 1945—1995, ISRI, Case postale 30, 1211 GenŁve-12).
Events had proved him right: Iraq, like other countries, had indeed taken the path
of calutrons, confirming the proliferation potential for this technology. “If one
had taken the matter seriously at the time, the course of events may have been
different,” notes Gsponer.
One major question remains, nonetheless. Western intelligence claimed to
have been surprised to have uncovered a significant calutron program in Iraq.
“I can’t believe that I was the only one, along with a few others, to know the
Iraqis were extremely interested in calutrons in the late 1970s,” wonders Gsponer.
“Western intelligence agencies must have known. Why wait so long to take action
then, and why pretend to discover the program after the Gulf War?”
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1.3 “To protect ourselves from the threat of nuclear
proliferation, we will have to use force”
One chapter in a recent collective work on the possibility of completely eliminating
nuclear weapons offers an interesting idea: every citizen should consider it his or
her responsibility to alert public opinion if he or she learns of any incident that
suggests a group or country is seeking to acquire the atomic bomb (Joseph Rotblat,
Jack Steinberger, and Bhalchandra Udgaonkar in Un monde sans armes nucléaires
[A world without nuclear weapons], Editions Transition, Paris, 1995). Yet, that
is exactly what Andre Gsponer said he tried to do in the early 1980s when he
saw that Iraq was very interested in calutrons, and even more to the point, when
he realized that the technologies related to particle accelerators could give rise
to new generations of nuclear weapons (Andre Gsponer et al., La quadrature du
CERN [The quadrature of CERN], Editions d’En-Bas, Lausanne, 1984]. “But no
one wanted to listen to me, including the scientific community,” laments Gsponer.
“Perhaps it’ll take a major city in a Western country going up in smoke after an
atomic bomb for us to decide to seriously think about a new policy for science and
technology that takes into account the consequences of fundamental research in a
truly responsible way.”
Seemingly confirming this analysis, the UN Security Council adopted on 15
August 1991 Resolution 707, which clearly specifies that Iraq is prohibited not only
from constructing, importing, and using, but also from conducting “any activity
such as research and development” in the field of “neutron sources, electron
accelerators, particle accelerators, heavy ion accelerators” and in the field of
“nuclear fusion experimental devices.”
Other experts also see the uncontrolled development of research as a key factor
in nuclear proliferation. A proliferation that is all the more inevitable as the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons now being renegotiated in New
York covers only technology related to nuclear reactors. In an article recently
published by Science, John Nuckolls, associate director of one of the largest
American military laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, states,
“the dissemination of scientific and technological advances as well as economic
growth offer an ever-growing number of nations the capacity to develop nuclear
weapons.” P.K.Iyengar, former director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Center in
Bombay and former chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission, expresses a
similar opinion in an editorial in the Indian journal Current Science: “As nuclear
science advances, nuclear technology evolves as much for peaceful purposes as
for military ones....It is important for physicists to recognize this and to inform
political leaders and the general public.”
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However, for the moment, we are witnessing an entirely different strategy
being put in place: counterproliferation, which involves allowing a country to
go to a certain point and then stopping it, with military force if necessary. For
Robert Kupferman, an expert in defense issues at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies in Washington,D.C., interviewed by telephone a few hours
after the Oklahoma City bombing, “there’s no doubt that nuclear weapons are
going to proliferate at a terrifying rate. To protect ourselves from this threat, we
will have to use force.”
8 Journal de Gene`ve
Paper 2
Iraq’s calutrons : Electromagnetic
isotope separation, beam technology,
and nuclear weapon proliferation
by Andre Gsponer and Jean-Pierre Hurni
Report ISRI-95-03 — 19 October 1995
2.1 Abstract
The past and present status of high-current electromagnetic isotope separation
(EMIS) technology for uranium and plutonium enrichment (i.e., calutrons) is
reviewed in the five nuclear weapons states and in four critical states: Japan,
India, Israel and Iraq.
The circumstances and significance of the 1979 discovery at CERN, the Euro-
pean center for nuclear research in Geneva, of Iraq’s definite interest in calutron
technology, is discussed in detail, together with the problem of publishing inde-
pendent opinions on the nuclear proliferation implications of particle accelerator
and fusion technologies.
The conclusion stresses the potential of “old” beam technologies such as
calutrons, e.g., for the transformation of reactor-grade into weapons-grade plu-
tonium, and of particle accelerators for the efficient production of plutonium
or tritium. UN Security Council Resolutions 687 and 707, obliging Iraq to all
9
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proliferating nuclear activities, are shown to provide a legal precedent for the
unambiguous definition of strictly peaceful nuclear activities. The “failure” of
Western intelligence in detecting Iraq’s gigantic calutron program is questioned,
and the relation of this “failure” to the justification of past and possible future
coercive counter-proliferation actions is investigated.
2.2 Introduction
Shortly after the Gulf War, under the terms of UN Security Council resolution
687, several International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) teams inspected known
or suspected nuclear sites in Iraq. Between June and September 1991, substantial
enrichment activities were discovered, including two industrial-scale facilities
using the electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) method, and a program to
produce enriched uranium with ultracentrifuges. From that time on, the fact that
Iraq did successfully put the EMIS method into practice, and the fact that Iraq
had a complex, comprehensive nuclear weapons program, have been presented as
big surprises and as major failures of Western intelligence. Why therefore, in the
months before the Gulf War, did President Bush and his administration give such
prominence to Iraq’s nuclear bomb ambitions? “As I report to you, air attacks
are under way against military targets in Iraq. We are determined to knock out
Saddam Hussein’s nuclear bomb potential,” the President said, before ticking off
other objectives of the assault, just two hours after U.S. warplanes began attacking
Iraq on January 16, 1991.
There were many indications of Iraq’s nuclear ambitions even before an Israeli
air raid in 1981 destroyed the Iraqi Tammouz 1 (Osiraq) reactor just before its
completion. For instance, the first author of this report (A. Gsponer) learned
in 1979 that Iraq was already interested in the construction of an industrial-
scale facility using the EMIS method [1]. This important discovery was one
of the reasons why he decided to quit high energy physics and to start working
full time on disarmament. With limited success, he tried to inform the arms-
control/disarmament community of the military impact of particle accelerator
technology, and in particular of their implications on both vertical and horizontal
proliferation of nuclear weapons [1, 2, 3].
The purpose of this report is to review some of the historical and technical
aspects of EMIS, to summarize what is publically known of Iraq’s attempt to use
this technology in its nuclear weapons program, and to draw the main disarmament
conclusions.
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Figure 2.1: Jean-Pierre Hurni and Andre A. Gsponer, circa 1995.
In the first part, it will be seen that EMIS technology is an integral part of the
nuclear programs of all nuclear weapons states (USA, Russia, England, France
and China) and that it has been developed to various degrees in many countries
including India, Israel and Japan.
In the second part, it will be seen that Iraq’s EMIS design was not a simple copy
of the rather crude one used by the USA during World War Two, but an improved
design which incorporated many of the refinements made since 1945. In this part
details of a biographical and historical nature will be given. For convenience,
these will be referred to in the third person.
In the final part, it will be stressed that not only EMIS technology, but also
a whole range of technologies, comprising old as well as new ones, are going to
make nuclear proliferation an increasingly likely possibility. UN Security Council
Resolution 687 and 707, which impose a comprehensive moratorium on Iraq
in order to avoid the resumption of its nuclear program, and which recognize the
proliferation potential of these technologies, are analysed in the perspective of their
contribution to the unambiguous definition of strictly peaceful nuclear activities.
Finally, the problem of the “failure” of intelligence to detect the massive Iraqi
nuclear weapons program is addressed in the light of the discovery of Iraq’s
interest in calutrons as early as 1979.
The authors would like to thank Ms Heather Serdar, graduate student at The
Graduate Institute of International Studies, University of Geneva, for sharing some
of her documentation on the United Nations and Iraq with us. The authors thanks
are also due to Ms Louise Dance for a considerable amount of work to ensure that
the English language of the report became acceptable.
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2.3 Principle and state of the art in calutron tech-
nology
2.3.1 Enrichment technologies in perspective
There are two general methods for producing fissile materials for military or
civilian purposes: breeding and enrichment. For a small or developing nation
with limited military nuclear ambitions, in the absence of any technical or political
obstacle, the cheapest and fastest option is breeding.
With breeding, a source of neutrons is used to convert a non-fissile material
such as U-238 or Th-232 into fissile Pu-239 or U-233. The neutron source is
generally a nuclear reactor or, possibly, a more complicated device such as a
particle accelerator or (in the future) a fusion reactor [3].
In practice, a small fission reactor with a power of a few tens of MW(thermal)
is sufficient to breed enough Pu-239 to make one atomic bomb per year. Such a
reactor was built in Israel in 1960 and it is now widely accepted that it has been
used to produce enough fissile material for several nuclear weapons. A reactor
of similar size was used to produce the plutonium for the bomb India exploded
in 1974. In 1981, concerned that Iraq could be developing nuclear weapons, an
Israeli air raid destroyed the Iraqi 70 MW(th) Tammouz 1 (Osiraq) reactor.
In enrichment, the concentration of fissile U-235, which is only 0.72 per cent in
natural uranium, is increased beyond the normal isotopic concentration. Weapons-
grade uranium should be more than 80 per cent pure in U-235. A number of
enrichment technologies are available; electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS),
gaseous diffusion, ultracentrifugation, laser isotope separation, plasma isotope
separation, etc. Of these technologies, gaseous diffusion is the most mature and
the method on which the present industrial production is based. The physical
principle of gaseous diffusion is such that plants using this method are necessarily
very large and expensive. Since the existing diffusion plants are aging, two
major alternatives for large scale commercial production (plasma and laser isotope
separation) have been extensively studied. In the USA, it is the atomic vapor
laser isotope separation (AVLIS) process that has been selected as the uranium
enrichment method of the future [4]. And the plasma separation process (PSP)
has been made available for other applications [5]. Both of these processes are
technologically highly sophisticated and do not constitute a near term threat for
nuclear proliferation in developing countries.
From the horizontal proliferation point of view, the ultracentrifuge method is
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now possibly the most attractive technique for building a relatively small enrich-
ment plant — one which would turn out enough fissile uranium for one or two
nuclear weapons a year. This method was used by South Africa and Pakistan to
produce the fissile material for their nuclear weapons. Ultracentrifugation requires
comparatively little energy and leads to small plants that can be easily concealed.
Technologically however, ultracentrifugation is somewhat more sophisticated than
electromagnetic enrichment, the technique which was historically the first to be
used on an industrial scale and produced the uranium for the Hiroshima bomb.
Compared with the other enrichment methods, the main advantage of EMIS is
that it uses only well known classical technologies (ion sources, vacuum, magnets,
etc). Its main disadvantage is that it is not a continuous process. It involves a
complicated and labour intensive series of physical and chemical tasks which pose
considerable problems during plant operation. As shown by Iraq however, many
of these problems can be alleviated by the use of microcomputer control systems.
2.3.2 Basic principle and main characteristics of EMIS
The electromagnetic isotope separation method is based on the principle that ions
of the same energy, but of different masses, describe trajectories with different
curvatures in a magnetic field.
At the heart of an EMIS system is an electromagnetic separator which com-
prises three main parts: a source in which the mixture of isotopes is ionized and
the resulting ions merged into a beam which is accelerated to some energy; an
analysing magnet providing the field in which the accelerated beam is separated
into as many beams as there are isotopes in the original mixture; and a receiver in
which different pockets collect the ions from the separated ion beams. The source
and the receiver are located in a vacuum tank situated between the pole faces of the
electromagnet. Some residual gas is left in the vacuum tank in order to pinch and
stabilize the ion beams. The associated chemical operations consist of preparing
the feed-material (usually uranium tetrachloride), extracting the enriched material
from the receivers (usually made of graphite) and cleaning the vacuum tank for
recovering the material lost in the separator by scattering, sputtering and stray
beams.
The most important parameters which characterize an electromagnetic sep-
arator are the ion beam current and the mass separation power. These two
characteristics are antagonistic: a very high isotopic purity can only be achieved
at the expense of a low current, which implies a low productivity. In practice,
the dividing line between laboratory separators for high precision electromagnetic
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Figure 2.2: Trajectories of U-235 and U-238 ions in a 180o calutron.
separation and industrial separators for high productivity is of the order of 1 mA
(one milliampere). Here the term “calutron” refers to a production electromagnetic
separator with a current of 1 mA or more.
In industrial scale separation, for various technical reasons, there is an upper
limit of about 100 mA to the calutron beam current, which in the case of uranium,
leads to a maximum enrichment of only 10 to 20%. There are two consequences.
First, since the production of 50 kg of U-235 per year corresponds to a total
beam current of over 100 A, there must be at least 1000 separators working in
parallel to share the load. Second, in order to achieve a final enrichment of more
than 90%, there must be a second enrichment stage which will require a somewhat
smaller number (about 300) lower current but higher resolution separators. Hence,
to produce enough U-235 for one atomic bomb a year a very large number of
calutrons is required.
The most straight forward design of a calutron makes use of a uniform magnetic
field, i.e., a field that is constant through space. In such a field the trajectory of
an ion is a circle whose radius is a function of its mass. The basic arrangement
consists of placing the source and the receiver in the field in such a way that after
half a turn, both of the ion beams are caught by appropriately placed collector
pockets (Fig. 2.2), one for U-238, another for U-235. This design, often referred
to as the 180o method, was brought up from laboratory to industrial scale by E.O.
Lawrence during World War Two [6] and now serves as a reference design for
comparing other calutron designs.
The mass separation power is a function of two parameters: the dispersion and
the resolution.
The dispersion is the spacing δ at the receiver between two beams of different
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Figure 2.3: Trajectories of ions of the same mass leaving the source at different
angles in a 180o calutron.
masses. In the 180o method, the dispersion is given by the formula
δ = R
m
M
(2.1)
where M is the average beam mass and m the mass difference. Hence, in the
separation of natural uranium (i.e., M = 238 and m = 238 − 235 = 3 ) with a
calutron of mean beam radiusR = 100 cm, the mass dispersion is of 100×3/238 =
1.26 cm.
The resolution ρ is given by the width of the beams at the receiver. This is a
function of many parameters such as the width of the source, image aberrations
(error in focusing), scattering on the residual gas, stability of the magnetic field,
etc. For high intensity separators, the main contribution to the resolution is from
the aberrations due to the angular spread of the initial ion beam. In particular, in
the 180o method, if ions of the same mass leave the source at different angles, their
trajectories do not meet at the same point on the receiver (Fig. 2.3). In the small
angle approximation, the resolution is then
ρ = Rα2 (2.2)
where α is half the opening angle of the initial beam.
For isotope separation to be possible, the width of the beams at the receiver
must be smaller than their separation, i.e., ρ < δ . Hence, from the above two
expressions, it is seen that uranium isotope separation with the 180o method is only
possible with beams of an initial divergence less than 6.4o (i.e.,
√
3/238 radians),
a rather small divergence for a high intensity beam.
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To improve the resolution, and thus to enable separation of high intensity
beams, various methods were studied during World War Two. The method finally
used in Lawrence’s calutrons was to make the magnetic field slightly non-uniform
(by introducing specially shaped iron shims in between the pole faces of the
magnet) in order to bring the beams to a better focus at the collectors [6]. After
the War, in the period 1945-1955, many other methods were tested to improve
the performance of electromagnetic isotope separation, a problem that is directly
connected to the improvement of several closely related techniques such as mass
spectroscopy and particle acceleration. In general, these methods tried to make
use of non-uniform magnetic fields in order to improve the dispersion and/or the
resolution, and thus to increase the separation power which may be characterized
by the ratio δ/ρ .
An important example of an improved calutron design was invented in 1946 by
the Swedish physicists Nils Svartholm and Kai Siegbahn [7] who were studying
the general problem of momentum spectroscopy in a non-uniform field. They
found that if the field decreases with radius going outward from the center of the
orbits, there is focusing in the direction parallel with the magnetic field as well
as normal to the field — the focusing is stigmatic. (If the field is uniform, there
is focusing only in the radial direction.) In particular, in a magnet of rotational
symmetry, if the field falls off in inverse proportion to the square root of the
radius, maximum separation and focusing is obtained when the ion’s trajectory
through the field makes an angle of 255o between the source and the receiver. The
Svartholm-Siegbahn method is therefore often called the 255o method. In this
method, the dispersion and resolution are given by
δ = 2R
m
M
(2.3)
and
ρ =
4
3
Rα2 (2.4)
respectively. Thus, compared with the 180o method, while the dispersion is better
by a factor of 2, the resolution is worse by a factor 4/3. The separation power
is therefore only 1.5 times better. There is however, a further advantage in the
Svartholm-Siegbahn method: because of the double-focusing effect of the non-
uniform magnetic field, it is possible to use beams of higher intensity.
This discussion of aspects of the 255o method is typical of the kind of improve-
ments possible over the standard 180o method: no break through is possible and
only factor of two improvements are feasible. Nevertheless, by combining several
such factors, substantial progress has been made since World War Two.
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2.3.3 Sources of information on EMIS and calutrons
In comparison with other enrichment technologies, and more generally with the
secrecy which surrounds the construction of nuclear weapons, essentially all the
information concerning EMIS has been declassified since World War Two. In
particular, the technical details of the American calutron program have been de-
classified in two steps. First, a series of fundamental research reports appeared
in division I (Electromagnetic Separation Project) of the U.S. National Nuclear
Energy Series between 1949 and 1952. Second, a collection of specialized reports
were declassified and started to appear towards the end of 1955 (Technical Infor-
mation Service, Oak Ridge, Reports number TID-5210 to TID-5219). At the same
time, many patents relating to the construction details of crucial calutron compo-
nents were filed in the United States. This was the era of the optimistic “Atoms for
Peace” program and it was believed that, apart from their scientific applications
and potential to produce small amounts of separated isotopes for industrial and
medical use, no country would ever turn to EMIS to produce the relatively large
amounts of enriched material needed for atomic weapons.
The main practical reason for declassifying information on calutrons is that
electromagnetic isotope separation involves no scientific or technological principle
which could be effectively protected by a patent or kept secret. The principles of
EMIS are common to several neighboring techniques which include mass spec-
troscopy, momentum spectrometry, electron microscopy and circular accelerator
technology. EMIS is also a very important tool for fundamental research in nu-
clear physics (where it is essential for separating the various isotopes of a natural
element in order to study their properties). All major components of an EMIS
system (ion sources, magnets, vacuum system, high voltage power supplies etc)
are widely used in all research laboratories which use low or high energy particle
accelerators to study nuclear reactions or the interactions of elementary particles.
As a result, after the declassification of the information from the Manhattan
project in the late 1940s and mid 1950s, most of the progress in EMIS technology
is now reported in open scientific literature. Important sources of information
are the proceedings of the twelve “EMIS conferences” which have taken place
in Europe, the United States, Israel and Japan between 1955 and 1992. The
proceedings of these “EMIS conferences” are generally published in the journal
Nuclear instruments and methods, the editor of which is Kai Siegbahn, the co-
inventor of the 255o method.
Because of the intrinsic simplicity of EMIS technology, there has been no
major break-through since the Manhatten project and those improvements made
between 1945 and 1955. For this reason, most of the contributions at recent
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EMIS conferences are concerned with perfecting the many low-current separators
used world-wide in fundamental or applied research. An increasing number of
papers deal with the so-called on-line EMIS facilities, which are complex research
instruments enabling the separation of very short-lived isotopes, and comparatively
fewer papers with the standard off-line facilities. Exceptions to this are a few
papers presented at the last two conferences. These gave information on several
old Russian and Chinese high-current off-line EMIS facilities on which previously
there was little information in open scientific literature.
2.3.4 EMIS in the United States
At the beginning of the Manhattan project, the method that would ultimately be-
come practical for producing the fissile material for an atomic bomb was unknown.
It was clear however, that any method that would process material in bulk would
certainly be more efficient than any method, such as electromagnetic enrichment,
that relies on passing small amounts of material through some kind of an analyser.
For this reason, reactor production of plutonium, or gaseous diffusion of uranium,
were expected to be the best methods. By mid-1942 no reactor worked and it
was not clear whether an industrial scale gaseous diffusion plant would ever work.
On November 5, 1942, General Groves decided that the design of the prototype
electromagnetic separator, built by E.O. Lawrence at the University of California
(hence the name “calutron”), would be frozen and that a plant called Y-12, with a
capacity of about 100 grams per day would be created in Oak Ridge [8].
In Lawrence’s original design, called “alpha,” the evacuated tank containing
the source and collector assembly was placed between the circular pole pieces
of a large magnet originally intended for a cyclotron. This 184-inch magnet was
completed in 1942 as a “mechanism of warfare,” with an A-1-a priority for steel
[8]. In Oak Ridge there were many calutrons to be put into operation. A simple
rectangular dipole magnet was designed and the calutrons were assembled into
ovals comprising 96 magnets alternating with 96 calutron tanks. This had the
advantage of forming a closed magnetic loop and minimizing magnetic losses and
steel consumption. In the end there were 9 such “racetracks,” making 864 alpha
calutrons in total.
In the alpha calutrons an attempt was made to get maximum possible output
per separator, and one method of doing this was to use equipment of a fairly large
size. The models adopted for production had a source-collector distance of 244
cm. The lateral width of the ion beam is limited by the dimension of the tank in
the direction of the magnetic field, which was of the order of 3500 gauss. The
tanks had an inside dimension of 61 cm and the lateral width of the ion beams
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was about 50 cm. The radial width of the beam varied from about 1 cm near the
receiver and acceleration system to approximately 60 cm in the 90o position [6].
The output of the alpha calutrons was enriched only to about 15%. To produce
weapons-grade uranium, 8× 36 = 288 improved calutrons were built to provide a
second enrichment stage called “beta.” The beta tank equipment, including sources
and collectors, was made with linear dimensions just half the corresponding alpha
dimensions. Beta calutrons worked with a lower current and emphasized recovery,
not only of the further enriched output but also of the already enriched feed.
Between January and June 1945, using feed from the alpha calutrons and the small
output of the gaseous diffusion plant, the Y-12 production was of 6 kg weapons-
grade uranium per month [9, p.494]. Neglecting losses, such an output means that
the average alpha and beta calutron currents were of the order of 150 and 20 mA,
respectively.
By mid-1945, the gaseous diffusion process had demonstrated that there was
a cheaper way of obtaining U-235 and soon after the cessation of hostilities, the
electromagnetic plant was declared obsolete and the shutdown of the facilities was
initiated. Only two of the nine buildings housing calutrons were retained intact —
the pilot plant with two alpha and two beta separators and a production building
containing 72 beta separators [10]. From that time on, these remaining calutrons
were used for the production of enriched stable isotopes (embracing more then 250
different nuclidic species), and selected radioactive isotopes, for use in military,
scientific, industrial and medical applications.
In order to increase the versatility of the Oak Ridge facility many improvements
have been made over the years. In particular, to make it more suitable for multi-
element enrichment, the original magnetic configuration (which linked the 72
beta calutrons into two sets of 36 separators in a common magnetic field) was
modified. Installing 5 magnetic shunts resulted in the subdivision of the track
into seven independent groups of calutrons. Moreover, six beta calutrons were
modified into 255o inhomogeneous magnetic-field separators to provide a factor
of two enhancement in dispersion. In one calutron, the source and collector
have been made external to the analysing magnet, providing a separation power
roughly ten times that of the standard 180o calutron, with a correspondingly lower
ion throughput [11, 12].
Apart from the large calutrons in Oak Ridge, many electromagnetic separators
have been built in various universities and research laboratories. In 1981, Los
Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory de-
cided to upgrade the quality of their isotope separation facilities to achieve better
resolution and dispersion [13]. The project was named LLORIS, “Los Alamos,
Livermore, Orsay Isotope Separator,” the design was the result of a collaboration
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with the Laboratoire Rene´ Bernas of Orsay, France. A special feature of this
0.5 mA ion beam current separator is the use of a magnet with an adjustable
quadrupole component. A total of three units have been constructed, two for Los
Alamos and one for Livermore.
For future large scale enrichment requirements, the plasma separation process
(PSP) is expected to provide the best option [12]. “In comparison with the calutron,
the PSP has a lower enrichment factor and is capable of enriching only one isotope
per pass. However, it is a very high throughput machine that could augment the
present enrichment program by making available large quantities of material at
medium enrichments and by providing pre-enriched feed-material for the calutron”
[11]. The main component of a PSP system is a large superconducting magnet
[14].
2.3.5 EMIS in the Soviet Union
The first documented history of the Soviet atomic bomb has only recently been
published [15]. The details of the enrichment program, and more particularly those
concerning the diffusion and electromagnetic processes, are based on a document
[16] by Igor Golovin, who worked closely with Igor Kurchatov in the 1950s and
later wrote his biography.
Like the United States, the Soviet Union worked from the beginning on all
possible enrichment methods. Work on electromagnetic enrichment started at the
Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy in 1943 when the institute was founded
[17], and was directed by L.A. Artsimovitch, I.N. Golovin and G.Ia. Shchepkin.
Early in 1946, sites were selected for the gaseous diffusion plant, Sverdlovsk-44,
central Urals, and the electromagnetic plant, Sverdlovsk-45, northern Urals. The
first tests of the electromagnetic process were made in 1946 with the help of an
electromagnet from Germany.
Things did not go smoothly for either the electromagnetic or the diffusion
process. Artsimovich was unable to obtain ion sources with the required current.
The problems with the diffusion process were even more severe. Construction of
the production plant, which had a planned output of one kilogram U-235 per day,
was completed in 1948. But, in 1949, the year of the first Soviet plutonium atomic
bomb, the degree of uranium enrichment obtained was only 40 per cent. This
40 per cent enriched uranium was brought to Sverdlovsk-45, and after a month
of round-the-clock work, Artsimovich and his group, using their experimental
apparatus, managed to produce 400 grams of uranium enriched to 92–98 per cent
[15, p.191], [16, p.20] (Neglecting losses and down-times, this corresponds to a
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total effective ion beam current of about 150 mA).
With the help of German scientists, the problems at the diffusion plant were
solved at the end of 1950. At about the same time the priority for electromagnetic
separation was reduced. It was decided not to build a large-scale electromagnetic
plant, and the small plant at Sverdlovsk-45, which had already been completed,
was no longer treated as a top-priority project.
As a reaction to Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” proposal in 1953, a large
amount of information was published on the Soviet achievement in the nuclear
domain. In particular, at the 1958 Atoms for Peace Conference in Geneva, a paper
on electromagnetic isotope separation gave many details on more than a dozen
large electromagnetic separators of various types, then operational in the Soviet
Union [18]. Of special interest were the largest separators which had a two-story,
four-tank design within a single 400 tons magnet. Such characteristics suggest
that these calutrons were the prototypes for the Sverdlovsk-45 plant. Photographs
of these calutrons can be seen in the paper [18, Fig.2] and in a booklet distributed
at the 1958 Atoms for Peace exhibit [19, p.53].
In 1957, L.A. Artsimovitch and others published a particularly elegant example
of a high-resolution calutron using the 255o method [20]. (In fact, for some
technical reasons, the focusing angle was 225o instead of the optimum 255o value.)
This design used a magnetic field of rotational symmetry and provided excellent
single-pass enrichment for heavy elements such as uranium or plutonium with ion
beam currents of the order of 10–15 mA.
In 1969, an electromagnetic separator, S-2, especially designed for high effi-
ciency separation of isotopes of the heavy radioactive elements which have a small
relative mass difference, was built in Arzamas-16 [21], the Soviet equivalent of
the Los Alamos laboratory. The magnet is C-shaped and the pole tips have a slope
creating a field which decreases in inverse proportion to the radius of the beam
trajectory. The ion source provides a beam of up to 10 mA. Although Arzamas-16
was originally a Soviet military laboratory, isotopically pure samples in the form
of layers, targets, solutions or other forms may now be obtained elsewhere on a
contractual basis [22].
The future of enrichment in the USSR was discussed by A. Tikhomirov at
the EMIS-12 conference [17]. The centrifugal method, which was considerably
developed in the USSR and led to a practical plant in 1959 at Sverdlovsk-44, was
presented as a good option for the large scale enrichment of medium weight
isotopes (such as germanium for semiconductor applications). However, the
plasma separation process (which in contrast to the centrifugal one does not
require volatile compounds) is seen as an important option for the future. In
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particular, it can be compared with the electromagnetic method in universality,
and the centrifugal method for the productivity. A similar conclusion had earlier
been reached by J.G. Tracy in an assessment of the future of enrichment from an
American perspective [12].
2.3.6 EMIS in the United Kingdom
A comprehensive review of the state of the art in electromagnetic enrichment in
the 1950s, giving details on the British and French early calutron efforts (as well
as some details on similar efforts in other European countries, South Africa and
Japan), was published in 1958 [23]. The British project was started in 1945 by
some of the British scientists who had been working for the Manhattan project.
They designed units similar to those they had been working on in the U.S.A. The
first separator built at Harwell (south of Oxford), completed early in 1950, was a
24-inch beam-radius separator similar to the American beta calutron.
The main purpose of this large capacity 180o machine was to produce material
in sufficient quantity rather than to obtain very high enrichment. Due to the
success of the Capenhurst diffusion plant, which came into operation between
1954 and 1957, there was no need to further develop the high production calutron
technology. Both scientific and military applications however, demanded smaller
quantities of highly enriched materials, for which a beam current of the order of 1
mA is sufficient.
A disadvantage of the 180o type of machine is the restriction placed on the
source and receiver design because of the cramped space and the magnetic fields
in the region of these units. In order to obtain high enrichment factors, a solution
is to consider a “sector machine” in which the source and collector are external
to the magnet. This led to the construction in Harwell of HERMES, “Heavy
Elements and Radioactive Material Electromagnetic Separator,” in which the ion
beam trajectory made a 90o angle at a 48-inch radius in the magnetic field [23,
150–165].
Typical applications of HERMES comprise the separation of plutonium iso-
topes [23, p.165]. At Oak Ridge, U.S.A., a beta calutron had been modified for
the same purpose while a smaller version had been constructed for use as a second
stage machine [23, p.165]. In the U.S.S.R., the 225o machine of Artsimovich had
been specially designed for the separation of radioactive heavy elements such as
plutonium [20].
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2.3.7 EMIS in France
In 1940, Alfred O. Nier at the University of Minnesota in collaboration with
Booth, Dunning and Gross at Columbia University, were the first to use the
electromagnetic method to separate the uranium isotopes in order to investigate
their fission properties [24]. Rene´ H. Bernas, who studied physics at the University
of Minnestota and was to become the leader of electromagnetic separation in
France, developed a high current version of the type of separators ordinarily used
in Nier’s laboratory [25]. In France in 1952, Bernas built a 60o sector machine
with an ion beam radius of 50 cm [23, p.82–95]. This separator was installed in a
laboratory of the Commissariat a` l’Energie Atomique (CEA), Saclay. In September
1955, out of 290 hours of collection time, 200 were dedicated to uranium with a
production of 1.4 gram of U-235 [23, p.93], corresponding to an effective beam
current of 0.1 mA. The success of the French machine was a positive factor in the
British decision to build HERMES.
Contrary to the United States, England and the Soviet Union, there has been
no attempt in France to pursue simultaneously the uranium and plutonium routes
to atomic weapons. Indeed, in 1952, France chose plutonium as the priority
for its own nuclear weapons program. Therefore, the construction of the first
French uranium enrichment plant, using the gaseous diffusion process, started in
1960 only. The Pierrelatte enrichment plant became operational in 1964 and was
completed in 1967. It is interesting that at about the same time some effort was
made to build large size calutrons. In effect, a 255o double focusing calutron
operating with a maximum ion beam current of about 150 mA, was built in Saclay
between 1962 and 1965 to produce isotopes in commercial quantities [26]. In the
construction of this device, several field configurations were tested. Similarly to
the Oak Ridge calutrons [8, 10], this 24-inch separator was based on an ordinary
rectangular magnet (which normally creates a uniform field). The required non-
uniform field was obtained by introducing suitably shaped iron “shims” between
the pole pieces [27]. While experiments with linear shims (corresponding to the
180o method) enabled the use of ion beam currents with maximum intensities of
the order of 100 mA, circular shims (corresponding to the 255o method) enabled
the use of currents of the order of 200 mA, clearly demonstrating the superiority of
255o method. An important aspect of the publications describing this work is that
they provide a good summary of the mid-sixties’ state of the art in industrial-scale
EMIS technology [26, 27]. In particular, they show the usefulness of computer
programs to study complicated non-uniform field systems and the simultaneous
focusing of two separate ion beams.
In France, as in the other countries which have mastered the technique of
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gaseous diffusion, calutrons have not become a means for large scale production
of enriched uranium. Over the years however, several large separators were built
in order to suit various other needs. For example, at the “Laboratoire Rene´
Bernas,” in Orsay, two separators, SIDONIE and PARIS, were built to prepare
extremely enriched isotopes [28]. PARSIFAL, a separator providing safe handling
of radioactive materials, was built at the military laboratory of Bruye`re le Chatel
to separate specific isotopes from a strong radioactive background [29]. Typical
applications are the purification of very small quantities of isotopes, with half-lives
greater than 12 days, that are produced in special monitoring targets exposed to
the neutron flux of a reactor or nuclear explosion. To increase the availability
of PARSIFAL, a copy of the source block was built in 1990, so that secondary
operations such as source-outgassing could be performed at the same time as actual
separation using the other source [30].
Expertise gained by French scientists in the design and construction of high
resolution electromagnetic separators led to a collaboration with the EMIS spe-
cialists at Los Alamos in an effort to upgrade the isotope separation facilities at the
Los Alamos and Livermore nuclear weapons laboratories [13]. This is a typical
example of the collaboration/competition relationship characterizing the arms race
between France and the United States since the early 1980s, and even more so
since the break up of the former Soviet Union. Where each state in relation to the
other takes the place of the Soviet Union as the challenger in the development of
the most sophisticated military technology.
In order to replace its aging gaseous diffusion facilities, France has perfected
the AVLIS process (SILVA in French) and expects to build an industrial scale laser
enrichment facility by 2010.
2.3.8 EMIS in China
Details on Chinese calutrons began to appear in open scientific literature in the
proceedings of the EMIS-10 conference [31]. The main characteristics of the four
calutrons built at the China Institute of Atomic Energy, Beijing, are given in these
articles, and a summary of the elements processed from 1965 to 1986 was given
at EMIS-11 conference [32].
A laboratory-scale 90o separator (F-1) was installed in 1962. Since then two
180o production separators (F-2 and F-3) have been installed in 1965 and 1968
respectively, and a 255o double-focusing separator (F-4) was constructed in 1980.
A comparison of the characteristics of F-2 and F-3 with those given in 1958 for the
Soviet calutrons, show that they are in fact identical to the two large single-tank
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calutrons (with 220 and 280 tons of magnet weight) previously built in the USSR
[18]. The summary of the elements processed shows that the first elements to
be isotopically separated were lithium and uranium, clearly indicating that the
applications were connected with the Chinese atomic weapons program. These
separators are still in use. A computer-aided inspection system was developed as
a first step in designing a computer control system to improve the quality of the
products and reduce operator supervision [33].
Since Soviet aid to China in the 1950s and 1960s included help in the con-
struction of a gaseous diffusion plant, the Chinese calutrons have not played a
direct role in the large-scale production of enriched uranium. Recently, the Chi-
nese know-how in calutron technology has become an element of concern for the
proliferation of nuclear weapons. Indeed, the agreement that China signed with
Iran in 1990 includes the shipment of several million dollars worth of calutron
equipment [34].
2.3.9 EMIS in India
A laboratory-scale 255o isotope separator, designed after the spectrometer orig-
inally built by Svartholm and Siegbahn [7], was completed in 1958 at the Saha
Institute of Nuclear Physics, Calcutta [35]. The construction of this EMIS de-
vice took place at the time of the construction of the research reactor supplied
by Canada. This reactor began operating in 1960 and was used to produce the
plutonium for the 1974 Indian nuclear explosion.
This separator was modified in the mid-1980s in order to be used for off-line
separation of short-lived isotopes produced using the variable-energy cyclotron of
the Bhabha Atomic Research Center [36].
2.3.10 EMIS in Israel
Israeli activities in the domain of EMIS were described at the EMIS-8 conference
of 1973 and further explained at the EMIS-9 conference which took place at Kiryat
Anavim, Israel, May 10-13, 1976. The two basic instruments developed in Israel
for this purpose, the SOLIS and MEIRA separators, are operating at the Soreq
Nuclear Research Center.
The Soreq on-line isotope separator (SOLIS) is connected to a fission source
placed at an external beam port of the Soreq Research Reactor. It is a research
instrument dedicated to the study of short lived isotopes produced in the fission of
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U-235 [37].
The separator MEIRA is a high output electromagnetic isotope separator whose
typical source oven charges are one hundred grams and beam currents are of the or-
der of 50 mA. “The aim of the MEIRA development was not to arrive at the highest
quality mass analysis, but to invest the minimum development, in both equipment
and modifications, in order to arrive reliably at the required analysis capability
[38].” This capability is typically the production of high purity tellurium-124, as
is required for the production of iodine-123 for radiopharmaceutical applications
[39]. The first objective of MEIRA however, has been the “systematic experi-
mental investigations (leading to) an understanding of the basic phenomena in the
separation process [39].” The depth of this understanding can be measured by the
fact that tellurium-124 at a purity in excess of 99% has been obtained in a single
pass with MEIRA [39]. Following this success, an automatic system, allowing for
unattended operation after the initial adjustment of the separation conditions, was
developed [40]. The nuclear proliferation significance of the MEIRA separator is
that it has the capability of efficient separation of plutonium isotopes, and shows
that Israel has mastered the technological challenge of building high productivity
calutrons for uranium enrichment or plutonium purification.
The key man behind the development of high current EMIS technology in
Israel is I. Chavet who received his PhD in France while working on the Orsay
separator built by R. Bernas [40]. The Orsay separator (i.e., a sector-type separator
derived from the one Bernas built in Saclay in 1953) is the model on which MEIRA
was built.
2.3.11 EMIS in Japan
Until the EMIS-11 conference in 1986, at which it was agreed that the following
EMIS conference would be held in Japan, there was little information published
on Japanese calutron activities in non-Japanese publications. The participation
in EMIS conferences by Japanese scientists was minimal. At EMIS-11, as an
introduction to a review paper on the on-line separator facilities in Japan, M.
Fujioka presented a brief history of off-line isotope separators in Japan [41]. As
early as 1941 an isotope separator was used for mass separation and identification
of a radioactive isotope, sodium-24. This study was made as a test experiment
for a larger research project concerning fission products. Construction of a larger
isotope separator of 180o deflection for such a purpose was started but interrupted
due to World War Two. At that time there were five existing cyclotrons in Japan.
They were seized by the Americans on November 20, 1945, and totally destroyed
[42]. According to a leading Japanese physicist, a student during the War, Japan’s
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atomic bomb effort focussed on enrichment. Two approaches were pursued, the
electromagnetic separation of uranium-235 and separation by a thermal diffusion
process [43]. The thermal process was abandoned before the end of the war and,
according to the Japanese physicist, “... if we spent 100 times more in research
effort, we could have developed the bomb in one year.”
The construction of off-line separators (mainly for stable isotopes) started again
ten years after the War. Two small separators were built in 1955. Then followed
the construction of four separators in succession. All four are of the Bernas or
Saclay type, and were built in 1956, 1958, 1959 and 1961. The last separator,
which is the only isotope separator constructed for off-line use that is still working
today, has been used up to the present mainly for implantation experiments using
stable as well as radioactive materials [41].
EMIS-12 was held at Sendai, Japan, 2-6 September 1991. Out of 149 regis-
tered attendees, 91 were from Japan and 58 were from elsewhere. There were
several contributions regarding on-line separation and related technical problems,
a subject on which Japanese scientists have developed considerable expertise [41].
There were also four contributions concerning off-line isotope separation dealing
with ion cyclotron resonance and plasma separation processes [44]. These later
contributions are an indication that, besides laser isotope separation, Japan might
be interested in new enrichment technologies which have the capability of separat-
ing in industrial quantities, all kinds of isotopes, including uranium or plutonium.
In effect, contrary to laser isotope separation, which may require different types of
lasers for different isotopes, the plasma separation process is much more flexible
because all parameters are continuously adjustable.
2.3.12 EMIS in other countries and at CERN
In the previous sections, EMIS activities have been reviewed in the five nuclear
weapon states and India, Israel and Japan. Similar activities, at one level or another,
for either scientific or industrial purposes, are under way in many industrialized
countries, especially in Europe. Since the previous coverage includes most of the
countries (except Germany) which have significant nuclear activities, they will not
be reviewed in detail.
A special case has to be made for CERN, the European nuclear research center
in Geneva, Switzerland. When CERN was created, in 1954, nuclear physicists and
accelerator specialists from all over Europe came to Geneva and played an essential
role in the highly successful development of the laboratory. These people were to
become staff members as machine designers or researchers, or to become users of
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the CERN facilities while remaining attached to their home university. Let us just
mention two people with direct previous experience in off-line and on-line isotope
separation. C.J. Zilverschoon, who’s PhD thesis (University of Amsterdam, 1954)
was on the construction of the “Amsterdam Separator,” originally designed as a
production machine and later used for more academic studies [23, p.119], was to
join the CERN staff and become a leading accelerator scientist. And O. Kofoed-
Hansen who, in 1950, with K.O. Nielsen, was to perform the first experiment to
make use of the beams of short-lived radioactive nuclei produced by an on-line
electromagnetic separator [45]. Kofoed-Hansen became a major advocate and user
of the worlds largest on-line separator, the Isotope Separator On-Line (ISOLDE),
built at CERN in 1967 [46].
While CERN’s mission was clearly defined in 1952 as a laboratory for funda-
mental research in high energy nuclear physics, using the various large accelerators
to be built in Geneva, it was also to become a centre of excellence in many special-
ized technologies with considerable industrial or military potential [47]. That this
was clear from the beginning is indicated by the explicit mentioning of “isotope
separation and beryllium engineering,” as examples of specialized technologies
in which CERN had to collaborate with external institutions [48]. As a result, in
time, CERN became a world leading institution, not just in pure science, but also in
many advanced technologies of importance to various nuclear activities including
electromagnetic separation of isotopes, together with a tradition of openness and
international collaboration which was to make it an ideal place to acquire detailed
information on such technologies.
2.4 Iraq’s calutron program
2.4.1 Spring 1979 at CERN
In 1979 Andre Gsponer was at CERN working on an experiment, NA10, designed
to measure, with good statistics and good mass resolution, the production of
high-mass muon pairs by pions. The apparatus (Fig. 2.4) consisted of a beam
dump followed by a high-resolution spectrometer whose central piece was a large
toroidal magnet (for a detailed description of the apparatus see reference [49]). In
the experiment, Gsponer was responsible for the data acquisition system, while
Klaus Freudenreich was the physicist in charge of the magnet. In Spring of
1979, Freudenreich informed Gsponer that he had recently been visited by an
Iraqi engineer wanting to know everything about the magnet, including all sorts
of construction details. As a justification for his interest, he claimed that he was
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motivated by the possibility of using such a magnet for storing electromagnetic
energy. But, for such an application, a superconducting magnet would have been
necessary, and the NA10 magnet was a conventional one. This contradiction
prompted the discussion between Freudenreich and Gsponer.
While the NA10 magnet was non-superconducting, it was a very special one,
and unique in the world at least because of its size. In particular, it had the property
of maximizing the amount of magnetized air (through which high energy particles
can pass with minimum disturbance), while minimizing the amount of steel. Since
the magnet had an axial symmetry, its construction had required the resolution of
a number of difficult engineering problems. It was well known to all physicists of
the NA10 collaboration that Mario Morpurgo, the designer of the NA10 magnet
and one of the world’s greatest specialists of magnet technology, considered the
NA10 magnet as one of his masterpieces.
Gsponer knew that during World War Two, in the Oak Ridge Y-12 plant,
there were hundreds of calutrons working in parallel. Each of them consisted of
an evacuated separation tank placed in a magnetic field. In Y-12, the magnets
providing the field and the calutron tanks were assembled into ovals comprising
96 calutrons: this had the advantage of forming a closed magnetic loop and of
minimizing magnetic losses and steel consumption. If this optimization process
is pushed to its limit, the result is a configuration which looks like a cut through
an orange, with one slice made out of steel, and the next one empty to contain a
calutron tank. This is exactly what the NA10 magnet looked like (see lower part
of Fig. 2.4), with room for six calutron tanks and a clever design calculated to use
as little steel as possible.
The conclusion was that the Iraqi engineer was most probably interested in a
magnet for electromagnetic isotope separation. Due to the nature of the technical
questions asked by the engineer, it was quite possible that Iraq, at the time, was
already comparing the engineering problems of various options for the construction
of an industrial scale EMIS plant. According to Freudenreich however, its seems
that the Iraqi engineer did not get access to the engineering drawings, nor to the
specific processes developed by CERN for the construction of the NA10 magnet.
2.4.2 Jafar Dhia Jafar and the origin of Iraq’s calutron pro-
gram
When the Iraqi engineer came to CERN to gather technical information on the
NA10 magnet, he introduced himself to Freudenreich as having been sent by Jafar
Dhia Jafar, an Iraqi physicist who had worked with Freudenreich at CERN in the
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Figure 2.4: Spectrometer of experiment NA10. The outer diameter of the magnet
is 410 cm.
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1970s. Jafar who was to become the head of Iraq’s atomic bomb program, was
trained as a high energy physicist at the University of Birmingham and at Imperial
College, London. Between 1967 and 1976 he published 12 papers on various
high energy physics experiments, first at the Birmingham synchrotron and later at
CERN. The results of the experiment on which Jafar had worked with Freudenreich
were published in 1975, at which time Jafar was back in Iraq and working at the
Nuclear Research Institute, Baghdad [50]. (The connections between Jafar and
Freudenreich, and later those between Freudenreich and Gsponer, are illustrated
in Figs. 2.5 and 2.6, in which the front pages of references [49] and [50] are
reproduced.)
The return of Jafar to Baghdad in 1975 coincided with the start of a government
drive to recruit nuclear scientists [51]. By 1979, Jafar became Vice Chairman of
the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission and was responsible for dealing with the
French on Osirak, the French nuclear reactor under construction in Iraq. On April
7, 1979, two days before a pair of reactor cores were to be shipped to Iraq, seven
Israeli agents broke into a warehouse in the port of La Seyne-sur-Mer, near Toulon,
and blew them up. On June 13, 1980, an Egyptian chemist hired by Iraq to work on
spent fuel reprocessing was killed in Saclay were he had been sent for training. On
August 7, 1980, the office of the Italian firm that supplied plutonium reprocessing
technology to the Iraqis, was bombed. Finally, on June 7, 1981, Israeli aircrafts
dropped several bombs on Osirak, scoring enough hits to permanently knock out
the reactor.
The destruction of Osirak is certainly the first deliberate act of “counter-
proliferation,” and the event that must have given priority to uranium enrichment
over plutonium production in Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. The assertion put
forward by most analysts, i.e., that Iraq’s calutron effort started after the bombing
of Osiraq, is not plausible. In common with all other nations with nuclear weapon
ambitions, all possible options for either producing plutonium or enriching uranium
must have been studied right from the beginning. As has already been stressed,
the production of plutonium with a small reactor was certainly the easiest route.
But, in the case of Iraq, the visit of an Iraqi engineer to CERN in 1979 indicates
that a significant amount of theoretical work on calutrons had already taken place.
Not only because the engineer was inquiring about the construction details of
a large magnet, but also because a clear understanding of the special properties
of this unique magnet was shown. In addition, the mere knowledge that such a
magnet had been built at CERN, could only have been obtained after a thorough
investigation of both calutron theory and the state of the art of magnet construction.
In this context, the fact that Jafar personally knew the man in charge of the NA10
magnet, Freudenreich, appears as a pure coincidence, a favorable circumstance
which he tried to exploit, and not as the starting point of some new investigation.
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Figure 2.5: Front page of reference [49].
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Figure 2.6: Front page of reference [50].
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Of course, since nothing is known by us about the connections between Jafar
and Iraq’s secret nuclear weapons program while he was in Europe, it is not possible
to know what role Jafar played in the early days of Iraq’s nuclear program. In
particular, we do not know if Jafar had anything to do with this program when,
after graduation at Birmingham and before joining Imperial College, he spent some
time in 1968-1969 at the Nuclear Research Center, Baghdad [52]. Later, when
Jafar worked with Freudenreich at CERN, it was well known in the experimental
team that Jafar had been an officer in the Iraqi army, and jokes were made because
another member of the team was a reserve officer in the Israeli army. Nothing
can be inferrerd by this, military service being an obligation in both countries.
It is interesting however, to point out the irony of this collaboration. Neither
do we have confirmation of the possibility that Jafar had a look at the British
calutrons while working at Harwell, or at the near-by Rutherford Laboratory, as
it is suggested by Burrows and Windrem [51, p.36]. What is clear, is that when
Jafar returned to Baghdad in 1975, because of his background as a high energy
physicist, it must have been more natural for him to work on calutrons than on the
other parts of the program. Later, after the bombing of Osirak, when enrichment
became the preferred option, Jafar was in a leading position at the Iraq Atomic
Energy Commission. It must not have been too difficult for him to push the
calutron method: compared to the centrifuge technique it required much less
foreign expertise and it was likely that he had a well studied design ready to be
tested in a pilot plant.
In order to understand Iraq’s calutron design, and to appreciate the significance
of Jafar’s interest in the NA10 magnet, it is important to examine first its potential
as an analysing magnet for a calutron.
2.4.3 The NA10 magnet as a calutron magnet
In 1977, a group of Swiss Federal Institute of Technology physicists (including
Freudenreich and Gsponer) proposed an experiment at CERN to study the inclusive
production of massive muon pairs with intense pion beams. They suggested in
their letter of intent [53] the use of an axially symmetric spectrometer consisting of
four magnetized iron toroids, with various detectors placed in between. Once the
experiment was accepted, it was found during the preparation stage, that a much
better technique than magnetized iron could be used for the magnetic analysis.
The idea came from Mario Morpurgo, one of the original builders of CERN, who
came to Geneva after his studies in Rome and immediately applied his intelligence
to the design and construction of conventional magnets [54].
Morpurgo’s idea was to build a large scale version of the six gap “orange”
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Figure 2.7: Section through the Risø spectrometer. The outer diameter of the
magnet is 50 cm.
spectrometer built in 1955 at Risø, Denmark, by O.B. Nielsen and O. Kofoed-
Hansen [55]: while the Risø magnet had a 0.25 meter radius and a length of about
0.5 meter, the NA10 magnet was to have a 2 meter outer radius and a 4.8 meter
over-all length. A section through the Risø spectrometer can be seen in Fig. 2.7
and a similar section through the NA10 magnet can be seen in Fig. 2.4. For the
experimenters, the advantage of this magnet over the use of magnetized iron is
that the magnetic analysis could be done by measuring the deflection of particles
travelling through air instead of steel, thus with a subtantially better resolution.
And for Morpurgo, the construction of such a magnet was a challenge, a special
design which implied the use of several unusual techniques.
Like the Risø magnet, the NA10 magnet has hexagonal symmetry [49]. An
essentially azimuthal field B = B(r) is excited between six laminated, wedge-
shaped, iron pole pieces, each subtending 18o in azimuth. The air-core part of the
magnet, consisting of sectors between the iron wedges, thus subtends 70% of the
azimuthal acceptance. Over almost the entire air-core volume, the field has a 1/r
dependence with a high degree of precision. The 1/r-dependence of the field is
useful for the magnetic analysis of particles of both low or high energy. That such
a field, instead of a uniform field, could be used for an improved 180o separator
was first recognized by H.O.W. Richardson [56]. He also found that under suitable
conditions both lateral and longitudinal focusing could occur. The idea was then
further developed by O. Kofoed-Hansen, J. Lindhard and O.B. Nielsen, who in
particular discussed the case where both source and focus are placed outside the
magnetic field [57]. Finally, a magnet producing a field with a 1/r dependence
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is used in the S-2 separator at Arzamas-16, thus confirming that high productivity
EMIS is possible with such a field [21].
The various methods proposed between 1940 and 1955 to increase the perfor-
mance of magnetic spectrometers and electromagnetic separators, and the relative
importance of the ideas developed by physicists of different countries with differ-
ent kind of applications in mind, could be the subject of a study by an historian of
sciences. Even a superficial survey of the literature however, would easily point
to some of the most important contributions. For example, the general analysis of
the double focusing problem by Svartholm and Siegbahn (which led to the 255o
method), or the ingenuity of the sector-type separators built by Rene´ Bernas. In
this context, the six gap “orange” spectrometer of Kofoed-Hansen, constructed at
the famous Niels Bohr Institute, was also a clever and rather well known device.
It is therefore not surprizing that Jafar must have taken considerable interest in
investigating the possibility of using this concept for the separation of the uranium
isotopes. In that case, the calutron tanks would have been placed in the air-cored
segments, and the optimum size of the magnet would have been of precisely the
same magnitude than that of the NA10 magnet.
In practice, the construction of a NA10-like magnet is not a trivial thing. In
particular, the windings have to be assembled into coils converging radially to the
axis of the magnet. The problem is then one of assembly because the coils cannot
simply be wound and later fitted together with the iron pieces: the coils have to be
made by wrapping the windings around the steel once the full magnet carcass has
been assembled. The solution was to make the coils by using a sophisticated high
frequency welding technique to join copper bars. This implied the resolution of a
number of ancillary problems, such as the electrical insulation of the coils, etc.
In conclusion, even though a multitank calutron concept based on the NA10
magnet is attractive in theory, it leads to a number of engineering problems which
would certainly have been considerable for Iraq. In fact, Jafar ultimately settled
on another design, based on the 255o concept, which in one respect has some
similarity with the original NA10 proposal, i.e., the use of magnetized cylinders of
steel [53]. Such magnets are much easier to build and were in fact used in another
CERN experiment, NA4.
2.4.4 Iraq’s calutron design
Because of the rather limited amount of reliable technical information published
until now, it is still not possible to give a truly accurate technical description
of the Iraqi attempt to produce highly enriched uranium by means of calutrons,
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and to make a well documented independent assessment of this effort. The only
non-classified first hand information on the subject are the reports to the UN
Security Council on the fifteen IAEA on-site inspections under Security Council
resolution 687 (1991) of Iraqi nuclear capabilities, carried out between May 1991
and November 1992. A number of photographs and articles by members of the
UN inspection teams have also been released by the IAEA over the same period
of time. In this section, using at best these documents, we will try to describe the
scientific principles of the specific calutron design developed by Iraq. To keep
our discussion at the level of the scientific principles, and due to the fragmentary
nature of the available information, we will not address the many technical details
that would be discussed in a comprehensive assessment.
The central piece in any electromagnetic isotope separation system is the
magnet which provides the mass analysing field. It is therefore fortunate that
precise information is available on the magnet used by Iraq. Engineering drawings
of the steel part of this magnet have been published [58, 59] and several good
photographs are available [59, 60].
The distinctive feature of Iraq’s calutron design is the use in an industrial-scale
separation facility, of an axially symmetric magnetic field with the right kind of
non-uniformity to produce double-focusing of the ion beam [7]. Such a field had
been used for example, in the calutron built by Artsimovitch et al. in 1958 [20],
and was recognized by the French in 1965 to “offer considerable advantage as
regards better focusing and increase of the transmission yield, allowing separation
of more intense beams with a good enhancement factor and yield” [26, 27].
In order to have a multi-calutron configuration in which the separation tanks
are placed in between adjacent magnets to utilize the magnetic field more econom-
ically, a special modular design is necessary. In Iraq’s case, the basis of this design
is a rotational symmetric dipole magnet shaped as a truncated flat double cone
with a slope of about 8o (Figs. 2.8 and 2.9). For the first enrichment stage (i.e., the
alpha-process) the outer radius of the magnet is about 220 cm and the maximum
thickness about 70 cm. For the second enrichment stage (i.e., the beta-process) no
drawings are available. It is known however, that the magnet was similar in shape
but half the size.
The general arrangement of the magnets and interleaving separation cham-
bers is known from the first three IAEA inspections [61, 62] and an Iraqi letter
commenting on the third IAEA inspection [63]. Iraq’s first industrial-scale EMIS
facility was constructed in Tarmiya, 40 kilometers northwest of Baghdad. A sec-
ond facility was planned at al Sharqat, 200 kilometers northwest of Baghdad. The
two plants were to be identical with a total of 70 alpha-calutrons and 20 beta-
calutrons in each. The 70 alpha separators were to be installed in two large (5 m
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Figure 2.8: Cross section of Iraq’s calutron magnet cores: Pre-machined iron
core for the 120 cm beam radius magnets.
Figure 2.9: Cross section of Iraq’s calutron magnet cores: Final dimensions of
120 cm beam radius magnet cores.
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by 60 m) parallel piers [61, p.11] with 35 separators in each line. This gives an
average space of 170 cm per separator. Removing 70 cm for the magnet width, a
space of about 100 cm is left for the vacuum chamber. At the end of each line,
a half magnet provides an end-pole. Interconnecting the end-poles of both lines
with iron plates, the magnetic flux can be closed and the resulting configuration
is similar to the “race-tracks” built in Oak Ridge during World War Two. A
schematic of this arrangement is shown in Fig. 2.10. The same basic principles
were to be used in the beta separators, with everything scaled down by a factor of
two. While the alpha ion-beam mean radius was 120 cm, the beta ion-beam mean
radius was 60 cm.
From the shape of the dipole magnet, Fig. 2.9, and the configuration depicted
in Fig. 2.10, it is possible to discuss the main properties of the mass analysing field
system used in Iraq’s calutrons. Good focusing requires very accurate fabrication
of the pole-pieces in order to obtain exactly the required field form. In Iraq’s
case, the problem of fabricating a number of large magnets with complicated non-
linear pole faces has been avoided by using dipole magnets with simple conical
pole-pieces. A sufficiently precise knowledge of the field form can then be gained
from the simplified second order analysis of Snyder et al. [64, p.854]. In this
approximation, the field in the midplane between two pole faces is described by a
field-index n which is a function of the slope of the pole-pieces, the beam radius
and the spacing between the two pole faces. In particular, n = 0 for a uniform
field, and n = 1/2 for the Svartholm-Siegbahn field of the 255o method. With
Iraq’s calutron magnet and the configuration of Fig. 2.10 in which there is room
for a 90 cm separation chamber, the field index is about n = 1/4. Iraq’s choice
for the alpha-separator field form is therefore a compromise between those for the
180o and 255o methods.
The compromise is a trade-off between productivity and quality. The larger
the space between the magnets, the more room there is for the ion-beams in the
separation chambers. For a given number of magnets, this increases the output,
but at the expense of the enrichment of the product.
On one hand, if the greatest possible enrichment is desired, the field form
required is that of the 255o method, which is obtained when the minimum spacing
between the magnets is only 30 cm. This leaves just enough room for a 30 to 60
cm wide vacuum chamber. In such a chamber, it is difficult to use more than one
or two beams. In effect, to generate an intense beam, the ion current is usually
extracted from the source through a narrow slit, about 10 to 40 cm long. The
source assembly is thus at least 20 to 50 cm wide, not much less than the width of
the separation chamber itself. To have more than one beam, the ion-sources must
be put below one another. This possibility, investigated by the French in the 1960s,
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Figure 2.10: Schematic of Iraq’s alpha calutron track. Only two adjacent magnets
and only one separation chamber are shown.
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Figure 2.11: Photograph of Iraqi alpha calutron chamber on its side.
is in practice limited to two concentric beams with two different radii [26]. The
reason is that when beams from several independent sources overlap the system
becomes unstable and the failure of one beam can cause all the beams to fail.
On the other hand, if a lower enrichment is acceptable an increase in pro-
ductivity is possible by widening the space between the magnets. This allows
the use of wider sources (i.e., with a longer extraction slit) or the use of several
ion-sources positioned side by side. For example, with a spacing of 100 cm, there
will be room for two or three double-sources, i.e., as many as six ion-sources in
one 90 cm thick vacuum chamber. With this spacing the field index takes a lower
value (1/4 instead of 1/2) and the benefits of the non-uniform field become less
significant resulting in lower enrichment of the output. According to the theory
[7], the optimum focusing angle also decreases from 255o down to about 210o.
The widening of the gap between the magnets would in principle require a redesign
of the vacuum chambers. Such a modification was eventually not necessary to
achieve a sufficiently enriched product in the first-stage separation units. That this
interpretation is plausible is supported by the photographs shown in Figs. 2.11 and
2.12.
In Fig. 2.11, an alpha calutron chamber is seen on its side. Assuming a diameter
of 440 cm its thickness is about 90 cm. The upper side is on the left, with two
protrusions on each side of a hook. The bottom side is on the right with two
ports that may have been connected to the vacuum pumps. The angle between
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Figure 2.12: Photograph of crushed Iraqi beta calutron chamber.
the two upper protrusions is close to 255o, and each of them has three axially
directed rectangular channels that may have contained one double ion-source or
one ion-collector assembly. That Iraq’s calutron could have had two to six sources
has been reported in at least one publication [65, p.18].
In Fig. 2.12, a beta calutron chamber can be seen. Assuming a diameter of
200 cm, its thickness is about 30 cm. Nothing definite can be said concerning the
focusing angle, but it is most likely that the beta calutrons used the 255o method
to achieve the higher separation power required by the second enrichment stage.
In conclusion, having used the engineering drawings of the magnet and the
published photographs as the main input, our analysis is summarized as follows.
The basis of Iraq’s design is not the 180o method used during World War Two
but the 255o method. For that purpose, a dipole magnet with a 8o conical shape
was built for the first enrichment stage. Using a 30 cm vacuum chamber, the 60
m long process bay of the Tarmiya plant could have accommodated a maximum
of 120 magnets and 120 concentric double-beam separation units operating in the
255o mode. Since the first-stage enrichment did not require the full separation
power of the 255o method, it must have been decided to put only 70 magnets in
the process bay. The advantage is that substantially fewer magnets are required,
freeing enough room for 70×3 = 210 double-beam units, and therefore increasing
throughput by a factor of 210/120 . This conclusion is independent of the specific
assumptions made here, i.e., the use of double ion-sources with non-overlapping
beams [26]. It is not impossible that Iraq’s calutrons had multiple-beam ion-
sources in which several extraction slits, with lengths of the order of 90 cm, were
placed just below on another to produce two or more overlapping beams of similar
radii.
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As previously explained, a comprehensive assessment capable of answering
whether or not the Iraqi effort was close to producing enriched uranium in signifi-
cant amounts, would have required the detailed analysis of many other important
aspects such as Iraq’s ion-source technology. According to the IAEA inspection
reports [62, p.6], and consistent with experience elsewhere in the world, Iraq found
that the only real obstacle in the development of an efficient EMIS system is the
design of a good ion-source. This is probably why the alpha calutrons under
installation when the Gulf War began, had only four 150 mA ion-sources in each
separation tank. Assuming an availability of 55%, a straight-forward calculation
shows that the maximum theoretical production of Tarmiya would have been about
14 kilograms of U-235 per year, in the form of 12 and 90% enriched uranium, for
the first and second enrichment stage respectively [63].
2.4.5 The difficulties of publishing
In 1980, two years after receiving a PhD in physics, Gsponer left elementary
particle physics and stopped working at CERN. His aim was to establish a sci-
entific research institute in which himself and other researchers could apply their
professional skills to the analysis of important disarmament problems. Together
with Roy Preiswerk, then Director of the Institute of Development Studies of the
University of Geneva, GIPRI, the Geneva International Peace Research Institute,
was created. An association whose most active members were physicists and
social scientists, primarily from CERN and the University of Geneva, and several
prominent local political figures.
GIPRI’s initial research program concentrated on the military applications
of particle accelerators. The idea was to include the military impact of par-
ticle accelerator technology, of which calutrons are an example, in the arms-
control/disarmament debate and to provoke a discussion in the scientific commu-
nity on the subject.
The third review conference of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) was to be
held in Geneva in August 1980. This presented a good opportunity to publish
a paper and so the first GIPRI report was written for the occasion. The title
was “Particle accelerators and fusion technologies: implications on horizontal
and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.” The draft of this paper [1] had
five chapters, the first one on enrichment. This chapter, after reviewing various
methods, concluded with the following paragraph on EMIS:
“Finally, the oldest enrichment method (which has the capability to
achieve an almost complete separation of U-235 in a single step), i.e.,
44 Report
electromagnetic isotope separation, may become interesting in spe-
cial circumstances thanks to technological advances. In effect, while
this method is relatively expensive and economically unattractive, it
uses only well known classical technologies. These technologies (ion
sources, vacuum, large magnets) are routinely used in nuclear physics
and are certainly within reach of many countries. The construction
of an enrichment plant based on this method (of the kind the United
States built during World War Two) could however, hardly be justified
for civilian purposes and would be very difficult to conceal. Never-
theless, the appeal of this enrichment method is illustrated by the fact
that Iraq recently showed strong interest in the technology of large
magnets” [1, p.3].
The other chapters dealt with the following subjects; accelerators for fissile
material production, application of accelerators to nuclear weapons technology,
thermonuclear fusion and hybrid reactors, applications of inertial confinement
fusion to nuclear weapons technology and finally, implications of emerging nuclear
technologies for developing countries.
Obviously, at a time when the debate on the risk of nuclear weapons prolifer-
ation was centered on problems arising from nuclear power generation by means
of fission reactors, an article with such a vast content was extremely ambitious.
Despite efforts to keep the content as simple as possible, the average reader would
have had some difficulty understanding the numerous technical concepts involved.
In addition, Gsponer was a totally unknown young physicist and did not have
the authority necessary to present new ideas to the rather closed and conservative
arms-control/disarmament community. This lack of authority was particularly
detrimental because the paper stressed a number of conclusions Gsponer was able
to draw using scientific deduction alone. It also included a statement on Iraq’s
interest in EMIS technology for which there was no reference because Gsponer
had accidentally discovered the fact himself.
Consequently, having given the draft for comment to several scientists and
researchers in the field of disarmament, Gsponer decided to shorten the paper. The
first and last chapters dealing with enrichment and the implications for developing
countries were removed. The paper was simplified by narrowing its focus on the
nuclear proliferation aspects of accelerator and fusion technologies, and avoiding
the danger in publishing something new and crucial on Iraq’s nuclear ambitions.
The years 1979-1981 were marked by a number of violent incidents in which
Israeli secret services and armed forces attempted to halt Iraq’s efforts to acquire
nuclear reactor and reprocessing technology. It was a serious concern therefore,
that mentioning Iraq’s definite interest in calutron technology could endanger
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Gsponer and former CERN colleagues.
The abridged paper was finalized with the help of Bhupendra Jasani, a physicist
working at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. It was sent to the
heads of delegations of the 1980 NPT review conference [2]. Later it was submitted
to Science, Technology Review and The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. All three
journals rejected the paper. Once translated and printed in German and Italian
Gsponer did not continue to try to find an English publisher.
In the Spring of 1981, soon after Ruth Adams was elected Editor of The Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists, she made a tour of Europe visiting several disarmament
research institutes to encourage European researchers to submit articles to the
Bulletin. The idea was to open the journal to broader perpectives than the American
ones which had dominated the journal since its foundation in 1945. In Geneva,
Adams visited GIPRI where Gsponer told her about his research on the military
use of particle accelerators. Interested by the subject, she invited him to submit a
short paper on a recent public debate in which the particle accelerator issue was
raised in the context of the construction of LEP, a very large particle accelerator
to be built at CERN. The result of the peer review was negative. On the advice
of Frank Barnaby, Director of SIPRI in Stockholm and an Editorial advisor of
the Bulletin, Gsponer submitted a new version of the paper in February 1982. In
March, he received copies of the proofs of the paper scheduled as a commentary
for the May 1982 issue of the Bulletin. Notwithstanding this approval and that he
had corrected and returned the proofs, his commentary was never printed. Despite
several attempts, there was never any answer from the Bulletin to any of his letters
enquiring as to why the commentary had not been printed.
Had Gsponer’s commentary been censured? Had his paper addressed sensitive
issues which were not supposed to be discussed in non-classified literature? The
only paragraph that could have justified such an action is as follows:
“Elementary particle physics, at the forefront of fundamental research,
is mainly carried out through the use of increasingly powerful and
larger high energy accelerators and storage rings. For applications
of accelerators requiring lower energies but very high currents, the
advances are equally impressive. These developments are leading to-
wards numerous new applications, especially in the fields of nuclear
energy and weaponry. Particle accelerators are becoming usable for
efficient breeding of fission and fusion materials, for driving inertial
confinement fusion devices, for studying the physics of thermonu-
clear weapons, and so on. The concept of high energy particle beam
weapons may become feasible and free-electron lasers using elec-
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tron accelerators and storage ring technologies may provide a new
generation of highly efficient and powerful lasers with many military
applications” [66].
Of course, it is not possible to know if the commentary was censured for
classification reasons or not. The only thing that can be said for sure, is that this
kind of problem is a recurring one in the United States [67, 68].
Another less dramatic explanation for the censorship of Gsponer’s commentary
is that nuclear physicists working in non-military laboratories, and especially those
using particle accelerators, are extremely nervous when it comes to the question
of the military impact of their work. The origin of this irascible response can
be found in the passionate desire of many atomic scientists to believe that their
work has many more positive consequences, such as nuclear energy or a better
understanding of the fundamental laws of nature, than terrifying consequences
such as nuclear weapons.
In 1982 Gsponer left GIPRI to create ISRI, the Independent Scientific Research
Institute. It was a much less ambitious enterprise than GIPRI, concentrating on
the independent assessment of nuclear technologies. For instance, in a paper
presented at the Third International Conference on Emerging Nuclear Energy Sys-
tems, Gsponer and others stressed again the nuclear proliferation impact of new
technologies [3]. In particular, in a section on enrichment, (with the electromag-
netic, plasma and laser separation processes in mind) they warned that
“new technologies could completely change the situation prevailing
since 1945, namely, the fact that enrichment facilities are in general
much larger, more complicated and expensive than simple production
reactors” [3, p.172].
Similar concerns about the impact of particle accelerator technology on en-
richment were repeatedly expressed in La Quadrature du CERN, a book Gsponer
had written with others for CERN’s thirtieth anniversary [47, p.20], [60, 70–73].
In 1990 Gsponer was in Mauritius. Like most, he followed the Gulf War
events on the radio and television. He resumed his work on theoretical physics
once military action was over.
Gsponer had heard the alarming statements that Iraq might have been working
on an atomic bomb. But at no point did he think that they could have made much
progress otherwise it would have been known for a long time. It came as a terrible
shock to him to learn about Iraq’s use of calutrons from a New Scientist article
published in July 1991 [69].
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More than 12 years had passed since Gsponer had discovered Iraq’s interest in
calutrons. An event that he was trying to forget. As with his evaluation of particle
beam weapons research [70, 71], he thought more and more that his appreciation
of this discovery was possibly exaggerated, and that he had been wrong to quit his
work as a particle physicist. After all the negative comments about his work on the
military implications of particle accelerator technology, and the personal attacks
he had endured from former friends and colleagues, a tragic event — the largest
military coalition since World War Two — finally confirmed that his worries were
well founded.
The time had finally come to make public how Gsponer had discovered in 1979,
Iraq’s work on EMIS technology. For obvious reasons, in all his publications, he
had never explicitly mentioned Iraq. After the Gulf War however, there was no
reason for further caution. Since he was still in Mauritius, he had first to return to
Geneva to meet former CERN colleagues, and then to wait for a good opportunity.
In 1995, Gsponer thought that the fifth review conference of the NPT would be
an appropriate time to put straight the historical record on Iraq’s calutron program.
Having investigated the possibility of publishing a report on calutron technology
to be sold or used as the basis of a book, he went to New York to inquire whether
the New York Times, with the help of some personal contacts in the science section,
would be interested in the story. These attempts were unsuccessful. Meanwhile,
a Geneva based science journalist picked up the story and wrote an article for
the Journal de Gene`ve, a daily newspaper with a good international audience.
After double-checking the facts, and interviewing Freudenreich to clarify the
circumstances of the 1979 visit to CERN by an Iraqi engineer, the article was
published as the main news story of the 22-23 April weekend edition of the journal
[72], one week after the NPT review conference in New York had started.
Except for some emotional reactions from the CERN staff and management,
the impact of the Journal de Gene`ve article was minimal, especially on the NPT
negotiations in New York. Its main merit was therefore to publish an important
historical fact, and to highlight the blindness of the scientific community with
regard to the military implications of its activities.
Fifteen years after Gsponer’s report for the 1980 NPT review conference
was written, the nuclear weapon states are coming close to an agreement on
a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). While this treaty would forbid all
nuclear tests, either above or under ground, the nuclear weapon states, the US
and France leading the way, are starting to build very large inertial confinement
fusion facilities [73]. These facilities enable the detailed study of the ignition
process of thermonuclear explosions. The irony is that the aim of Gsponer’s
papers of 1980-83 [1, 2, 3], was precisely to show that such a treaty would be
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meaningless if accelerator and fusion technologies were systematically applied to
the development of new nuclear weapons. With these technologies it is indeed
possible to conceive and test new weapons in the laboratory without large scale
explosions.
2.5 Implications for the proliferation of nuclear weapons
2.5.1 Beam technologies and nuclear weapon proliferation
Enrichment of fissile materials by means of calutrons is a classical example of
the use of particle beam technology in the nuclear fuel cycle. Another example
is breeding of special nuclear materials by means of particle accelerators. The
current interest in these technologies is due to the fact that beam technologies are
becoming increasingly competitive substitutes for traditional nuclear technologies.
Laser and particle beam technologies are also key components of emerging nuclear
energy systems such as fusion, and of increasing importance for the qualitative
development of nuclear weapons.
In the early eighties when Gsponer and his GIPRI/ISRI collaborators were
stressing the nuclear proliferation risk of “old” technologies such as EMIS, their
opinion was at odds with the generally accepted one. For instance, in an excellent
review on uranium enrichment and nuclear weapon proliferation [5], despite the
recognition that electromagnetic processes were “again under serious considera-
tion” [5, p.186] the general conclusion was to consider the calutron as “no longer
a viable process” for the production of enriched uranium [5, p.22]. Today, after
Iraq’s construction of a large EMIS plant, the question is not so much which assess-
ment was right or wrong, but why Iraq’s enormous effort remained “undetected”
until the end of the Gulf War. This is particularly disturbing because all analysis
have concluded that the construction of an industrial-scale EMIS plant would be
very difficult to conceal, and because Iraq’s motivation of using the EMIS process
was precisely the same as the motivation of the United States during World War
Two, to produce fissile material for a nuclear weapon by all means and at any cost.
In this context, it should be stressed that besides EMIS, other proliferation-
prone “old” technologies should be given serious consideration [1, 2, 3]. Of these
technologies, the most important one is certainly that of particle accelerators.
In fact, from 1941 (when plutonium was first produced) until the end of 1943,
circular accelerators were the sole source of plutonium, and over this period
slightly more than 2 milligrams of plutonium were produced [2]. It has been
calculated that a 1000 MeV proton accelerator with a beam of 1 mA (i.e., a beam
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power of 1 MW) could produce enough spallation neutrons to breed about 10 kg of
plutonium per year, enough for two to four atomic bombs [3]. The construction of
such an accelerator, and of the associated reprocessing plant, is certainly possible
for many countries, including some in the developing world. Compared with a
calutron plant of similar fissile material output, the cost would be considerably
less. A major obstacle to the acquisition of such a technology is that, contrary
to nuclear reactors, complete accelerators with the requisite characteristics cannot
be bought on the market. Similarly with what Iraq had to do in the case of its
calutron plant, an accelerator-breeder would have to be built by assembling it from
its components, something that requires a considerable indigenous research and
development effort. In practice, the main difference would come from the fact
that particle accelerator technology is in several respects more sophisticated than
calutron or even centrifuge technology. With the current proliferation of advanced
scientific, industrial and military technology, this kind of barrier is likely to become
less and less effective in the future.
Of special concern is the fact that particle accelerators have recently established
themselves as very serious candidates for replacing aging nuclear reactors in many
kinds of military and/or civilian applications. For a given total thermal power, a
major technical advantage of spallation based systems is that productivity (i.e the
number of neutrons or the amount of plutonium or tritium produced) is roughly
five times greater than the productivity of fission based systems [2]. As a result, the
problems of radioactivity, containment and cooling will be proportionally smaller
by about the same factor.
In the field of neutron physics research, the current problem in Europe [74] as
well as in the USA [75], is the replacement or upgrading of aging reactor or accel-
erator facilities. In Europe, there is a proposal to replace an old German research
reactor fueled by highly-enriched uranium with a spallation neutron source (based
on a 5 MW beam-power accelerator) rather than replacing it by a new research
reactor of the same type [75]. Such a switch from a reactor to a different type
of neutron source has a positive non-proliferation impact, mainly by suppressing
the risk of diversion or theft of highly-enriched uranium. The negative impact is
that it will contribute to the spread and development of accelerator-based neutron
generation technology.
The most significant development however, is the US proposal to replace its
military production reactors with accelerator-based facilities [76]. The possibility
that the US will build a giant tritium-producing accelerator (with a 100 MW beam
power), dubbed the APT, Accelerator Production of Tritium, is quite high, since it
could simultaneously satisfy the needs of both military and scientific communities.
In the words of Burton Richter, the Director of the Stanford Linerar Accelerator
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Center: “With small modification to the APT, the U.S. can have both the world’s
premier neutron source and a secure tritium supply” [76]. If the US goes ahead
with this proposal, the road will be open for other countries to follow. Of direct
concern would not only be the declared nuclear powers, but also countries like
India or Japan, which already have substantial knowledge and skills for building
accelerators and existing or projected spallation neutron sources [2, 3].
Another recent development is the proposal to use accelerators to incinerate
long lived radioactive waste [77]. Since the transmutation process is producing a
large number of spallation neutrons, the same technology could be used to breed
plutonium or tritium [77].
Finally, while the idea was not new, Carlo Rubbia, Nobel laureate and at the
time Director of CERN, unveiled in 1993 a “method to produce safe and clean
nuclear energy by aiming accelerated protons at a thorium target” [78]. The method
claimed to pose “no risk of military proliferation,” and to be “most advantageous
for developing countries.” Since then, experiments were performed at CERN
[79] and research is underway to investigate the possibility of using the system as
an incinerator of radioactive waste. While the method may have some potential
technical advantages, it must be stressed that its nuclear weapons proliferation
impact is far from negligible.
Since accelerator based power systems may lead to economically attractive de-
signs with an electric output of about one tenth of a normal nuclear power station,
the problem of safeguarding a large number of dispersed accelerator power plants
will be considerable. Similarly, in case of the clandestine use of accelerator tech-
nology to breed plutonium or tritium, the problem of detecting the illicit activity
will be magnified by the five fold reduction of heat and radioactive effluents. The
main proliferation problem however, is the fact that the construction of any kind
of accelerator system for commercial scale nuclear power generation, nuclear fuel
generation for civil or military use, transmutation, etc., will open another Pan-
dora’s box of problems that can only exacerbate the current nuclear proliferation
situation.
2.5.2 EMIS for plutonium purification
It is well known that the kind of plutonium bred in commercial power-generating
nuclear reactors is not suitable for the design of reliable nuclear weapons. The
nuclear weapons in the contemporary military arsenals are made of weapons-grade
plutonium, i.e., plutonium that is more than 95% pure in the isotope Pu-239. A
state determined to make nuclear weapons using reactor-grade plutonium (i.e.,
ISRI-95-03 51
containing between 10 to 30% of the unwanted Pu-240 isotope) would certainly
first try to purify it to convert it into weapons-grade plutonium. This would simplify
considerably the design of the weapon by enabling the use of less sophisticated
implosion technique to achieve criticality.
In theory, the isotopic separation of plutonium is a much less demanding
task than enrichment of uranium. For instance, as the initial Pu-239 content of
reactor-grade plutonium is over 70%, while the U-235 content of natural ura-
nium is only 0.7%, a plutonium enrichment plant will be about 100 times smaller
than an uranium enrichment plant of the same fissile material output. For exam-
ple, a straightforward calculation shows that using the electromagnetic separation
method, a single calutron with a beam current of less than 100 mA is sufficient to
produce 5 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium per year.
The technology of plutonium isotopic separation however, is no more covered
by secrecy than uranium enrichment technology. An important reason for this
is that nuclear reactor research, as well as nuclear weapons diagnostic [80], re-
quires plutonium isotope separation in order to measure Pu-240 relative to Pu-239
production because these isotopes have alpha-decay energies very close to one
another. In practice however, there are problems.
First, any method suitable for separating kilogram quantities of pure Pu-239
from reactor-grade plutonium has to be capable of operating with highly radioac-
tive feed material. For such an application, gaseous diffusion or ultracentrifugation
for example, are unsuitable because the whole apparatus (including key compo-
nents such as the porous barriers or the centrifuge rotors) would become highly
radioactive so that repair or maintenance becomes impossible. Isotopic separation
of radioactive materials requires that the process takes place in a containment ves-
sel which can be removed for decontamination or recovery of the feed material.
This is possible with the laser, plasma or electromagnetic separation methods in
which the ionized feed material is generally processed within a removable “liner”
enclosed in the vacuum chamber.
Second, the atomic weight difference between Pu-239 and Pu-240 is one, while
it is three between U-238 and U-235. Thus, the enrichment of plutonium requires
a three fold increase in separation power over enrichment of uranium. This means
a substantial increase in difficulty [10, p.348] so that a typical EMIS plutonium
separator will look much more like the 255o calutron of Artsimovitch [20] than a
World War Two 180o calutron.
A good idea of what a calutron for plutonium separation might look like is given
by the S-2 separator of Arzamas-16 [21]. The construction of a facility comprising
a number of such calutrons would in some respects be more complicated, and
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perhaps more costly than the chemical reprocessing plant, which would first of all
be required to extract the plutonium from irradiated power-reactor fuel elements.
A government having completed the first step would most probably go ahead
with the plutonium isotopic purification step, even though it has been proved that
by using the appropriate technique, a crude nuclear explosive could be made of
power-reactor plutonium [81].
A first country for which it can be seriously argued that plutonium enrichment is
a potential nuclear proliferation threat is Iran. Since 1990, Iran has been receiving
aid from China for the construction of a small calutron [34]. In 1995, Russia
agreed to build a nuclear power reactor on the site of a German reactor which was
left incomplete after the collapse of the Shah regime. In a decade or so therefore,
and in the case of a breakdown of international safeguards, Iran could have direct
access to indigenously bred reactor-grade plutonium, and the potential capacity to
turn it into weapons-grade plutonium.
A second country of concern is Japan. Considering the return to Japan in 1993,
of more than a ton of Japanese plutonium from a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant
in France, Japan’s inventory of separated reactor-grade plutonium could reach
several tens of tons by 2005-2010. In Japan, the main technical justification for
extracting plutonium from spent reactor fuel is its potential use in fast-breeder
reactors. There is, however, “the conspiracy theory that in the long term Tokyo
aims to develop the capacity to build nuclear bombs at short notice should the
international situation so demand” [82]. In such a case, with all its technological
might, Japan would certainly not satisfy itself with crude nuclear devices. It is
more likely to purify its reactor-grade plutonium in order to build a credible nuclear
arsenal. To do so, Japan would be able to chose from the full range of the most
sophisticated enrichment technologies, including the laser and plasma isotope
separation processes (see Sec. 2.3.11). Japan’s current interest in the development
of advanced enrichment technology, and in particular of the plasma separation
process (the modern method with the greatest potential in terms of universality
and productivity), is of great concern from the point of view of nuclear weapon
proliferation.
2.5.3 UN resolutions 687 and 707 and their implications for a
halt of all proliferation prone nuclear activities
In paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 687, adopted on 3 April 1991,
the IAEA was requested by the Security Council to carry out immediate on-site
inspection of Iraq’s nuclear capabilities and carry out a plan for the destruction,
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removal or rendering harmless of items prohibited to Iraq under paragraph 12 of
the resolution 687. On 15 August 1991 the Security Council adopted a further
resolution, number 707, obliging Iraq to “halt all nuclear activities of any kind,
except for the use of isotopes for medical, agricultural and industrial purposes
until the Security Council determines that Iraq is in full compliance with resolution
707 and with paragraphs 12 and 13 of resolution 687, and the IAEA determines
that Iraq is in full compliance with its safeguards agreement with that agency
(article 3.vi).”
The plan, and the annexes thereto, which constitute an integral part of the
plan, were adopted by the Security Council as document number S/22872/Rev.1.
This unprecedented document, drafted with Iraq’s specific case in mind, is in fact
the first legally binding document in which all activities prone to nuclear weapon
proliferation are clearly and comprehensively defined. It is the first time that in
an official document, the many ambiguous activities which broadly come under
the name of “peaceful nuclear activities,” as well as those which are generally
considered as non-military scientific research activities, are explicitly recognized
as important for the acquisition or development of nuclear weapons. Similarly, by
clearly defining those applications of nuclear physics and nuclear energy that are
useful for “medical, agricultural or industrial purposes,” this document also defines
which kind of “peaceful nuclear activities” are really benign from the point of view
of nuclear weapon proliferation. In practice, in obliging Iraq “not to acquire or
develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems
or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities
related to the above” (article 12 of resolution 687), the UN Security Council
developed and accepted a document unambiguously defining what in essence
is a nuclear free zone and created a legal precedent which makes Iraq the first
example of such a zone. This precedent is particularly significant because it
included the development of procedures and equipments for ongoing monitoring
and verification, which are now applied in Iraq.
While many would object to the idea that resolutions 687 and 707 (or more
precisely the plan making Iraq a nuclear free zone and thus a de facto nuclear
weapon free zone) could be applied to or adopted by all nations, this idea merits
much consideration in the light of the danger that nuclear weaponry represents for
the world.
Annex 1 of document S/22872 defines activities prohibited or permitted under
resolutions 687 and 707. It is completed by Annex 3, a fifteen page long list of all
items specifically prohibited, or may be prohibited if used in prohibited activities,
and by Annex 4 which details permitted activities. Significantly, Annex 1 and
Annex 3 are much more explicit and comprehensive than any previous official
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documents listing equipment and materials subject to nuclear export controls,
including the so-called “Zangger list” [83]. Considering the importance of these
annexes for future discussions on nuclear weapon free zones and an eventual
nuclear free world, Annex 1 is reproduced in the Appendix 1 of this report.
A salient feature of Annex 1 is that it makes a clear distinction between activities
prohibited by Resolutions 687 and 707. Activities prohibited by resolution 687
(paragraphs 2.1-2.9 of Annex 1) are those which are clearly prohibited to non-
nuclear-weapon states by the Non-proliferation treaty and those constituting a
direct short-term nuclear weapon proliferation threat in case of diversion or misuse,
and therefore put under IAEA safeguards.
The prohibition of nuclear activities by Resolution 707 (paragraphs 2.10-
2.18 of Annex 1) is much more comprehensive; it comprises all possible nuclear
activities except applications of isotopes to agriculture, industry and medicine.
While the activities put under IAEA safeguards are essentially those related to
nuclear power generation by means of fission reactors, Resolution 707 prohibition
extends to nuclear fusion based on magnetic or inertial confinement (paragraph
2.15), production of isotopes of any kind (paragraph 2.16) and particle accelerators
of all types (paragraph 2.17).
In other words, Resolution 707 is a legal implementation of the suggestions
made in 1980 that international safeguard measures should be extended to particle
accelerator and fusion technologies [1, 2, 3], and an explicit recognition of the fact
that these technologies constitute a direct threat for nuclear weapon proliferation.
A second important feature of Annex 1 is that it prohibits not only “design,
manufacturing, import of systems, equipment and components, pilot plant con-
struction, commissioning and operation, or utilization,” but also “research and
development” on the specified activities. This is a very important novelty because,
until Resolutions 687 and 707, research and development activities have always
been excluded in arms control agreements [84]. In the case of the future Compre-
hensive Test Ban Treaty, only a very limited range of research activities, i.e., those
in which a fission chain reaction is started, will be prohibited. In particular, there
will be no prohibition on thermonuclear fusion, including inertial confinement
fusion, even though such research is ultimately motivated by the possibility of
triggering large scale thermonuclear explosions without needing a fission primer.
The potential of inertial confinement fusion for studying thermonuclear weapons
physics and effects has been discussed in open literature since 1975 (see [2, 3, 84]
and references therein).
The necessity of arms control and disarmament measures at the research and
development stage has been repeatedly stated albeit but by a few [3, 47, 84, 85, 86],
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in contradiction with the prevailing opinion in the scientific community [87].
These measures should constrain both “civilian” and “military” research activities,
including fundamental research as it was deemed necessary for example, in the
case of antimatter [86]. In the instance of a ban of inertial confinement fusion
research, the construction of very large laser facilities for fundamental research in
astrophysics, hydrodynamics, high-pressure physics or plasma physics [88] would
be forbidden.
2.5.4 Intelligence failure or staging for counter-proliferation?
Until now, the most comprehensive coverage of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program
is provided in a series of articles by David Albright and Mark Hibbs in The
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and Arms Control Today. These articles also
provide a good introduction to some of the most disturbing problems relating to
Iraq’s case, such as the question of the “intelligence failure” and the prospect
of a “counter-proliferation” policy replacing the current non-proliferation regime.
A proper assessment of this “failure” is essential precisely because it is often
quoted today in the context of either proliferation and nuclear terrorism [89] or
counter-proliferation [90].
On the intelligence failure question, Albright and Hibbs’ opinion in 1992 was
categoric:
“After the Osiraq bombing, Iraq simultaneously pursued several
means of producing highly enriched uranium. Postwar revelations
of Iraq’s most developed enrichment route, based on archaic calutron
electromagnetic separation technology, startled the world. Western
intelligence agencies had been fully aware that Iraq was attempting
to develop the means to enrich uranium, but had focussed on the gas
centrifuge effort — which matched current approaches used in several
developed nations — and missed the calutron effort completely” [91,
p.5].
In 1993 however, Albright’s opinion was somewhat more cautious:
“Iraq is considered an intelligence failure because large-scale nuclear
activities were not discovered by the IAEA or Western intelligence
agencies” (before the end of the Gulf War). The reasons for this
failure, however, involve more than a deficiency in either safeguards
or intelligence collection methods.
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Western governments did not aggressively pursue leads about Iraqi
nuclear efforts or seriously impede Iraq’s nuclear program during the
1980s. (...)
Despite a failure to detect the full scope of Iraq’s program, intelligence
agencies knew enough before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to have
justified some sort of intervention. (...)” [92, p.15].
It can safely be assumed that there are inconsistencies between what was known
to Western intelligence agencies and what was done with that information. This
was highlighted in the response of IAEA officials to international media criticism
of the IAEA when Iraq’s nuclear weapons program was uncovered. Jon Jennekens,
retired Deputy Director General for Safeguards of the IAEA, in his first public
statement since retiring, said for instance:
“The Americans and the British knew what (Saddam) Hussein was up
to because they pulled a sting operation when the Iraqis were trying
to import very high-precision timing devices from the U.S., through
the U.K. They pulled a sting operation and arrested people so it was
clear why the Iraqis wanted these instruments, but the information
was never divulged to the IAEA secretariat” [93].
In fact, the whole process which after the end of the Gulf War led to the
uncovering by IAEA inspectors of the details of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program,
can be seen as a cover-up operation. One in which the IAEA was used to hide the
extent of the knowledge that Western intelligence had already obtained before the
war. For example, is it credible that it was only on the basis of information provided
by two defectors, that the most important discoveries about Iraq’s nuclear weapons
program were made? Firstly, in June 1991, a defector provided the information that
led to the huge facility in which uranium was enriched with calutrons. Secondly,
in September 1991, another defector informed Western intelligence on the location
of 25’000 documents. These included design information definitely confirming
that research and development in several key areas specifically related to nuclear
weapons had been done in Iraq [94].
Moreover, it is difficult to believe that Iraq’s enormous nuclear effort had
remained undetected for so many years, an effort which cost over 10 billion
dollars during the 1980s and employed 10’000 or more scientists, technicians and
others. It is improbable that only a few isolated individuals like Gsponer, were
aware of Iraq’s long time interest in calutron technology. There are also several
hints indicating that the full extent of Iraq’s effort was already known before the
Gulf War. For instance, this knowledge would certainly have been necessary to
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convince some countries to join or accept operation ‘Desert Storm’, and President
Bush’s repeated suggestion before the war, that Iraq’s bomb was only months away
[95].
A possible explanation of these events could be that from the early 1980s
there was a gradual shift from a non-proliferation to a counter-proliferation policy
[90, 96, 97]. If this is so, the lessons of Israel’s precedent, the bombing of Osiraq
in 1981, must have been taken into account.
The bombing of Osiraq by the Israelis took place when the reactor was almost
ready to produce plutonium. By comparison, Iraq’s pilot calutron plant started
in 1981. Assuming that intelligence services knew this, counter-proliferation
action would still have been difficult from a political point of view. The military
significance was not sufficient at the time: it was a small experimental facility.
The installation of the first large alpha calutrons in the Tarmyia production
plant only started in 1989. Not until 1989–1990 therefore could Israel or the USA
have begun to put political or military pressure on Iraq: A counter-proliferation
policy needs a clear cut proliferating situation in order to justify intervention.
Otherwise the political cost, which was quite high in Israels’ precedent of 1981,
would be prohibitively high.
But Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. Was this invasion encouraged by
Saddam Hussein’s belief that he was very close to having the atomic bomb in his
hands? Was this just the kind of mistake the Western powers were waiting for
in order to neutralize Iraq’s growing military strength? Were the Western powers
expecting such a mistake and did not intervene earlier by political or economical
means because of a shift from non-proliferation to counter-proliferation? This
would explain why Iraq was allowed to come so close to having an atomic bomb.
In any event, 1991 was not only the year of the Gulf War — which could be
seen as the first major act of counter-proliferation — but also the year in which
France and China finally joined the NPT. An event that paved the way to the
unconditional permanent extension of the NPT, decided in New York in 1995. Not
all the motivations of France and China to join the NPT are known, but it may
well have been that the assurance that deliberate force could be legitimized to keep
nuclear weapons in the hands of the superpowers, must have been an important
one. In declaring on the 31th of January 1992, that the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction was a threat to international peace and security, the Security
Council has in effect authorized the use of force against any proliferating state,
including those which are not party to any international treaty.
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3.1 Introduction
In paragraph 13 of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 687 [1, 2]
adopted on 3 April 1991, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was
requested by the Security Council to carry out immediate on-site inspection of
Iraq’s nuclear capabilities and carry out a plan for the destruction, removal or
rendering harmless of items prohibited to Iraq under paragraph 12 of the resolution
687. On 15 August 1991 the Security Council adopted a further resolution, number
707 [3], obliging Iraq to “halt all nuclear activities of any kind, except for use
of isotopes for medical, agricultural or industrial purposes, until the Council
determines that Iraq is in full compliance with the present resolution and with
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paragraphs 12 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991) and the Agency determines that
Iraq is in full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the Agency.”
The plan, and the annexes thereto, which constitute an integral part of the
plan, were approved by the UNSC in resolution 715 [4] as document number
S/22872/Rev.1, 20 September 1991 [5]. This unprecedented document, drafted
with Iraq’s specific case in mind, is in fact the first legally binding document in
which all activities prone to nuclear weapon proliferation are clearly and com-
prehensively defined. It is the first time that in an officialdocument, the many
ambiguous activities which broadly come under the name of ’peaceful nuclear ac-
tivities’, as well as those which are generally considered as non-military scientific
research activities, are explicitly recognized as important for the acquisition or
development of nuclear weapons. Similarly, by clearly defining those applications
of nuclear physics and nuclear energy that are useful for ’medical, agricultural or
industrial purposes’, this document also defines which kind of ’peaceful nuclear
activities’ are really benign from the point of view of nuclear weapon proliferation.
In practice, in obliging Iraq “not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or
nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any re-
search, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above”
(article 12 of resolution 687), the UNSC developed and accepted a document un-
ambiguously defining what in essence is a nuclear free zone and created a legal
precedent which makes Iraq the first example of such a zone. This precedent
is particularly significant because it included the development of procedures and
equipments for ongoing monitoring and verification, which are now applied in
Iraq.
3.2 Technical assessment
Annex 1 of document S/22872 defines activities prohibited or permitted under
resolutions 687 and 707. It is completed by Annex 3, a fifteen page long list of all
items specifically prohibited, or may be prohibited if used in prohibited activities,
and by Annex 4 which details permitted activities. Significantly, Annex 1 and
Annex 3 are much more encompassing and comprehensive than any previous offi-
cial documents listing equipment and materials subject to nuclear export controls,
including the so-called ‘Zangger list’ or London Guidelines [6]. Considering the
importance of these annexes for future discussions, Annex 1 is reproduced in
the Appendix 1 of this report.
A salient feature of Annex 1 is that it makes a clear distinction between activities
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prohibited by resolutions 687 and 707. Activities prohibited by resolution 687
(paragraphs 2.1-2.9 of Annex 1) are those which are clearly prohibited to non-
nuclear-weapon states by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and those
constituting a direct short-term nuclear weapon proliferation threat in case of
diversion or misuse, and therefore put under IAEA safeguards.
The prohibition of nuclear activities by resolution 707 (paragraphs 2.10-2.18 of
Annex 1) is much more comprehensive; it comprises all possible nuclear activities
except applications of isotopes to agriculture, industry and medicine (paragraphs
2.19-2.21). While the activities put under IAEA safeguards are essentially those
related to nuclear power generation by means of fission reactors, resolution 707
prohibition extends to nuclear fusion based on magnetic or inertial confinement
(paragraph 2.15), production of isotopes of any kind (paragraph 2.16) and the use
of particle accelerators of all types (paragraph 2.17).
In other words, resolution 707 is a legal implementation of the suggestions
made in 1980 that international safeguard measures should be extended to particle
accelerator and fusion technologies [7, 8], and an explicit recognition of the fact that
these technologies constitute a direct threat for nuclear weapon proliferation. A
first step in that direction is that tritium and lithium-6 are now included in the list of
nuclear-related dual-use equipment and material and related technology mentioned
in the Warsaw Guidelines [9]. But, ’fusion’ and ’accelerators’ are not even
mentioned as dual-use technologies, even though both technologies can be used
to breed fissile material [8], tritium [10] or antimatter [11] for military purposes.
Similarly, in the amended London Guidelines [12], the only change has been to
include the full range of enrichment technologies without any reference to fusion
materials or technologies. Finally, the Wassenaar Arrangement — which in April
1996 succeeded to the Coordinating Committee on Export Controls (COCOM)
two years after it ceased to exist — includes several lists of sensitive dual-use
equipment. These lists, however, only refer to particle accelerator and fusion
technologies in the context of directed energy weapons, and to lasers as a controlled
technology, without any explicit reference to their use in the nuclear fuel cycle of
for thermonuclear fusion [13].
A second important feature of Annex 1 is that it prohibits not only “design,
manufacturing, import of systems, equipment and components, pilot plant con-
struction, commissioning and operation, or utilization,” but also research and
development on all nuclear activities excepted those permitted by paragraphs
2.19-2.21. This is a very important novelty because, until resolutions 687 and 707,
research and development activities have always been excluded in arms control
agreements [14]. For example, Article II of the NPT only forbids the manufacture
of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon States.
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In more recent agreements not specifically related to Iraq, the scope of the
control of research and development is less generously defined. For example,
research and development is explicitly mentioned in the Warsaw guidelines [9]. In
particular, “suppliers should not authorize transfers of equipment, material, or re-
lated technology (...) for use in a non-nuclear-weapon state in a nuclear explosive
activity (where) ’nuclear explosive activity’ includes research on or development
(...) on any nuclear device or components or subsystems of such a device” [9].
But the limited range of technologies covered by these guidelines leaves open
the possibility of conducting proliferation prone research activities using parti-
cle accelerators and fusion technologies. Such activities are not possible in the
African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone where Article 3 of the Treaty of Pelindaba
explicitly prohibits conducting “research on (...) any nuclear explosive device by
any meansanywhere” [15]. However, as in the Warsaw guidelines, this prohibi-
tion only applies to nuclear explosives. In resolutions 687 and 707 prohibition of
research applies to all nuclear activities (including fundamental research) except
research on application of radiation and isotopes in food and agriculture, medicine
and industrial processes.
3.3 Legal assessment
The political implications and the legal status of resolutions adopted by the UNSC
has been an issue of extensive discussions since the foundation of the UN more
than fifty years ago. Whereas this was more or less of purely academic interest
during the period of the Cold War due to the political limitations of the UNSC, the
changed global political climate has allowed for new developments in this field
that are of importance for practical purposes [16].
Today, it is mostly recognized that the UNSC has quasi-legislative and quasi-
judicial authority with regard to the implementations of the provisions in Chapter
VII of the UN Charter, i.e., when there is a threat to the international peace, breach
of the peace or act of aggression [17, 18]. In the case of UNSC resolutions 687, 707
and 715 that were adopted in connection with Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait the
UNSC intended to reach several objectives, e.g., the implementation of a cease-
fire agreement and an arms control regime (comprising the elimination of nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons) upon Iraq (comprising the total elimination of
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons including the corresponding production
capabilities), a solution to the boundary dispute between the two states and the
settlement of economic issues related to the former occupation of Kuwait by Iraq.
The legal nature of UNSC resolutions and the legislative authority of the UNSC
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within the UN setting [17] can be characterized in the following way:
• legal acts are generated in a unilateral form, namely through the adoption of
resolutions by the UNSC,
• a special legal norm is created or a general legal norm is modified, in our case
given by a significant extension of Iraq’s existing safeguards obligations.
Therefore, when we consider the legal status of UNSC resolutions 687, 707,
715 and the corresponding plan for their implementation that is given by the
document S/22872/Rev.1, and following the respective legal expertise [17, 18], we
arrive at a new comprehensive and legally binding definition of all proliferation
prone activities in the context of mastering the dismantling of the clandestine Iraqi
nuclear weapons programme. Clearly, these developments can have substantial
implications on further political and legal activities in this field, in particular in
connection with current efforts to strengthen the IAEA safeguards regime.
Of course, there are a variety of possible objections that can be made to our
line of argumentation. From a political point of view it can be argued that the
UNSC, because of its limited and biased membership [19], cannot be accepted as
a ‘lawmaking’ authority. One can very reasonably support the opinion that the
UNSC is not empowered to impose upon UN members such binding rules that are
not restricted in their application to a specific case the UNSC has explicitly dealt
with before.
However, we have to take into consideration that the UNSC by adopting the
resolutions mentioned above did not exclusively act with regard to the provisions of
Chapter VII of the UN Charter but also in order to enforce Iraq’s obligations under
the NPT and to secure its future compliance after having broken crucial provisions
of this treaty. Since the NPT is an international legal instrument with nearly
global adherence, the legal consequences for the NPT regime as a whole cannot be
neglected. In this sense the UNSC resolutions and the corresponding action plan
should also be seen as implementation measures of the nuclear non-proliferation
regime that had to be adopted in order to deal with with a situation where basic
obligations of the NPT were violated. It cannot be denied that the UNSC has
created in this way a new interpretation with regard to an effective implementation
of the corresponding NPT provisions. The revelation of an extensive clandestine
nuclear weapons research and development programme in Iraq has forced the
UNSC to expand the scope of the existing IAEA safeguards system via adoption
of resolution 707 and 715 in order to ensure Iraq’s compliance with Art.II of the
NPT.
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3.4 Conclusion
In this article we have tried to give an assessment of the non-proliferation im-
plications of the UNSC resolutions aiming at the containment of Iraq’s nuclear
ambitions. By necessity, it was important to rely on a technical and legal analysis.
Because of the increasing complexity of technological development, it will be
more and more important to approach emerging proliferation concerns at the ear-
liest possible stage. In order to meet this objective, the necessary legal framework
has to be continuously adapted. In this perspective, the case studied in this paper
shows several directions for possible future development:
• first, the scope of international treaties and arrangements should include all
materials and technologies related to fission, fusion [20], acceleration and
annihilation processes;
• second, the treaties and arrangements should include effective measures
of preventive arms control [21], such as legally binding restrictions in all
relevant areas of research and development, whether they are claimed to be
for military or civilian purpose;
• third, the concept of ’peaceful nuclear activities’ should be given a well
accepted and unambiguous meaning by making explicit which materials,
technologies and activities are really benign from the point of view of
nuclear weapon proliferation. This is of crucial importance for the creation
of genuine nuclear weapon free zones and for serious discussions on a total
abolition of nuclear weapons.
In all three of these points the UNSC resolutions considered in this paper
provide useful legal precedents. Moreover, our analysis indicates that the cor-
responding UNSC resolutions 687, 707 and 715 could be used in the future as
the basis for a legally binding definition of all proliferation prone nuclear activ-
ities. Finally, not only did the events in Iraq partly trigger the still continuing
93+2 discussions on the IAEA safeguards system, but they obliged the interna-
tional community to create what in essence is a nuclear free zone and to develop
adequate monitoring and verification procedures and equipment.
It is therefore likely that future developments will show that the case studied
in this paper will help to put additional pressure on the continuing process of
expanding the scope of existing safeguards agreements.
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Paper 4
Iraq’s calutrons: 1991 - 2001
by Andre Gsponer.
Posted on internet on 31 July 2001.
4.1 Introduction
In July 1991, shortly after the Gulf War, news from Iraq confirmed what I had
concluded twelve years earlier: That Iraq had decided to use the calutron electro-
magnetic isotope separation (EMIS) process to produce highly enriched uranium,
i.e., the very same process that was actually used to produce the uranium-235 that
was fissioned in the atomic bomb that exploded over Hiroshima in August 1945.
At that time I was still recovering from a cancer treatment, and I had to wait
until 1995 to find the energy to write a report on my discovery in 1979 of Iraq’s
intention to use the calutron technology, and my discomfort with the official thesis,
namely that nobody knew before the Gulf War that Iraq had built a gigantic calutron
enrichment plant and was very close to assemble its first atomic bomb.
For a number of reasons the report I wrote in collaboration with Dr. Jean-
Pierre Hurni is still not published. In particular, I had great hopes that I would
get additional information from the IAEA that would help putting the report into
a final form. But that did not happen with the unfortunate death of Dr. Maurizio
Zifferero, late head of the UNSC 687 Action Team from 1991 to 1997, and his
replacement by Mr. Garry Dillon who may have decided to cut off contact with
me and not to keep Dr. Zifferero’s commitments.
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Only thirty copies of the draft report, ISRI-95-03, were printed, and only a
few additional photocopies were made. Now, ten years after the Gulf War, the
time has come for this document to be made publically available. It is a matter
of truth and justice that the facts I discovered in 1979 while working at CERN
(the European Center for Nuclear Research, Geneva, Switzerland) are published.
At the least, this report should help professional historians and political analysts
to review what happened in Iraq before and during the Gulf War, e.g., in order to
better understand the origin and the spectacular growth of the Iraqi nuclear weapon
program, independently of the official statements made by the U.N. and the Allies,
or by the U.S. and Iraqi governments. Moreover, the correspondence related to this
report with the IAEA and the reviewers, as well as the additional information on
calutrons, EMIS, accelerator technology, CERN, and the origin of Iraq’s calutron
program collected between 1995 and 2001, should be a useful complement to the
web pages opened by the IAEA Iraq Action Team on the Agency’s WorldAtom1
web site in June/July 2001.
Although the 1995 report could have been rewritten and a number of improve-
ments made, I have decided to leave it exactly in its original form, apart from
a few minor modifications such as a few spelling or typographical mistakes. In
the same spirit, the written commentaries from various sources are presented in
their original form as copies of the letters I have received. Of particular interest
is the correspondence with Dr. Maurizio Zifferero of the IAEA, who was as much
interested in knowning the truth about the origin of the Iraqi calutron program,
than in making sure that whatever would be published would not contribute to the
further proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Consequently, the form of the following presentation of the documents on
EMIS technology and Iraq’s calutrons is that of a chronology, interleaved with
some personal comments that I hope will be useful to the reader. It begins with
Suren Erkman’s paper in Le Journal de Gene`ve of April 1995 and the reviewing
of the main report, ISRI-95-03, that started in October 1995. There are then two
sections on two attempts, one to present at a conference, the other to publish in an
academic journal, some of the material contained in the report ISRI-95-03. This
is followed by a section presenting some more recent documents that would have
been mentioned in an updated version of the report, as well as links to related
web sites. Finally, I added two sections providing independent confirmation of
my 1979 findings at CERN, as well as a conclusion emphasizing some lessons I
learned from this more than twenty years long experience.
1 http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/index.html .
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4.2 Suren Erkman’s article in Le Journal de Gene`ve
of 22-23 April 1995
When I returned to Geneva in January 1995 I met with a number of friends and
former colleagues who encouraged me to publish what I knew about the origin
of Iraq’s calutron program. In particular, Suren Erkman, a science journalist
at Le Journal de Gene`ve (which from an intellectual and political standpoint
was considered as the “best” newspaper in Geneva, and the only one with an
international audience) wrote a long article based on a careful inquiry comprising
a number of interviews including the two main CERN witnesses, i.e., myself, and
Dr. Klaus Freudenreich who was repeatedly approached by Iraqi engineers in early
1979. This article was announced on a full size poster [Fig. 1.1] and published in
the weekend edition of 22-23 April 1995 of Le Journal de Gene`ve [Figs. 1.2 and
1.3], see Paper 1.
The following Monday there were a number of emotional reactions in Geneva
and especially at CERN, and six people made the effort to write down their reaction
to Suren Erkman’s paper:
1. 24 April 1995 : Dr. Med. Denis Dupont, Geneva
2. 24 April 1995 : Dr. Reinhard Budde, CERN staff member
3. 25 April 1995 : Prof. C.H. Llewellyn Smith, Director General of CERN
4. 27 April 1995 : Prof. Jack Steinberger, Nobel laureate and CERN staff
member
5. 28 April 1995 : Dr. Gerd Harigel, CERN staff member and GIPRI board
member
6. 28 April 1995 : Dr. Jean-Pierre Stroot, CERN staff member and GIPRI
board president
The only positive reaction was by Dr. Denis Dupont, M.D., who asked to
receive a copy of my forthcoming report (entitled at the time “Calutrons: 1945-
1995”) that was announced in Suren Erkman’s paper.
The other five reactions were negative, and very emotional except for that by
Prof. C.H. Llewellyn Smith, Director General of CERN. This official reaction,
which is basically an attempt to dismiss CERN’s responsibility, is reproduced for
the record as [Letter 4.12.1]. Since Le Journal de Gene`ve article was written
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in French, all these reactions were in French, except for the one by Prof. Jack
Steinberger, a member of Pugwash who co-edited with Joseph Rotblat the book:
A Nuclear-free World: Desirable? Feasible? (Westview Press, Boulder Colorado,
1996).
The four reactions by current or former CERN staff members are all in the
same vein and it is fortunate that the one by Nobel laureate Jack Steinberger
[Letter 4.12.2] is a good summary of the other three. In particular, it is claimed that
“Gsponer has become psychopathic on the issue of alleged military involvements
of CERN [...] His stories of military use of CERN are pure invention,” whereas
a number of positive details are given on Jafar Dhia Jafar, who after working at
Imperial College spent a four-year period at CERN before becoming the head of
Iraq’s nuclear weapons program.
For example, it is said in Prof. Steinberger’s letter “that at this time Jafar had
no Iraqi military motives or connections.” This is wrong since it was well known
to all members of the CERN collaboration in which Jafar Dhia Jafar worked in the
early 1970s that there were two high-ranking military officers in that collaboration:
one Israeli and on Iraqi! Moreover, it is now abundantly confirmed that Dr. Jafar
was actively involved in Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapon program since its very
beginning, which includes all the time he had spent at CERN.
Otherwise, in agreement with all recollections by CERN staff members that
I have spoken to and who have personally known Jafar Dhia Jafar, it seems that
he was very good at building lasting relationships, and was much appreciated as
a colleague and friend. For instance, senior CERN staff member Douglas R.O.
Morrison remembered him very well as a an excellent bridge player...
Strikingly, all five reactions by CERN staff members did not show any interest
in knowning more about the facts: none of them asked to receive the announced
report “Calutrons: 1945-1995.” On the contrary, little concerning the substance
or the facts is disputed: All criticisms are directed at me as a person, as if I was a
traitor, and Jafar Dhia Jafar is presented as a loyal CERN user.
On the other hand, the IAEA was immediately interested and quick to react:
the head of UNSC 687 Action Team in Iraq, Dr. Maurizio Zifferero, called Suren
Erkman at the beginning of May already [Letter 4.12.3]. Moreover, the joint
IAEA/UNIDO library sent a purchase order for “Calutrons: 1945-1995” on 17
May 1995.
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4.3 “Iraq’s Calutrons” report [ISRI-95-03] and its
reviewing
Work on “Calutrons: 1945-1995” in collaboration with Dr. Jean-Pierre Hurni
spanned over the Summer and Autumn 1995. I wanted the document to be useful
as much for understanding the past as for preventing further proliferation of particle
accelerator-based nuclear technology such as electromagnetic isotope separators,
plutonium or tritium breeders, antimatter production, particle beam weapons,
missile defence, etc. A big effort was therefore made to be as pedagogical and
comprehensive as possible, both from the technical and the political standpoints.
The final document was larger than expected, and its final title became “Iraq’s
calutrons — Electromagnetic isotope separation, beam technology, and nuclear
weapon proliferation” in order to emphasize its broad focus on the nuclear weapon
proliferation implications of particle beam technology.
Thirty copies of the report, i.e., Paper 2, were printed and the reviewing
started by sending copies to the IAEA/UNIDO library and to the Action Team
[Letter 4.12.4]. Dr. Zifferero answered by asking permission to copy it to two
experts [Letter 4.12.5], one in LLNL (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
U.S.A.) the other in ORNL (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S.A.). I replied by
sending two extra copies of the report [Letter 4.12.6].
The reviewing took place between 8 November 1995 and 18 June 1996 and
consisted of inviting commentaries from 22 people: 3 science journalists, 1 inter-
national lawyer, and 18 physicists.
1. Mr. Suren Erkman, Journal de Gene`ve, Geneva
2. Mr. William Broad, New York Times, New York
3. Mr. Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, Bonn
4. DDr. Stephan Klement, MCIS, Southampton
5. Dr. Jafar D. Jafar, IAEC, Baghdad
6. Dr. Maurizio Zifferero, IAEA, Vienna
7. Prof. Jack Steinberger, CERN, Geneva
8. Dr. Klaus Freudenreich, CERN, Geneva
9. Dr. Douglas R.O. Morrison, CERN, Geneva
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10. Dr. Richard L. Garwin, IBM, Yorktown
11. Dr. Christopher C. Paine, NRDC, Washington
12. Dr. Harry Bernas, CSNSM, Orsay
13. Dr. Martin Kalinowski, INESAP, Darmstadt
14. Dr. Wolfgang Liebert, IANUS, Darmstadt
15. Dr. Annette Schaper, PRIF, Frankfurt
16. Dr. David Albright, ISIS, Washington
17. Prof. Robert F. Mozley, CISAC, Stanford
18. Dr. Bhupendra Jasani, Kings College, London
19. Dr. Frank Barnaby, SIPRI, Stockholm
20. Dr. Richard Kokoski, SIPRI, Stockholm
21. Dr. Paul J. Persiani, ANL, Argonne
22. Dr. Isaac Chavet, SOREQ NRC, Yavne, Israel
The only person who was invited to make commentaries after the 18 June 1996
was Dr. Isaac Chavet, a leading member of Israel’s electromagnetic separation
program, who wrote to me spontaneously.
As will be seen, only four people supplied substantial comments: Dr. Maurizio
Zifferero, Prof. Robert F. Mozley, DDr. Stephan Klement, and Dr. Isaac Chavet.
Trying to correspond with Dr. Jafar was a special case because of the sanctions
imposed on Iraq. I had first to write to the Iraqi permanent mission in Geneva
[Letter 4.12.7] which answered that I had to send any correspondence for Dr. Jafar
to the IAEA who would decide if the mail could be forwarded, and whether he
could be allowed to comment or not upon ISRI’s report [Letter 4.12.8].
I therefore wrote to Dr. Zifferero [Letter 4.12.9] with a long letter to Dr. Jafar
[Letter 4.12.10]. The answer of Dr. Zifferero came very soon [Letter 4.12.11]. It
was negative, but at the same time appreciative of the quality of the questions I
had raised since some of them were to be added to the list of questions the Action
Team had about Iraq’s calutron program. Moreover, the answer was also very
encouraging since Dr. Zifferero suggested a compromise: that I should be given
access to at least part of the “Full, Final and Complete Declaration” (FFCD) of the
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activities carried out under the clandestine nuclear program when this declaration
would be completed.
Another encouraging event happened a few months later: I received a phone
call from Iraq’s permanent mission in Geneva and a secretary told that “Jafar
Dhia Jafar sends you his regards and encouragements for your efforts to achieve
nuclear disarmament.”
Meanwhile, I received the first substantial comment, that of Prof. Robert F.
Mozley [Letter 4.12.12] who had written a report that I did not know at the time I
wrote my report with Jean-Pierre Hurni:
• Robert F. Mozley, Uranium enrichment and other technical problems relat-
ing to nuclear weapons proliferation, Center for International Security and
Arms Control (CISAC), Stanford University, 320 Galvez Street, Stanford
CA 94305-6165, U.S.A., (July 1994) 65 pp.
In his letter, Prof. Mozley referred to a paper by Dr. Paul J. Persiani of the
Argonne National Laboratory that I had also missed in my literature search with
Jean-Pierre Hurni:
• Paul J. Persiani, Non-Proliferation Aspects of Commercial Nuclear Fuel Cy-
cles, report to the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, 33rd Annual
Meeting, Orlando, Florida, (July 1992) 4 pp. Available from P.J. Persiani,
TD 207, Argonne National Laboratory, 9700 South Cass Av., Argonne, IL
60439, U.S.A.
As the University of Geneva library was not able to get hold of this paper, I
wrote to Dr. Persiani [Letter 4.12.13] who was kind enough to send me a copy of
his paper.
The report of Prof. Mozley, and even more specifically the paper of Dr. Persiani,
emphasize that unpublished studies made in the U.S.A. in the late 1970s (i.e.,
precisely at the time when Iraq started to be actively interested in the calutron
technology) had concluded that:
“a potential proliferation path, using calutrons for isotopic enrich-
ment of low-enriched uranium, LEU, to highly enriched uranium,
HEU, could be developed with mature technology by countries pursu-
ing a clandestine weapons program.”
Therefore, since the documents of Prof. Mozley and Dr. Persiani have been
published after the Gulf War, its seem that I was the only one to have consistently
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tried to warn publically about this proliferation path during the 1980s. In this
respect, as a complement to what is explained in the report ISRI-95-03, I should
add that on 13 July 1982 I submitted with Bhupendra Jasani to Frank Blackaby,
then Director of SIPRI, a research proposal entitled “Military applications of high
energy beams” that included a chapter on “Enrichment of uranium and plutonium
using accelerators and lasers” in which we planed to discuss the proliferation
potential of the calutron technology.
To end the reviewing process I sent on 18 June 1996 a letter with Dr. Jean-
Pierre Hurni to all the above mentioned people, but we did not receive any further
comments.
4.4 Attempt to present a paper at the EMIS-13 con-
ference and spontaneous contribution of Dr. I.
Chavet
The reviewing being essentially terminated, I thought it would be a good idea
to present a summary of the report ISRI-95-03 at the forthcoming international
conference of world experts of electromagnetic isotope separation, EMIS-13, that
was to take place on September 23-27, 1996, at Bad Du¨rkheim in Germany. I
therefore wrote to Prof. G. Mu¨nzenberg, Chairman of EMIS-13, and submitted
the abstract of a contribution [Letter 4.12.14].
A few days later I had the good surprise to receive a letter from Dr. Isaac Chavet
who had been mainly active in Israel’s mass separation systems [Letter 4.12.15].
(See Sec. 2.3.10 of ISRI-95-03: “EMIS in Israel.”) In my answer I asked him to
send his comments on our report and on Israel’s EMIS facilities [Letter 4.12.16]. I
also took this opportunity to write to Dr. Zifferero to remind him about our interest
in receiving the information he had promised and about the possibility to meet
some members of his Team at EMIS-13 [Letter 4.12.17].
In his answer [Letter 4.12.18] Dr. Zifferero confirmed his commitment to send
us a copy of the EMIS part of the FFCD as soon as possible. However, concerning
EMIS-13, he explained that nobody of his team would have the time to attend the
conference.
In any event, I still had no reaction from EMIS-13 and time was running out to
write the paper for this conference. I therefore decided to call Prof. Mu¨nzenberg
on the telephone in order to ask him whether our contribution had been accepted
or not. He told me “that our abstract had been discussed, but that it was felt to
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deal mostly with old technologies while EMIS conferences are discussing concepts
that are on the frontier in the field.” The answer was a polite “no.”
As a consolation, I received a few days later Dr. Chavet’s commentary in the
form of a letter of three pages with many interesting details, as well as a positive
introductory remark on my efforts at trying to stop the proliferation of nuclear
weapons [Letter 4.12.19].
4.5 Attempts to publish a paper [ISRI-96-06] on the
legal implications of the UNSC resolutions re-
lated to Iraq
In June 1996 I had the good fortune to meet with DDr. Stephan Klement, a physi-
cist and international lawyer working at the Mountbatten Center for International
Studies at University of Southampton. Discussing the question of the legal impli-
cations of the U.N. Security Council resolutions related to Iraq’s nuclear weapon
program we reached the conclusion that it would be a good idea to write a specific
paper expanding the ideas sketched in Sec. 2.5.3 of ISRI-95-03 and submitting it
to a journal of international law. This required adding a legal assessment to the
essentially technical assessment done by Dr. Jean-Pierre Hurni and myself.
The draft of the paper was circulate for review to a few experts in international
law (i.e., Alyn Ware and members of the board of the Lawyer’s Committee for
Nuclear Policy, LCNP) and then sent to The International and Comparative Law
Quarterly which did not accept the paper for publication [Letter 4.12.20].
Before sending the paper to another journal, I wanted to inquire at the IAEA
about the fate of the FFCD, because it could have contained information affecting
our paper with DDr. Stephan Klement. The pretext came in the form of the discov-
ery of a very interesting recent paper by R. Meunier, a French EMIS specialist who
with others built the “Sidonie” electromagnetic separator of Orsay in the 1960-70s
(see Sec.2.3.7 of ISRI-95-03: “EMIS in France”):
• R. Meunier, Faisabilite´ et evaluation exploratoire d’un projet pour la se´para-
tion isotopique du caesium issu de la fission, report CSNSM-94-30 (Octobre
1994). Available from R. Meunier, C.S.N.S.M., IN2P3-CNRS, Bat. 108,
F-91405 Orsay Campus, France.
As I mentioned in my letter of 30 December 1996 to Dr. Zifferero [Let-
ter 4.12.21], this document describes an industrial scale electromagnetic separation
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system which could handle 4.3*238/135 = 7.6 tons of natural uranium per year. It
is a very detailed study by somebody who has spent his life building high-current
electromagnetic separators. The study is especially interesting because it gives
precise estimates for the construction and operating costs of an industrial scale
EMIS plant.
Unfortunately, this letter may have never reached Dr. Zifferero because I later
learned that he died rather suddenly from a cancer.
I therefore decided with Dr. Jean-Pierre Hurni and DDr. Stephan Klement to
finalize our paper and to send it on 12 February 1997 to Security Dialogue, which
rejected it on 20 May 1997 [Letter 4.12.22]. In his letter of rejection, the editor
stressed the facts that the resolutions in question were quite old at the time (i.e.,
more than five years) and that they actually had little legal weight. While both
of these facts are true, it turns out that these Security Council resolutions were
nevertheless providing the only legal basis for what UNSCOM was doing in Iraq.
If international lawyer agree that they have little or no value, then what about the
legal status of the ongoing U.N. and other coercive operations in Iraq?
4.6 The loss of contact with the IAEA
While the death of Dr. Zifferero in 1997 was an unfortunate incident of life, the
whole political situation concerning Iraq, UNSCOM, and the sanctions regime
changed very dramatically in the first half of 1997 as a consequence of the imple-
mentation by the U.S. of new policies against Iraq.
Concerning UNSCOM, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced on 1st
May 1997 that the chairman will be replaced by the Australian Richard Butler,
who was soon to assume a much more anti-Iraq position than his predecessor,
the Swede Rolf Ekeus. Similarly, the successor of Dr. Zifferero, Mr. Garry
Dillon, was apparently chosen as much more for his political correctness than for
his professional credentials. (Mr. Garry Dillon was the chief inspector of most
inspection campaigns in Iraq since 1993 until they were interrupted in 1997.)
Consequently, my hopes of positive collaboration with the IAEA and UNSCOM
faded out.
What I had been promised by Dr. Zifferero was access to part of the “Full, Final
and Complete Declaration.” The first version of this FFCD had been supplied to
UNSCOM on 12 March 1992, and a 1019 pages long revised version on 1 March
1995. In 1996, the only part of the FFCD that was publically available was the
table of content of a draft version attached to document S/1996/261. This table of
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content indicated that EMIS technology was as expected a substantial part of the
FFCD and that the information it contained was certainly much more detailed than
what I needed to answer the questions I had raised in my letter of 22 January 1996
to Dr. Jafar. In fact, according to the more recent IAEA documents S/1988/312 and
S/1999/127, the final version of the FFCD (dated 25 March 1998) is essentially a
consolidated version of the text dated 7 September 1996 supplemented by written
revisions and additions. Therefore, by early 1997, Dr. Zifferero, his deputy, or later
his successor, could have fulfilled the promise made in the letters I had received
in 1995 and 1996.
Since I was not receiving any response from UNSCOM, I made a last attempt
when I learned that Dr. Richard Hooper (the director of IAEA’s Department of
Safeguards who had also been involved in UNSCOM inspections) was going to give
a lecture on 1st December 1997 at a conference of nuclear weapon proliferation
experts to which I had been invited. I wrote him a letter [Letter 4.12.23] that he
did not see because he was not in Vienna before the conference. However, at the
conference, where I gave him a copy of my letter, he told me that I should not
write to the successor of Dr. Zifferero since he would personally transmit my letter
to Mr. Garry Dillon. Unfortunately, I never received any answer from him.
4.7 Additional technical papers and sources of in-
formation
Since 1995 I have become aware of a number of technical reports and books
that would have been included in the bibliography of an updated version of the
1995 report on Iraq’s calutrons. Three of those (by R. Mozley, P. Persiani and R.
Meunier) have already been mentioned but I repeat them below for completeness.
As can be seen, the first one is dated October 1945: it should have been included
in the 1995 version of the report already because it contains the first open technical
discussion of the wartime EMIS effort in the U.S.A.
• H.D. Smyth, Atomic energy for military purposes, Rev. Mod. Phys. 17
(October 1945) 351–470. Chapter IX (pp. 422–429) is a general discussion
of separation of isotopes, and chapter XI (pp. 437–444) discusses electro-
magnetic separation of uranium isotopes. This article is a republication of
a report first issued by the “Manhattan District,” U.S. Corps of Engineers,
and constitutes the scientific basis of the book: Atomic Energy for Military
Purposes (Princeton University Press, 1945).
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• S. Villani, ed., Uranium Enrichment, Topics is applied physics, Vol. 35
(Springer Verlag, Berlin, 1979) 322 pp.
• Paul J. Persiani, Non-Proliferation Aspects of Commercial Nuclear Fuel Cy-
cles, report to the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, 33rd Annual
Meeting, Orlando, Florida (July 1992) 4 pp. Available from P.J. Persiani,
TD 207, Argonne National Laboratory, 9700 South Cass Av., Argonne, IL
60439, U.S.A.
• Robert F. Mozley, Uranium enrichment and other technical problems re-
lating to nuclear weapons proliferation, Center for International Security
and Arms Control, Stanford University, 320 Galvez Street, Stanford CA
94305-6165, U.S.A. (July 1994) 65 pp.
• Robert W. Selden, Accelerators and national security — The evolution of
science policy for high-energy physics, 1947-1967, History and Technology,
11 (1994) 361–391.
• R. Meunier, Faisabilite´ et evaluation exploratoire d’un projet pour la se´para-
tion isotopique du caesium issu de la fission, report CSNSM-94-30 (Octobre
1994) 26 pp. Available from R. Meunier, C.S.N.S.M., IN2P3-CNRS, Bat.
108, F-91405 Orsay Campus, France.
• Richard Kokoski, Technology and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
SIPRI monograph (Oxford University Press, 1995) 351 pp.
• Joseph Magill et al., Accelerators and (non)-proliferation, Paper presented
at the ANS Winter Meeting in Albuquerque, New Mexico (Nov. 16-20,
1997) 7 pp. Available form J. Magill, Institute for Transuranium Elements,
P.O. Box 2340, D-76125 Karlsruhe, Germany, or in the publication section
of ITU’s website.2
• J. Magill and P. Peerani, (Non-) Proliferation aspects of accelerator driven
systems, J. Phys. IV France 9, Pr7-167 (1999) 19 pp. Available form
J. Magill, Institute for Transuranium Elements, P.O. Box 2340, D-76125
Karlsruhe, Germany, or in the publication section of of ITU’s website.3
Of course, there is also a lot of new published technical information related
to calutron technology and electromagnetic isotope separation. In particular, such
2 http://ituwebpage.fzk.de .
3 http://ituwebpage.fzk.de .
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information can be found in the proceedings of the last EMIS conference (EMIS-
13), or the next one (EMIS-14, May 6-10, 2002, in Canada)4, as well as of the
latest magnet technology conferences, the next one of which (MT-17) taking place
on 24-28 September 2001 at CERN.5
Moreover, there are a number of web sites which collect information on Iraq’s
former nuclear weapons program and related disarmament questions:
• Iraq Watch, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Washington:
http://www.iraqwatch.org/ .
• Special Collection: Iraq, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Chicago:
http://www.bullatomsci.org/research/collections/iraq.html .
• Iraq Special Collection, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey:
http://cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/index.htm .
• Country Assessment: Iraq, Institute for Science and International Security,
Washington:
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/ .
• IAEA Iraq Action Team web pages, Vienna:
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/index.html .
The availability of the latest documents, reports, and activities of IAEA’s Iraq
Action Team on the Agency’s WorldAtom web site was announced by the IAEA
in March 2001. Possibly the most useful document of general interest on this
site is the fourth consolidated report S/1997/779 which provides an overview of
the activities undertaken by the IAEA since it began the implementation of its
obligations to carry out on-site inspection of Iraq’s nuclear capabilities. However,
this and the other documents give only little information on the origin of Iraq’s
nuclear weapons program, on how they acquired information on nuclear technol-
ogy and nuclear weapons, and on other aspects that are essential for devising and
implementing truly effective disarmament and preventive arms control policies.
In particular, the Action Team Fact Sheet6 of 13 July 2001is purely descriptive and
totally neutral on these matters, as if the IAEA which had been created to promote
atomic energy had no responsibility in the proliferation of nuclear technology.
Finally, there is certainly some insight to be gained from a study of the differ-
ences and similarities between the 1991 Gulf War, and the 1999 intervention in
4 http://emis14.triumf.ca/info/ .
5 http://www.cern.ch/MT-17/ .
6 http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/nwp2.html .
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Kosovo and previous events in former Yugoslavia. For instance, during the war
over Kosovo, two Serb scientists were asked to leave CERN, a decision which
followed a couple of years old controversy about what CERN should do with the
scientists from ex-Yugoslavia [See, Tribune de Gene`ve (7 fe´vrier 1993, page 5;
8 fe´vrier 1993, page 13).] The facts (related to the present subject) are that a
cyclotron was under construction at the Vinca Institute for Nuclear Research, and
that Serbia has a long standing expertise in calutron technology [see, B. Dunjic,
Multi-ion source electromagnetic isotopic separator, Nucl. Inst. and Methods, 38
(1965) 109–122)].
4.8 Independent confirmation of Iraq’s early inter-
est in EMIS technology
In Autumn 1997 I met a retired Algerian professor living in Paris named Mohamed
Larbi Bouguerra. He told me that he had met a CERN physicist named Wilson
who knew Jafar Dhia Jafar personally, and who knew a number of things about
Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. Since Wilson is quite a common name (there
are eight “Wilsons” just in the CERN telephone directory), it was rather difficult
to find out which Wilson it was, especially since Prof. Bouguerra himself was not
too sure about his recollections.
Fortunately, Jean-Pierre Hurni finally discovered an article by Richard Wilson,
Mallinckrodt Professor of Physics at Harvard University, who had published an
article entitled Iraq’s uranium separation: The huge surprise in the Middle East
monthly New Outlook, Vol.34, No.5 (Tel Aviv, September/October 1991) 36–40.
On page 38, Prof. Wilson writes:
“The scientific world is international. Scientists are inquisitive. In the
1970s Iraqi scientists collaborated with Russians, who automatically
kept an eye on them. In 1981 the Iraqi wanted Western collaboration.
In 1982 I made a personal visit myself that they were not making
bombs with their publically known facilities. Their best scientist, Dr
Jafaar, wanted to study inelastic neutron scattering on the ellipsoidal
nuclei of the rare earths using separated isotopes which were known
to be available from Oak Ridge. I carried to U.S. DoE a request for
a loan of the isotopes, a loan which could have been accompanied
by a scientific collaborator reporting to any intelligence agency he
wished. Although these isotopes were of no conceivable use in a
bomb program, no U.S. government official wanted to appear to help
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the Iraqis, and the request was denied.”
With hindsight, we can interpret this initiative of Dr. Jafar as an attempt to
establish a scientific link with Oak Ridge, the laboratory where the World War
II calutron plant was built, and where a couple of wartime calutrons were still in
daily operation, despite the fact that they were nearly forty years old.
4.9 Independent confirmation of Iraq’s use of CERN
as a source of information
David Albright and Kevin O’Neill of the Institute for Science and International
Security (ISIS) in Washington posted on the ISIS web site a document entitled
Iraq’s Efforts to Acquire Information about Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear-Related
Technologies from the United States dated November 12, 1999.7 This document,
based on a report and interviews of Khidhir Hamza, a senior Iraqi nuclear scientist
who held several high-level positions in Iraq’s pre-Gulf War nuclear weapons
program, shows how Iraq obtained information from various sources including
CERN. In particular, in the section entitled Observation: Magnet designs were
obtained from abroad one reads:
In one interview, Hamza discussed how Iraq sought computer pro-
grams in the 1970s to design magnets for the EMIS program. Many
of the programs obtained by Iraq were of U.S.-origin. According to
Hamza:
“We tried to get some standard U.S. magnet design programs. We
found two or three at CERN. These were originally American pro-
grams, but CERN used them to design their own magnets. Jaffar
brought with him the entire CERN library when he came back to Iraq
in 1974. We also sent some people back to CERN and they also
brought back some tapes.
Another source of programs was a library at Belfast, in Northern
Ireland. There is a library there, which has an international repository
of [computer] programs. You can join in and gain access for a
couple of thousand dollars a year, so we joined that library – I was
the corresponding member (...) we [also] purchased a professional
package from some companies that designed magnets for CERN. One
7 http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/infogather.html .
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of them was a Swedish company. I forget the name. The other was
German. I don’t remember its name, either. According to Jaffar, these
two contracts would result in an EMIS magnet, but each, by itself,
would not” (May 27, 1999 interview of Khidhir Hamza).
Iraq had difficulty in finding programs compatible to its computer
systems. According to Hamza, “the only problem [with the CERN
magnets] is that they were installed on CDC computers in Geneva
and we had to install them on IBM. We had to do a lot of changes in
the command systems in the program, which we did” (May 27, 1999
interview of Khidhir Hamza).
Another publication of ISIS by David Albright, Corey Gay and Khidhir Hamza
entitled ‘Development of the Al-Tuwaitha site: What if the public or the IAEA had
overhead imagery?8 is to my knowledge the only document apart from ISRI-
95-03 which is highlighting the contradiction between the huge Iraqi nuclear
weapon program, the fantastic information gathering capabilities available to the
intelligence agencies of the great powers, and the claim that Iraq’s effort was
discovered only after the Gulf War.
4.10 Conclusions
Over the twenty-two years that began in 1979 with my analysis of the reasons why
Iraqi engineers could be interested by the constructions details of a large magnet
such as the one of the NA10 experiment at CERN, everything that I had concluded
has been confirmed.
Today, I can even claim that if I would have been successful in carrying out the
research program that I had drafted for the Geneva International Peace Research
Institute (GIPRI) which I created at the end of 1979, and been able to publish its
conclusions, history might have been different: Without the prospect of soon being
a nuclear power, Iraq might have been less tempted to invade Kuwait, a major war
would have been avoided, and the Middle East situation would be very different
now.
However, since I was not alone in these efforts to avoid further nuclear pro-
liferation and to eliminate nuclear weapons, and since many of these efforts were
made by scientists much more competent, famous, or influential than me, the main
unanswered question is why so little progress has been made so far.
8 http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/tuwaitha.html .
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I think that the main elements of an answer to this question are illustrated by the
documents presented in these web pages, which is why I feel it was so important
to post them. These elements fall in two main categories: political and scientific.
First, if I may start with the political elements, I think that the shift from a
non-proliferation to a counter-proliferation policy which I suspected in my 1995
report with Dr. Jean-Pierre Hurni is now confirmed, and that this shift is the
natural consequence of the nuclear weapon States’s policies of the past fifty years.
For instance, the current drive towards the abolition of the ABM treaty and the
development of a full-fledged missile defense system is the direct consequence of
these policies, which are based on the premise that the original nuclear weapon
States’s will never renounce nuclear weapons — which give them a major military
edge over all other nations. It is therefore unavoidable that all efforts towards
genuine nuclear disarmament, and in particular all professional-level research
efforts of the kind I tried to make in the past twenty years, were and still are
doomed to fail: Nuclear disarmament is simply not a priority of any scientific
funding agency in any country...
Second, concerning the reasons why it has not been possible to interest and
associate the scientific community to the efforts of the kind I made, a major reason
is certainly the tremendous feeling of guilt which drives the majority of scientists to
avoid working, reading, and even thinking about the military (and other negative)
implications of their work.
In this respect, it is symptomatic that the only organizations which have some
influence, e.g., Pugwash, do not do any real professional-level work (either scien-
tific or political) on the issues they talk about. Their role is apparently to express
concerns and to reassure the scientific community by suggesting that scientists in
either military or civilian institutions have no fundamental responsibility for the
consequences of their work and blindness. This attitude explains to a large extent
the very emotional reactions of CERN staff members to the 22-23 April 1995
article in Le Journal de Gene`ve, and why these same people show no interest in
knowing more about the facts.
In contrast, people working in organizations having a direct contact with the
military implications of nuclear science and technology generally show a very
different and much more rational attitude. After twenty years of relations with
both “academic scientists” and “nuclear weaponeers,” there is no real surprise that
most encouragements for my efforts come from people like Maurizio Zifferero,
Jafar Dhia Jafar, or Isaac Chavet, rather than from my peers.
Finally, a few words about my personal experience as a “whistle-blower.”
Doing what I did was unavoidable in order to preserve my intellectual and moral
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integrity. However, the personal and professional consequencies were disastrous:
becoming a “whistle-blower” means leaving the herd, and there is no reward for
breaking the rule — the awkward silence about science and warfare.
4.11 Acknowledgements and invitation for comments
I am indebted to Dr. Jean-Pierre Hurni and Prof. Gilles Falquet for their help in
assembling these web pages, and to Carey Sublette for providing space on The
High Energy Weapons Archive web site.
I would greatly appreciate any comments, suggestions or criticism, as well as
any additional information, material, or personal recollection regarding the facts
and questions raised in these web pages. Please address these contributions by
mail to ISRI, P.O. Box 30, CH-1211 Geneva-12, Switzerland, or by e-mail to
gsponer@vtx.ch.
4.12 Letters
This section contains the letters which are referred to in the previous sections.
They have been typeseted and slightly edited in order to have the same format.
They are also available as scanned documents on the The High Energy Weapons
Archive web site.9
4.12.1 From C. Llewellyn Smith, CERN, 25 April 1995
CERN — EUROPEAN ORGANIZATION FOR NUCLEAR RESEARCH
Professeur C.H. Llewellyn Smith
Directeur ge´ne´ral
CH-1211 Gene`ve 23, Suisse
Notre Re´f.: DG/mnd/1099
Monsieur
Antoine Maurice
Re´dacteur en Chef
Journal de Gene`ve
9 http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Iraq/Calutron.html .
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rue de Hesse 12
1211 Gene`ve 11
Gene`ve, le 25 avril 1995
Monsieur le Re´dacteur en Chef,
Votre journal a fait paraıˆtre en premie`re page de son no 95, des 22-23 avril
1995, un article intitule´ “Bombe atomique: l’Irak est passe´ par le CERN,” suivi
en page inte´rieure d’un retentissant: “Gene`ve berceau de la bombe irakienn.” J’ai
e´te´ surpris par ces titres excessifs, qui me paraissent sans raport tant avec la re´alite´
qu’avec le contenu même de l’article.
Puis-je rappeler que, selon la convention internationale qui le cre´e, le CERN
“s’abstient de tout activite´ a` fins militaires” et qu’il se conforme strictement a`
une e´thique de rescherche civile et pacifique. Les re´sultats de ses recherches sont
publie´s; il n’y a rien de secret ou de confidentiel dans les re´sultats des travaux de
notre institution.
En l’occurence, l’article e´labore´, semble-t-il sur la base d’une opinion indi-
viduelle, n’e´tablit pas la de´monstration d’un lien direct entre les activite´s du CERN
et la bombe irakienne. Il semble même e´tablir le contraire.
En effet, il souligne d’abord que “finalement, les Irakiens ont choisi un de-
sign diffe´rent de celui du CERN pour les aimants de leurs calutrons.” Il rappelle
ensuite que le future responsable de la bombe irakienne avait travaille´ au CERN
durant les anne´es 70, en tant que rattache´ a` l’Imperial College de Londres, et
qu’ulte´rieurement il avait envoye´ au CERN un inge´nieur irakien pour rechercher
des informations sur les aimants construits par ce dernier. Cependant, il constate
aussi, de bonne source, que les “informations que cet inge´nieur a reçues se trou-
vaient dans la litte´rature scientifique publique et ... qu’il n’a pas eu acce`s aux plans
d’inge´nieur originaux, ni a` certains proce´de´s particuliers de´veloppe´s par le CERN
pour construire cet aimant.” Il est difficile de mieux souligner que la technologie
choisie n’e´tait pas celle utilise´e par le CERN.
Je suis navre´ que votre journal, pour lequel j’ai de la conside´ration, se soit laisse´
entraıˆner a` une conclusion qu’aucun fait ne corrobore. Je vous serai reconnaissant
d’informer vos lecteurs de la pre´sente re´action du CERN a` votre article.
Veuillez agre´er, Monsieur le Re´dacteur en Chef, l’expression de mes sentiments
distingue´s.
C.H. Llewellyn Smith
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4.12.2 From J. Steinberger, CERN, 27 April 1995
Jack Steinberger
CERN
CH-1211 Geneva 23
Switzerland
M. Antoine Maurice
Re´dacteur en Chef
Journal de Gene`ve
rue de Hesse 12
1211 Gene`ve 11
Geneva, 27.4.1995
Dear M. Maurice,
The 24/4 issue of the Journal de Gene`ve distinguishes itself by a front page
headline and an article signed Suren Erkman, both referring to CERN, and both
remarkable for their misleading and misinforming character. I think I know what
goes on in CERN pretty well, since I have participated in physics experiments at
CERN since the middle 50’s, have been a staff member from ’68 till my retirement
in ’86, was director of research for a while in the seventies, and still work there
full time.
I KNOW that CERN has no involvement with any military. Neither the physics
we do nor the technology we develop, has excited any particular interest by the
military, European or otherwise. In all of my time at CERN I have not see any
sign of interest by any military organization in anything we do here.
For his information regarding the alleged Iraqian use of CERN, Erkman bases
himself on statements by A. Gsponer, who worked here as a young physicist in
the late 70’s. I know the history of Gsponer, who has become psychopathic on
the issue of alleged military involvement of CERN. He went on to GIPRI, and
made life difficult there until he left. His stories of military use of CERN are pure
invention.
I know the N10 magnets which are referred to. They are a straightforward
application of principles known since Ampere and Maxwell. Being aircore toroids,
the basic design is of no conceivable interest for calutrons. Neither could their
technology have been of interest, since there is nothing there which is in anyway
new. The connection with the Iraq calutron is the invention of the mind of Gsponer.
The physicist Jafar, referred to as the patron of bomb development in Iraq,
was in the seventies the associate at a postdoctoral level of a professor at Imperial
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College whom I know very well and trust. They were working together in particle
physics experiments. According to my colleague, Jafar was excellent, and was
proposed to a permanent faculty at Imperial, but this proposal did not go through.
As physicist at Imperial, Jafar participated in a normal way in experiments at
CERN with my colleague, who believes that at this time Jafar had no Iraqi military
motives or connections.
There is no doubt that many technologically underdevelopped countries, in
their military development, have used and continue to use, persons trained in the
West. Does that mean that the West should refuse to teach foreign students?
It would be most interesting for me to understand why Mr. Erkman saw fit
to write such dribble, and why your paper saw fit to publish such disinformation,
certainly no service to your readers. I would be most grateful to you for any
information which might help me to understand this action of your paper. A
telephonic attempt to reach Mr. Erkman was without response.
Sincerely yours,
Jack Steinberger
Nobel Laureate in Physics
4.12.3 To M. Zifferero, IAEA, 5 May 1995
ISRI — Independent Scientific Research Institute
P.O. Box 30
Ch-1211 Geneva-12
Switzerland
Dr Maurizio ZIFFERERO
Leader UNSC 687 action team
International Atomic Energy Agency
P.O. Box 100
A-1400 Vienna
Austria
5 May 1995
Dear Dr Zifferero,
Suren Erkman from the Journal de Gene`ve has informed me that you called
him in connection with his article on my discovery of Iraq’s strong interest in
calutron technology while I was working at CERN in 1979.
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In the coming weeks I will be working out of my office most of the time. If
you want to call me, the best would be to use my home telephone number (Geneva
312’22’91) between 18h00 and 21h00.
Enclosed are a few articles on the kind of work done at ISRI.
Yours sincerely,
Dr A. Gsponer
4.12.4 To M. Zifferero, IAEA, 8 November 1995
ISRI — Independent Scientific Research Institute
P.O. Box 30
Ch-1211 Geneva-12
Switzerland
Dr Maurizio ZIFFERERO
Leader UNSC 687 action team
International Atomic Energy Agency
P.O. Box 100
A-1400 Vienna
Austria
8 November 1995
Dear Dr Zifferero,
Please find enclosed the report on Iraq’s calutrons that was announced in the
Journal de Gene`ve edition of 22-23 April 1995.
I would greatly appreciate yours comments and could, if it is of interest, come
to Vienna to give a seminar on this topic.
Yours sincerely,
Dr A. Gsponer
4.12.5 From M. Zifferero, IAEA, 15 November 1995
IAEA - INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
Wagrammerstrasse 5
P.O. Box 100
A-1400 Vienna
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Austria
Dr. A. Gsponer
ISRI
Box 30
1211 Geneva 12
Switzerland
15 November 1995
Dear Dr. Gsponer,
We just received your report on Iraq’s calutrons. Thank you for sending it. We
plan to study it and would like to ask you permission to copy it to two experts,
one in LLNL and one in ORNL, who assisted us in evaluating the Iraqi effort on
EMIS.
Once the analysis is finished, I would like to get back to you with our comments.
Thanks again for your courtesy.
Yours sincerely,
Maurizio Zifferero
Leader
UNSC 687 Action Team
4.12.6 To M. Zifferero, IAEA, 20 November 1995
ISRI — Independent Scientific Research Institute
P.O. Box 30
Ch-1211 Geneva-12
Switzerland
Dr Maurizio ZIFFERERO
Leader UNSC 687 action team
International Atomic Energy Agency
P.O. Box 100
A-1400 Vienna
Austria
20 November 1995
Dear Dr Zifferero,
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Please find enclosed, for your experts at LLNL and ORNL, two extra copies
of the report ISRI-95-03 on Iraq’s calutrons.
Yours sincerely,
Dr A. Gsponer
4.12.7 To B. Al-Tikriti, Mission of Iraq, 20 November 1995
ISRI — Independent Scientific Research Institute
P.O. Box 30
Ch-1211 Geneva-12
Switzerland
Mr Barzam Al-Tikriti
Ambassador
Permanent Mission of the
Republic of Iraq
28a, Ch. du Petit-Saconnex
1209 GENEVA
20 November 1995
Your excellency,
Please forgive my writing you without having been introduced.
I am a physicist who worked at CERN at a time when Dr Jafar Dhia Jafar, Vice
Chairman of the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission, was also there. I have written
a study on Iraq’s electromagnetic enrichment program and would very much like
sending a copy of the report to Dr Jafar for his comments.
You will find enclosed a copy of a Journal de Gene`ve article in which the report
in question was announced.
Since I don’t have the proper address of Dr Jafar, and would like to make sure
that my report gets into his hands as soon as possible, it may be that the best might
be to sent it by diplomatic mail, unless you think otherwise.
In either case, I would greatly appreciate that you let me know Dr Jafar’s
address, or whether you would be ready to forward a letter and a 50 pages document
to Dr Jafar through your embassy.
Yours sincerely,
Dr Andre´ Gsponer
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Encl: Journal de Gene`ve 22-23 avril 1995
4.12.8 From Mission of Iraq, 16 January 1996
Mission permanent de la Re´publique d’Irak
Aupre`s de l’office des Nations unies a` Gene`ve
Recommande´
Ref.: MP/013/1996
Dr. Andre´ GSPONER
ISRI
Boıˆte postale 30
1211 Gene`ve 12
Monsieur,
Comme suite a` votre lettre du 02/11/95, adresse´e a` S.E. Monsieur Barzan AL-
TIKRITI, Ambassadeur, Repre´sentant permanent de la Re´publique d’Irak aupre`s
de l’ONU a` Gene`ve, nous vous avisons que votre courrier a e´te´ transmis aux
autorite´s irakiennes concerne´es. Ces dernie`res tiennent a` vous informer que,
pour recevoir une re´ponse favorable a` votre demande, vous devez obtenir une
autorisation de l’Agence internationale de l’e´nergie atomique (AIEA) a` Vienne,
permettant a` Monsieur Jafar Dhia Jafar de commenter l’e´tude mentionne´e dans
votre lettre.
Par ailleurs, vous pouvez aussi envoyer votre e´tude a` Monsieur Jafar Dhia Jafar
par le bias de l’AIEA a` Vienne et le destinataire pourra e´galement vous adresser
ses remarques par l’interme´diare de l’Agence susmentionne´e.
Nous vous prions d’agre´er, Monsieur, nos salutations distingue´es.
Gene`ve, le 16 janvier 1996
4.12.9 To M. Zifferero, IAEA, 22 January 1996
ISRI — Independent Scientific Research Institute
P.O. Box 30
Ch-1211 Geneva-12
Switzerland
Registered
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Dr Maurizio ZIFFERERO
Leader UNSC 687 action team
International Atomic Energy Agency
P.O. Box 100
A-1400 Vienna
Austria
22 January 1996
Dear Dr Zifferero,
Please find enclosed a copy of the report ISRI-95-03 on Iraq’s calutrons and a
letter addressed to Dr Jafar Dhia Jafar.
I am sending you these documents at the suggestion of the Permanent mission
of Iraq in Geneva which stated that in order to send a copy to Dr Jafar Dhia Jafar
and allow him to give comments, I should transit through your office.
I would therefore greatly appreciate if you could forward the enclosed letter
and report to Dr Jafar Dhia Jafar, and grant him the permission to answer my
questions and send his comments back to me.
Thank you very much for your courtesy.
Yours sincerely,
Dr A. Gsponer
Encl.:
- Letter to Dr Jafar Dhia Jafar
- Report ISRI-95-03
4.12.10 To J.D. Jafar, IAEC, 22 January 1996
ISRI — Independent Scientific Research Institute
P.O. Box 30
Ch-1211 Geneva-12
Switzerland
Dr Jafar Dhia Jafar
Vice Chairman of the
Iraq Atomic Energy Commission
c/o International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna
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22 January 1996
Dear Dr Jafar Dhia Jafar,
In the early 1970s, while you were working at CERN on the measurement of
polarization effects in various reactions using a polarized target, I was involved in
similar experiments, possibly using the same South hall beam line (e.g., L. Dick
et al., Phys. Lett. 57B (1975) 93-96).
We never met, and I would not be writing the present letter if you had not sent
somebody to CERN in 1979 in order to enquire about the magnet of the NA10
experiment on which I was working at the time. This event, which is described in
some detail in chapter 2 of the report ISRI-95-03, together with the discovery in
1978 of the existence of research on particle beam weapons (to be later expanded
in the SDI program), was one of the reasons why I decided in 1980 to leave high
energy physics to work full time on disarmament.
The enclosed report, ISRI-95-03, that I am sending you for review and com-
ments, is a typical example of the kind of work I am presently doing. It is an
independent assessment of EMIS technology and an attempt to draw the main
disarmament conclusions.
This report has been sent for review and comments to more than fifteen re-
searchers, including specialists at CERN and at the IAEA. In fact, I expect that
there will be substantial differencies in the final version of the report, which I hope
to be ready in March or April.
A major weakness of this report is our discussion of the development of EMIS
technology in Iraq. In particular, several aspects of our interpretation of the
published information on the design principles of the EMIS plant that was under
construction at Tarmiya are rather speculative. In fact, as you can see from section
2.4 of our report, our interest is not to document in all possible detail each part of
the enrichment plant, but to describe the general scientific principles of the final
design of the electromagnetic separation system, and to give the main general
characteristics such as sizes, beam currents, number and position the ion sources
and collectors, etc. Another aspect we would like to document with some precision
is the reasoning which lead to the choice of the mass analyzing field system, and
in particular the role of the NA10 magnet in this context.
I would therefore greatly appreciate it if you could send us any information
that could help us to answer the following questions:
A) Concerning the design under construction at Tarmiya (section 2.4, pages
24-27 of ISRI-95-03):
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1) Is the description we give in section 2.4 globally correct, or have we made
any gross mistakes in our interpretation - and if so what are they?
2) What was the focusing angle in the alpha-calutrons? In the case where
the focusing angle was slightly less than 180o, could it be that they were two
independent sets of beams in each half of the separation chambers?
3) Did the alpha-stage use multiple overlapping beams of similar radii (like
the two- or four-beam units used at Oak Ridge), multiple overlapping beams with
different radii, or non-overlapping beams like the two-beam units studied by the
French (our reference number [26]).
4) How many ion-sources and collectors were there in the alpha-calutrons?
How were they positioned? What were the overall dimensions of each of these
sources? What were the lengths of the ion extraction slits? What were the design
and measured ion source currents? What were the measured ion currents at the
collectors?
5) Is the schematic of the calutron track shown in Fig. 6 correct? In particular,
could you confirm that the minimum spacing between the magnets was about 100
cm.
6) Is our interpretation of Fig.7a correct (i.e., that this chamber was designed to
contain three concentric and non-overlapping double-beams)? If our interpretation
is wrong, could you tell us how the ion-sources and ion-collectors were positioned?
How were the pumps connected to the chamber: Are the three “channels” pump-
vibrations absorbers?
7) Is it correct that the beta calutrons were to use the 255o method? In this
case, how many beams were there to be in each chamber? Is Fig.7b a beta calutron
chamber or just a prototype chamber?
B) Concerning the NA10 magnet and other analyzing field systems (sections
2.1 to 2.3, pages 19-23 of ISRI-95-03):
1) What was the main reason for not using simple magnets of the kind used at
Oak Ridge?
2) Did you consider in detail the possibility of using a 1/r field such as the one
produced by the S-2 separator at Arzamas-16? Did you consider the possibility of
using a Bernas-type sector separator?
3) Did you consider in detail the possibility of using a magnet similar to the
NA10 magnet? What was the main reason for not using such a magnet?
Obtaining answers to some, or all of the above questions would greatly help
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us to finalize the report ISRI-95-03. I would also very much appreciate it if you
could send us any comments you may have on our report.
Thank you very much for your collaboration.
Sincerely,
Dr Andre´ Gsponer
Encl.: Andre´ Gsponer and Jean-Pierre Hurni, “Iraq’s calutrons — Electromagnetic
separation, beam technology and nuclear weapon proliferation,” report ISRI-95-03
(19 October 1995).
4.12.11 From M. Zifferero, IAEA, 26 January 1996
IAEA - INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
Wagrammerstrasse 5
P.O. Box 100
A-1400 Vienna
Austria
Dr. A. Gsponer
ISRI
Box 30
1211 Geneva 12
Switzerland
26 January 1996
Dear Dr. Gsponer,
Please refer to your request dated 22 January 1996 concerning the set of
questions you would like to be answered by Dr. Jafar. Having gone through these
questions in some detail, I am afraid we cannot assist you in this matter, since
most of these questions look rather tutorial in nature in the sense that could assist
Iraqi scientists and engineers by providing them food for new thoughts, should
they decide to start again clandestine activity on EMIS.
I would propose an alternative way to meet, at least in part, your request. Our
Iraqi counterpart is preparing, at the request of the IAEA, what is called a Full,
Final, Complete Declaration (FFCD) of the activities carried out under their past
clandestine programme. We expect a first draft of the FFCD, which should include
a substantive chapter covering their efforts on EMIS, to be ready for discussion
within a couple of months or so. We plan to submit each chapter of this report to
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the scrutiny of experts in each relevant area. This examination is likely to result
in a number of questions to be put to the counterpart. In this conjunction, some
of your questions, excluding those tutorial in nature could be added to the list. I
hope this proposal will meet, albeit partially your request.
Sincerely,
Maurizio Zifferero
Leader, UNSC 687
Action Team
4.12.12 From R.F. Mozley, CISAC, 28 February 1996
601 Laurel Ave.
Menlo Park, CA 94025
U.S.A.
Dr. Andre´ Gsponer
ISRI
Box 30
1211 Geneva 12
Switzerland
February 28, 1996
Dear Dr. Gsponer,
Thank you for sending me your report on Iraq’s calutrons. I found it very
useful and interesting. (...)
Although you were early in this, you are not alone in your lack of success
in warning about the possible use of calutrons as a method of enrichment by
proliferants. As you may have seen in my enrichment paper, p 48, Paul Persiani
also had no success.
I don’t share your view that governments and physicists have conspired to
prevent such publication. The physicists I know delight in showing governmental
policy to be wrong. I think you have observed the reluctance of publishers to
accept new ideas, especially if they don’t come from an internationally famous
scientist.
My comments which you requested are:
You have written two papers, one on the Iraqi calutron program, the other
on your difficulties in publication. I believe that the first paper will be readily
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accepted for publication. The combined paper that you sent will either be refused
publication or the difficult part will be edited out. I think it would be useful to
write about the difficulties in a separate article.
I would enjoy receiving other reports from your institute.
Yours sincerely,
Robert F. Mozley
4.12.13 To P.J. Persiani, ANL, 17 June 1996
ISRI — Independent Scientific Research Institute
P.O. Box 30
Ch-1211 Geneva-12
Switzerland
Dr Paul J. Persiani
Argonne National Laboratory
9700 South Cass Av.
Argonne, IL 60439
U.S.A.
17 June 1996
Dear Dr Persiani,
I would greatly appreciate receiving a copy of your document entitled Non-
Proliferation Aspects of Commercial Nuclear Fuel Cycles, report to the Institute
of Nuclear Materials Management, 33rd Annual Meeting, Orlando, Florida, July
1992.
I am very much concerned by the question on non-proliferation and would
like to draw your attention to the fact that I have discovered in 1979 already
Iraq’s interest in calutron technology. (J.D. Jafar, the head of Iraq’s atomic bomb
program worked at CERN for many years.) With a colleague at ISRI we have
written a report on the proliferation problems associated with various beam-related
technologies.
This report (the abstract of which is enclosed) has been sent to a number of
individuals at several institutions for reviewing (IAEA, ORNL, LLNL, CERN,
etc). I would very much like having your comments on this report, provided you
have the time and interest to do it. We plan to finalize our report in September this
year. If you are interesting receiving a copy of our report, please let me know.
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Yours sincerly,
Dr Andre´ Gsponer
4.12.14 To G. Mu¨nzenberg, GSI, 19 June 1996
ISRI — Independent Scientific Research Institute
P.O. Box 30
Ch-1211 Geneva-12
Switzerland
Professor G. Mu¨nzenberg
Chairman of EMIS-13
GSI
Planckstrasse 1
D-64291 Darmstadt
19 June 1996
Dear Professor Mu¨nzenberg,
Please find in attachment the abstract of a contribution we are submitting to
the organizing committee for a short presentation at the EMIS-13 conference.
We realize that this contribution, written by two nuclear physicists, is special
in the sense that it is discussing the nuclear weapon proliferation implication of
EMIS rather than a technical point related to the development of the technology.
Our contribution will be a summary of the final version of the report ISRI-95-
03 released on 19 October 1995. This preliminary report, of which we include
the title page and table of contents on pages 3 and 4, has since been extensively
reviewed at a number of places including IAEA, ORNL, LLNL, CERN, etc.
We think that such a contribution would be important, as much for the historical
and technical analysis we present, as for the kind of background it provides to a
scientific community which is evolving in a more and more complex world.
Yours sincerely,
Dr Andre´ Gsponer
Electromagnetic isotope separation, beam technology and
nuclear weapon proliferation
by
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Andre´ Gsponer and Jean-Pierre Hurni
Independent Scientific Research Institute
P.O. Box 30, 1211 Geneva 12
Switzerland
Abstract
The past and present status of high-current electromagnetic isotope
separation (EMIS) technology for uranium and plutonium
enrichment (i.e., calutrons) is reviewed in the five nuclear weapons
States and in four critical States; Japan, India, Israel and Iraq.
The circumstances and significance of the discovery in 1979 of Iraq’s
definite interest in calutron technology is discussed in some details.
The conclusion stresses the potential of “old” technologies such as
calutrons (and the plasma separation process), e.g., for uranium or
plutonium enrichment, and of particle accelerators for the efficient
production of plutonium or tritium.
Submitted to EMIS-13
September 23–27, 1996
Bad Du¨rkheim
4.12.15 From I. Chavet, SOREQ, 25 June 1996
SOREQ
Soreq NRC
Yavne 81800
Israel
Mr Andre Gsponer
ISRI, Box 30
1211 Geneva 12
Switzerland
June, 25 1996
Sir,
A friend of mine from the I.A.E.C. showed me your very interesting paper,
written in collaboration with Jea-Pierre Hurni:
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Iraq’s Calutrons — Electromagnetic isotope separation, beam
technology and nuclear weapon proliferation (ISRI-95-03)
This paper appealed to me since I have been mainly active in ion optics and
especially in mass separation systems.
However there was no accompanying bibliography.
Would you kindly send me the bibliography of this important paper in order to
fully appreciate its scientific message.
Thankfully yours,
Dr I. Chavet
4.12.16 To I. Chavet, SOREQ, 1 July 1996
ISRI — Independent Scientific Research Institute
P.O. Box 30
Ch-1211 Geneva-12
Switzerland
Dr I. Chavet
SOREQ NRC
Applied radiation
technology division
Yavne 81800
Israel
1 July 1996
Dear Dr Chavet,
Thank you very much for your letter of June 25. According to your request, I
am sending you the bibliography and the figures of the report ISRI-95-03.
In fact, this report is preliminary and we have have sent it to a number of people
and institutions for reviewing. (See attached copy of letter of June 18.)
Since you have now a complete copy of our report, I would greatly appreciate
any comments or suggestions you may have.
Also, I would greatly appreciate if you could send us any recent publication
concerning your activities in the field of mass separation systems, and - if there is -
a recent annual report in which the activities of SOREQ in this field are described.
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On a personal level, I can tel you that I am a good friend of Harry Bernas, the
nephew of Rene Bernas.
Hoping to meet you in September at EMIS-13,
Yours sincerely,
Dr Andre Gsponer
4.12.17 To M. Zifferero, IAEA, 1 July 1996
ISRI — Independent Scientific Research Institute
P.O. Box 30
Ch-1211 Geneva-12
Switzerland
Dr Maurizio ZIFFERERO
Leader UNSC 687 action team
International Atomic Energy Agency
P.O. Box 100
A-1400 Vienna
Austria
1 July 1996
Dear Dr Zifferero,
Please find enclosed the copy of a letter of Dr. I Chavet, the leader of EMIS
activities at SOREQ NRC, Israel. I have sent him the part of our report on Iraq’s
Calutrons he was missing, and asked him to send us any comments he may have.
The irony of the introductory sentence of Dr Chavet’s letter is that it is not clear
whether he got part of our report form the “Israel Atomic Energy Commission,”
the “Iraq Atomic Energy Commission” or possibly the “IAEA” if the last letter is
mistyped!
I would like to take this opportunity to remind you of our interest in receiving
any comments and suggestions from your Team on our report, as well as all
possible answers to my questions to Dr Jafar Dhia Jafar along the lines of your
letter of January 26.
Finally, I would like to suggest that the EMIS-13 Conference, September
23–27, 1996, might provide a forum for informal discussions on these questions
and other points of common interest. In this perspective, I am enclosing an
announcement of EMIS-13, hoping that some members of your team will attend
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this conference.
Yours sincerely,
Dr A. Gsponer
4.12.18 From M. Zifferero, IAEA, 2 August 1996
IAEA - INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
Wagrammerstrasse 5
P.O. Box 100
A-1400 Vienna
Austria
Dr. A. Gsponer
ISRI
Box 30
1211 Geneva 12
Switzerland
2 August 1996
Dear Dr. Gsponer,
Please accept my apologies for the late reply to your kind letter of 1 July 1996.
I have read your report for a second time and I believe it contains a good review
of the subject. The Iraqi “Full, final and Complete Declaration” (FFCD) of their
past programme was delivered to the Agency on 1 March 1996 in draft form.
It contained an extensive description (over 1000 pages) of their programme and
EMIS part of it.
As you can imagine it took some time to go through this document and identify
ambiguities, inconsistencies and contradictions, discuss them with the Iraqi coun-
terpart and ask for adequate revisions. The EMIS part of FFCD was extensively
discussed in the second half of June and we are now waiting for the corrected
and probably final version. As promised in my letter to you dated 26 January
1996, I will provide you with a copy of the EMIS part of the FFCD as soon as I
receive it and hope you will find in it replies to some of your questions. I hope
that this will occur before the EMIS-13 Conference of 23 September. Attendance
of representatives from the Action Team is unfortunately problematic since most
of us will be in Iraq at that time.
Sincerely,
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Maurizio Zifferero
Leader, UNSC 687
Action Team
4.12.19 From I. Chavet, SOREQ, 6 August 1996
SOREQ
Soreq NRC
Yavne 81800
Israel
Dr Andre Gsponer
ISRI, Box 30
1211 Geneva 12
Switzerland
6 August 1996
Dear Dr Gsponer,
Thank you for your answer of the 1st July. I apologize for this delay. I was
somewhat busy and I had to search for some of the references.
I personally congratulate you for devoting your time at trying to stop, or at
least to reduce, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, although I do not expect
substantial results. This perspective only enhances the merit of your efforts and
those of your collaborators.
To answer your request of comments on your paper, I really cannot say much
on the core of the topic, but I can only express my modest opinion concerning
some technical subjects mentioned there.
1) You describe in some detail the “orange” Risøspectrometer and the NA10
one you helped to build at CERN. Both are indeed ingeniously conceived and
beautifully designed. However, one must distinguish between instruments in-
tended for measurements and those intended for material separation with a view
to reasonable output. The requirements and problems are different and so are their
design principles.
2) You stress the importance of the focusing in the transverse (or vertical)
direction in addition to the lateral (or horizontal) focusing. This vertical focusing
which is very important for spectrometers is not really necessary for production
mass separators, since these machines have forcibly long emission slits and it does
not matter where the ions land on the collector, as long as they do not depart
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laterally from the image line. This last condition should preferably be chosen as
part of the optical requirements.
3) Without detailing here the merits and drawbacks of inhomogeneous fields,
I would remind that the control of the ion trajectory in the transverse (or vertical)
direction can also be achieved with adequately sloped field boundaries. An added
bonus of this last method is a much lighter and cheaper magnet.
4) With all my admiration for the NA10 spectrometer design, I think that it
would be very difficult to apply a similar design to isotopes separators, for reasons
too long to discuss here. Even if it were possible, it could be very awkward and
expensive to operate such a battery. The closed magnetic loop of the Oak Ridge
calutrons (or its modification used in Iraq) seems still the simplest and best design.
5) In the field of isotope separation we prefer the term “enrichment enhance-
ment factor” instead of mass separation power. It is defined as the ratio of the
abundance of two isotopes of a given element after a separation, divided by the
same ratio before the separation. You were quite right in stating that this factor
depends on the dispersion and the width of the peaks at the collector, but it de-
pends also of the magnitude of the “tails” of the peaks which are due to various
contamination factors well studied by workers in the field. This enrichment factor
is strictly defined for only two isotopes of a given element. However, it is also
loosely used for the enrichment of a single isotope relative to all isotopes of an
element.
6) You are right in saying that a large beam current and high enrichment factor
are antagonistic. This is well illustrated by the American calutrons versus the
European laboratory separators. However, as in light optics, where a sophisticated
compound lens can achieve both wide aperture and high resolution, we were
convinced, when first planning MEIRA, that a well designed ion-optics could
achieve both high beam current and high enhancement factor, thus combining the
qualities of both types of separators. The challenge was indeed met as proved
for instance in the separation of Tellurium-124 (natural abundance 4.75%). From
the data of your reference [39], namely a purity of 99.77% for Te-124 obtained
in production operating conditions (beam current 42.5 mA), one can infer an
enhancement factor of 8700 which compares honorably with the best European
machines. This performance was achieved by an elaborate design, eliminating all
practical aberrations of the second and third order (heterogeneous terms included).
So it is not quite correct to say that MEIRA was built on the model of the Orsay
separator, which was not corrected even for the second order aperture aberration
term. Nevertheless, this last machine represented at its time a tremendous leap
forward in the technology of isotopes separators and it did a splendid job in the
early sixties (we used to operate it continuously in three shifts 24 hours a day).
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I was very luck to be trained at Orsay under the late Rene´ Bernas and will never
forget his thorough understanding and openmindness as as his tutorial qualities.
Incidentally, may I mention that MEIRA has been copied at the Amersham
Laboratories (Amersham, England) and successfully operated for industrial use.
Concerning your question about my recent work, I am retired since 1989 and
have stopped doing any significant work worth publishing since then. Anyhow,
my last papers were:
Effective aberrations in electromagnetic isotopes separators in collaboration with
J. Camplan, N.I.M. Phys. Res. 226 (1980) 250.
Imaging properties of a convex spherical surface emitting a space charge limited
ion current, N.I.M. Phys. Res. A251 (1986) 201.
Size of virtual source behind a convex spherical surface emitting a space charge
limited ion current, N.I.M. Phys. Res. A258 (1987) 58.
Principles of unattended operation of isotope separators, N.I.M. Phys. Res. B26
(1987) 44.
Concerning the last work done on MEIRA, in fact, all activities linked with
isotope separation were stopped more than ten years ago for lack of financial
support and the machine has been used as low voltage accelerator for research in
the following topics, the results of which were published in various journals:
a) Ion implantation to improve surface quality of steels.
b) Bombardment of various materials with low voltage oxygen ions to assess
their suitability for use in space projects. For this work, a deceleration system was
designed and adapted to the separator.
c) Development of diamond-like films by carbon implantation at adequate
energies. For this work a precise two-dimensional mechanical scanning system
was designed.
In all these activities I only helped to develop the necessary accessories and fit
them to the separator.
I am happy that you meet Harry Bernas. Please give him my best regards.
I am sorry that, for various reasons, I would not be able to attend the EMIS-13
Conference. I can only wish it to be a very successful one.
Truly yours,
Dr I. Chavet
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4.12.20 From I. Langermann, ICLQ, 28 August 1996
THE INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY
The British Institute of International and Comparative Law Quarterly
17 Russel Square
London QC1B 5DR
Dr Andre Gsponer
ISRI
Box 30
CH-1211 Geneva 12
Switzerland
28 August 1996
Dear Dr Gsponer,
Thank you very much for submitting the article by yourself, Dr Hurni and Dr
Clement entitled “UN Security Council Resolutions 687, 707, and 715 and their
Implications for a Halt of all Proliferation Prone Nuclear Activities — a Technical
and Legal Assessment” for consideration for publication in ICLQ.
However, I regret to inform you that, after very careful consideration, the
editors have decided not to accept your article for publication.
I appreciate that this will come as a disappointment and would like to thank
you for letting the ICLQ consider your work.
Please let me know if you wish the article to be returned to you.
Yours sincerely,
Ida Langermann
Assistant General Editor
4.12.21 To M. Zifferero, IAEA, 30 December 1996
ISRI — Independent Scientific Research Institute
P.O. Box 30
Ch-1211 Geneva-12
Switzerland
Dr Maurizio ZIFFERERO
Leader UNSC 687 action team
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International Atomic Energy Agency
P.O. Box 100
A-1400 Vienna
Austria
30 December 1996
Dear Dr Zifferero,
I recently got across a remarquable document by Robert Meunier who with
others built the “Sidonie” electromagnetic separator of Orsay in the 1960-70s. This
document CSNSM-94-30 describes an industrial scale electromagnetic separation
system for cesium which could handle 4.3 × 238/135 = 7.6 tons of natural
uranium per year. It is a very detailed study by somebody who has spent his
life building high-current electromagnetic separators. The study is especially
interesting because it gives precise estimates for the construction and operating
costs of an industrial scale EMIS plant.
It is quite possible that you already have this report but I wanted to make sure
that the IAEA had seen it.
I was recently at a Wilton Park conference entitled “Preventing the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction: Is it an achievable goal?” (December 16–20,
1996). I was rather surprised by the number of references made to UNSCOM and
Iraq. At one time I had to make the point that UNSCOM was an INDEPENDENT
commission and that one had to wait for its final report before drawing too many
conclusions.
I look forward the EMIS part of the FFCD so we can put our report on Iraq’s
calutron into final form and publish it in 1977.
Best wishes to you and to UNSCOM for 1997.
Yours sincerely,
Dr Andre´ Gsponer
4.12.22 From A. McDermott, Security Dialogue, 20 May 1997
SECURITY DIALOGUE
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo
Fuglehauggt. 11
N-0260 Oslo
Norway
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Andre Gsponer
Independent Scientific
Research Institute
Box 30
1211 Geneva 12
Sveits
20 May 1997
Dear Andre Gsponer,
We have now completed the evaluation of your article “UN Security Council
Resolutions 687, 707, and 715 ...” I am sorry that this took such a long time to
complete. As you know, one of our referees became ill and it took a bit longer than
we had counted on to get his review. However, two referees have now commented
on your article and I have also read it with interest. Unfortunately, I have to agree
with the reviewers, both of whom mention that the 1991 resolutions of the UN
Security Council (UNSC) referred to are some years old now. There would have
been acute problems enforcing the resolution, particularly since neither China nor
France were as yet parties of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial autority of the UNSC was regarded as fairly
tenuous and without sufficient authority to force compliance out of Iraq.
Again, our apologies that it has taken us this long to come to a negative
conclusion!
Sincerely,
Anthony McDermott
Editor, Security Dialogue
4.12.23 To R. Hooper, IAEA, 21 November 1997
ISRI — Independent Scientific Research Institute
P.O. Box 30
Ch-1211 Geneva-12
Switzerland
Dr Richard HOOPER
Director
Department of Safeguards
International Atomic Energy Agency
P.O. Box 100
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A-1400 Vienna
21 November 1997
Dear Dr Hooper,
Please find enclosed the title page of the report ISRI-95-03 on “Iraq’s Ca-
lutrons” that we have circulated for review starting October 1995.
It is quite possible that you have seen a copy of this report. It was sent, in
particular, to late Maurizio ZIFFERERO, then leader of the UNSC 687 action team
in Iraq. In case of need, you should find a copy of it in the IAEA Library.
The purpose of this letter is connected with the fact that you will be giving a
lecture on Monday December 1st at the 515th Wilton Park Conference: “Building
an effective international consensus against nuclear proliferation.” Since I will be
attending this conference, I would greatly appreciate to have a brief conversation
with you on the correspondence I had with Dr Maurizio ZIFFERERO about our
report on Iraq’s calutron effort.
In effect, since Octobre 1995, we had quite a substantial correspondence about
our report. This results in many important improvements and we would like to
put this document into a final form, hopefully in the beginning or Spring of 1998.
In particular, I would like to know when we may expect to receive the EMIS
part of the Iraqi “Full, Final and Complete Declaration” that was promised by
Dr Maurizio ZIFFERERO in his letters to us of 26 January and 2 August 1996
(enclosed).
I believe that a conversation at Wilton Park about this question might be useful
before I write to the new leader of the UNSC 687 action team.
I would greatly appreciate that you help me on this point.
Yours sincerely,
Dr Andre´ Gsponer
Director
Encl.:
- Title page and abstract of ISRI-95-03, 19 October 1995
- Letter of 2 August 1996 by Dr Maurizio ZIFFERERO to ISRI
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Paper 5
Iraq’s calutrons: 2002 - 2005
by Andre Gsponer.
Many events related to Iraq’s former nuclear weapons program, including
a second war on Iraq, occurred after the paper Iraq’s calutrons: 1991 - 2001,
reproduced in Part 4 of this report, was posted on internet on July 31, 2001, that is
only a few weeks before September 11, 2001. This is because the US Government
immediately started to claim that there could be a link between Al Quaida’s terror
attack on the United States and Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq — which led to
the false claim that Saddam Hussein was trying to restart his nuclear program.1
In order to remain brief, only four events will be reported here: The unsuccess-
ful attempt in April 2003 by Dr. Jafar Dhia Jafar (who ran Iraq’s nuclear program
from its beginning to its end) to come to Geneva to tell his version of the facts right
after the beginning of the second Gulf War; the contribution in August 2003 of a
comment to Lord Hutton’s inquiry on Dr. David Kelly’s suicide; the publication
in January 2005 of J.D. Jafar’s book “The Assignment;” and finally in May 2005
the publication of a conspicuous paper on US calutron technology on the occasion
of the 60th anniversary of the production of the 50 kg of enriched uranium used in
the atomic bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.
1The false claims that Iraq had resumed its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs
were used to justify Gulf War II. The invasion of Iraq began on 20 March 2003, Bagdhad fell on 9
April 2003, and the war was officially declared to be “over” on 30 April 2003.
121
122 Iraq’s calutrons:
5.1 J.D. Jafar’s aborted visit to Geneva during the
2003 invasion of Iraq
Although he had been approached by US intelligence to defect before the 20 March
2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, Jafar Dhia Jafar remained in Iraq until he fled to the
United Arab Emirates just two days before Baghdad fell to coalition forces, on 9
April 2003. This is how, three weeks later, I received the following e-mail:
Date: Sat, 26 Apr 2003 20:09:27 +0400
From: ajafar@emirates.net.ae
Subject: Attn: Professor Andre Gsponer
To: gsponer@vtx.ch
Dear Professor Gsponer,
My father, Dr. Jafar Dhia Jafar, would like to speak to
you confidentially and has requested my help to obtain your
private telephone number.
Since he does not currently have access to email, please
can you respond to this address.
ajafar@emirates.net.ae
Thank you for your assistance.
Yours sincerely,
Amin Jafar
To which I immediately replied:
Date: Sat, 26 Apr 2003 18:24:01 +0100
From: gsponer <gsponer@vtx.ch>
Subject: Telephone number
To: ajafar@emirates.net.ae
Dear Amin Jafar,
Please inform your father that he is most welcome to call
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me at the number below which is currently both my professional
and private telephone number. He may call me on this direct
line any time (except tomorrow) between 9 am and 9 pm Swiss
time.
Sincerely,
Andre Gsponer
Jafar called me on the 4th of May at 6 pm. After greeting he said: “I come
right to the point: I need an invitation to get a visa for coming to Geneva. I have
a valid passport and I can travel. But I need an invitation and I thought that
you could help me with that.” Jafar further explained that he wanted to come to
Geneva to explain that Iraq destroyed its nuclear weapons program in 1991 and
never restarted it, so that there was nothing to be found in Iraq, contrary to the
claims made to justify the invasion of Iraq.
I responded that I was ready to invite him at ISRI so he could do that, but
that I had no direct experience with inviting somebody like him under the current
circumstances. I would therefore first have to enquire on how to proceed in order
to avoid a categorical “no” from the Swiss administration.
Consequently, right after we convened of the time of our next telephone conver-
sation, I called some diplomats I knew with whom I could speak in full confidence.
After some brainstorming, I decided to take the advice of trying to get the support
of the Swiss Ambassador to the UN.
It was not possible to speak right away to Christian Faessler, the Swiss Am-
bassador to the UN responsible for disarmament matters. But I could immediately
speak to his military counselor, Dr. Rene´ Haug. Fortunately, I knew Haug since
1980, i.e., the time when after having left CERN I was learning something about
international relations, strategy and international security, and diplomacy, by tak-
ing classes as student at large at University of Geneva’s Graduate Institute of
International Studies (IUHEI2), where Haug was an assistant. I could therefore
casually explain him that I was seeking the Ambassador’s support for insuring
that Jafar could get a visa to enter Switzerland and spend some time at ISRI to
express his point of view, something I thought should be good for Switzerland’s
diplomacy and reputation as a neutral country.
2Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales)
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Rene´ Haug talked to the Ambassador, who said to be ready to support Jafar’s
visit to Switzerland. The next step was to enquire at the federal office in Berne
responsible for granting visas, to which Haug sent an e-mail on 6th of May. I
could therefore tell to Jafar that within a week or so he should know whether his
visa application would be accepted or not. Unfortunately, when the answer came,
on 13 May, it was negative:
“No personality of the former Baghdad regime will receive a visa
following a decision of the Federal Council of February 2003.”
This answer was given in writing to Rene´ Haug,3 who told me informally that
the Ambassador and himself were surprised since they had not been informed that
such a decision was taking before the war in Iraq had started.
When I reported this negative answer to Jafar he was very disappointed as
well: “I have never been a member of the Baath party, I have never been in the
government, I am not in the list of the 55 most-wanted Iraqi,4 I am completely free
to move...” In response to this I suggested that we may wait a couple of months
to make another try, and asked for his mailing address so that I could send him a
letter:
May 19, 2003
Subject: Visit to Geneva
Dear Dr. Jafar,
First of all I wish to thank you once again for having taken the
initiative to get in touch with me. This is a recognition of the fact that
I have always worked for a truly universal nuclear disarmament, and
that I have always kept a respectful attitude towards all parties.
In this letter I would like to reiterate what I said on the telephone,
namely that you should be able to come to a place like Geneva in
order to express what you have to say. This is very important be-
cause the current political situation is extremely bad and thus only
truly competent and well informed people like you may have an in-
fluence on the course of events. For instance, it was mainly because
3
“Les personalite´s de l’ancien re´gime de Baghdad ne recevront aucun visa suite a` la de´cison
du Conseil Fe´de´ral de fe´vrier 2003.”
4It was later told by US officials, in July 2003, that besides the list of 55 there was also a longer,
unpublished list of Iraqi leaders earmarked by the US government.
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senior scientists who took part in the Manhattan Project were willing
and able to express themselves (in the political arena and in journals
like The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists) that some of the most
terrifying possibilities did not realize in the past fifty years. These
people have now passed away, and we are witnessing a come back
of the worse diseases which plague affluent societies: imperialism,
militarism, racism, and colonialism. (In annex I am sending you two
examples which confirm that I am not alone in making such a pes-
simistic assessment.)
As I have said to the Swiss ambassador to the U.N., the danger of
not granting a visa to personalities like you is that scientists and tech-
nician who have worked on military technology in your (and other)
countries may ultimately decide to disappear and work in clandes-
tinity. He agreed with me and it is therefore very annoying that you
could not come. However, the main reason for not granting the visa
is apparently purely administrative: It is too soon to challenge a de-
cision made by the Federal Council less than three months ago.
Therefore, if you can wait a few more months, it might become much
easier to get a visa. Whenever you will feel like making another try I
shall be ready to help you again. In the mean time, if you start working
on some papers or a report on your experience I am also ready to help
you if I can. Feel free to ask me if you need some documents, or to
send me your drafts for review, etc.
In conclusion, I very much hope that you will be able to come to
Geneva in a few months time, which will give me the opportunity to
meet and work work with you on questions of common interest.
Best regards,
Dr. Andre Gsponer
P.S.: Please let me know if you have received my letter.
Encl.:
• J. Scheffran, Editorial: The new American dream is a nightmare,
INESAP Information Bulletin, No. 21 (April 2003) 2.
• E-mail exchange between Dr. Daniel Amit, a leading Jewish
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physicist, and Dr. Martin Blume, editor-in-chief of the Physical
Review (March 21, April 8, April 9, and April 14, 2003).
To which Jafar responded:
Date: Mon, 26 May 2003 11:45:56 +0400
From: Jafar DA Jafar <jafdjaf@hotmail.com>
Subject: Visit to Geneva
To: gsponer@vtx.ch
Dear Dr. Gsponer
Thank you for your letter dated May 19, 2003 which I received
yesterday.
Also, I read with interest the two attachments to your letter.
It is unfortunate that opinions like these are not well publicized,
in fact contrary opinions find their way, far more easily,
in the press of widest circulation. However, it is still
very important to learn the lessons of the more recent past
in order to make it harder for a repeat performance on some
other unfortunate people. I am glad to see that you are
as much concerned as some of us who were directly affected
by the more recent events.
Thank you again for your efforts and I shall await your signal
for the proper time.
With best wishes,
Dr. J. D. Jafar
Unfortunately, I could never send a positive signal to Dr. Jafar, who in the
meantime turned to other countries, where he met similar problems. For instance,
in November 2003, he was prevented from flying to Britain after his entry visa was
cancelled just hours before he was due to board a plane to Heathrow. It was only
the following year that he was finally able to go to England, where he could give
interviews, including his first broadcast interview aired on BBC on the 11 August
2004.
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5.2 Comment: “Farewell to a fellow whistle-blower”
Comment sent to the BBC on 2003/08/21 at 21:15 GMT in relation to the Hutton
inquiry on Dr. David Kelly’s suicide, with the request of forwarding the full
commentary to Lord Hutton, which was done. Excerpts of the comment were
published on the BBC website on 2003/08/28 at 21:17 GMT.
As the Hutton inquiry proceeds it becomes more and more clear that
what has killed Dr. David Kelly is the collapse of his system of values.
After having worked for more than twenty years for the cause of true
peace and disarmament, he could not live anymore with the evidence
that these goals were nothing but words in the mouth of the most senior
political leaders.
As today’s testimony of Ambassador David Broucher confirmed, Dr.
Kelly could not imagine that a democracy such as the United Kingdom
would take part in the open aggression of a sovereign State. In
the previous days we heard how much facts — simple undisputable
technical facts — were distorted and reworded in order to fit the
‘political judgement’ of the top politicians. It would have seemed
that such Middle-Age casuistry should be anachronistic in modern
democracy... But that is not all: There are more than twenty years that
facts about Iraq’s (and other countries’s) weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) are systematically distorted by Western governments.
Like Dr. Kelly, who happens to be only a couple of years older than me,
I have accumulated much evidence over the 24 years that I have been
working on Iraq’s WMD, see http://arXiv.org/abs/physics/0512268.
Already before the 1991 Gulf War everything was done to make sure
that WMD could become a pretext for attacking Iraq in case of dis-
grace. At no point between 1979 and 1991 did Western governments
really object to Iraq’s development and use of WMD. Neither did
Britain object to Iraq’s invasion of Koweit after having been duly
informed of its imminence.
What Dr. Kelly is recalling us is that words about human rights, rule
of law, democracy (in short, ‘top Western values’) should be put into
practice in international relations. Otherwise, we will only add more
weight to people like Oussama Bin Laden whose main criticism of the
West is precisely its lack of sincerity, and its systematic use of double
standards.
Dr. Andre Gsponer
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5.3 J.D. Jafar’s book: “The Assignment”
In January 2005 the Norwegian publisher SPARTACUS Verlag announced the
publication of a book based on a manuscript by J.D. Jafar on Iraq’s nuclear
weapons program. According to SPARTACUS Verlag’s web-site:5
The Assignment
The inside Story of the Iraqi WMD-Programme
by
Jafar Dhia Jafar, Numan Saadaldin Al-Niaimi, Lars Sigurd Sunnana˚
240 pages
ISBN 82-430-0333-9
This book presents the complete story of the Iraqi programme for
aquiring WMD, told by those who directed it on behalf of Saddam
Hussein.
Dr. Jafar Dhia Jafar, born in 1942, educated in the UK and married
to a British woman, was the initiator and scientific leader of the Iraqi
nuclear programme, and later the chief liaison between the Iraqi
regime and the various international bodies working to disarm Iraq.
He fled Baghdad shortly before the collapse of Sadddams regime in
April 2003. Together with his close colleague Numan Saadaldin Al-
Niaimi, also a distinguished leader of the Iraqi WMD-programme,
and the Norwegian journalist Lars S. Sunnana˚, he has written a story
from within, both personal and political, viewing the unfolding events
from the perspective of the engaged scientist as well as that of a
citizen and father. In addition to thrilling accounts on the progress
of the development of an Iraqi nuclear bomb, the authors present
extraordinary glimpses from the inner circles of Iraqi political life,
including several encounters with Saddam Hussein himself.
Engaging in their criticism of the regime, however, the authors of-
fer their most severe criticism of US foreign politics and the UN-
inspectors, convincingly demonstrating that Saddam closed down his
WMD-programme already in 1991. One of their points in case, is that
the ongoing bloody war could have been avoided had the inspectors
done their job without looking to political concerns.
Lars Sigurd Sunnana˚ is an acclaimed journalist, and was Norwegian
Broadcasting’s Middle East correspondent from 1999 to 2003.
5http://www.spartacus.no/index.php?Books=&ID=Artikkel&ID2=Vis&counter=71
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Figure 5.1: J.D. Jafar at the 27 January 2005 press conference in Oslo presenting
his book: The Assignment — The inside Story of the Iraqi WMD-Programme.
World rights held by Spartacus Publishing House in Oslo, Norway,
except Arabic language territories.
As this book is in Norwegian its audience is of course somewhat limited,
although an English version is expected to be published sometimes in the future.
Fortunately, Prof. Richard Wilson at Harvard University has a copy of Jafar’s
original text in English, and was kind enough to suggest an excerpt which is of
special interest in the context of the present report:6
A comparative study of three proven enrichment technologies, con-
ducted during the second half of 1981 came to the following conclu-
sions:
• The electromagnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS) method had a
number of advantages:
1. It is reasonably well documented in unclassified literature;
6Richard Wilson, private communication, 19 January 2006.
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2. The design and manufacture of prototype equipment could
be achieved with available resources and skills; and
3. HEU could be achieved after only two enrichment stages.
The main disadvantages of this method were: it requires bulky
and weighty components, intricate chemical processing and is
an uneconomical proposition when a large output is required.
• The gaseous diffusion method had inherent disadvantages:
1. The barrier has to be invented from basic principles, thereby
requiring an intensive R & D effort with no guarantees of
success.
2. The method requires a large number of compressors that
could neither be purchased easily nor manufactured locally.
3. Gaseous diffusion demands a large cascade of approxi-
mately 3500 stages to produce HEU.
• The gaseous centrifuge method is technologically more advanced
than gaseous diffusion and, apart from an intensive R & D
effort would need more than one invention to harness magnetic
centrifuge technology.
Uranium enrichment programme
Before 1981 came to a close, a decision was taken to establish an
enrichment technology as a precursor to the production of HEU in
accordance with the following strategy:
• To adopt EMIS as a primary option and to proceed with its
development in three phases:
1. To build research units in the first phase.
2. To build demonstration units in the second phase.
3. To build production units to achieve 15 kg U/year of 93%
enrichment with natural uranium as feed. Ultimately using
LEU as feed material would enhance output by fivefold.
• To adopt gaseous diffusion as a parallel option with the following
objectives:
1. To develop a suitable barrier.
2. To develop the specifications of suitable compressors and
blowers and to operate them singly and in short cascades.
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3. To build a cascade to produce LEU of around 3-4% en-
richment and about 5 ton U/year to provide the feed for
EMIS.
• Activities were organised in such a fashion so as to ensure the
following criteria:
1. A thorough assessment of published information had to pre-
cede any project.
2. Research and development projects were adopted so that
adequate understanding of the know-how in the main and
supporting technologies could be achieved.
3. Work had to start in the laboratory phase, the results of
which were then utilised in the pilot phase. The final pro-
duction phase was to be implemented on the basis of the
outcome of the preceding two phases. These phases could
be partially overlapped whenever possible. In other words,
at the time of initiating the first phase of experimental ac-
tivity a pilot project could also be commenced. Inherent in
this mode of work was the deployment of assumptions and
parameters that had not yet been adequately tested or veri-
fied experimentally. In many cases work on the production
phase could begin at approximately the same time as exper-
imental work relating to the previous phase was initiated.
But in such cases, the margin for error is wider and that
had to be set against the ‘time saving’ consideration. As the
work progressed, modifications and changes would have to
be introduced into the designs as and when such alterations
were deemed advantageous.
• All research and development activities were to be performed at
the Tuwaitha site, while production plants and ancillary fabri-
cation plants were to be constructed at new, carefully selected,
sites. The main criteria for selection of those sensitive sites
were:
1. They had to be topographically fortified against aerial attack
or sabotage.
2. They had to be near large communities so that local man-
power could be recruited and trained.
3. Sites had to be geographically scattered so that a simultane-
ous attack on all would require immense military resources
on the part of a potential enemy.
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5.4 Sixty years after Hiroshima
In May 2005, Physics Today, the flagship magazine of the American Physical
Society, published a seven page-long apologetic paper by William E. Parkins,
a participating scientist in the World War II calutron project that succeeded in
producing the fissionable material for the Hiroshima bomb during World War II:
W.E. Parkins, The Uranium Bomb, the Calutron and the Space-Charge
Problem, Physics Today, Vol. 58 (May 2005) 45–51.
Let me just quote the opening sentence:
“Uranium! Uranium! Uranium!” A voice shouted out into the night
from the second floor of a dormitory in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. It was
6 August 1945. That day, President Harry S Truman had announced
to the world that the US had dropped a new weapon, a uranium bomb,
on the city of Hiroshima, Japan” [p. 45].
and the closing sentence:
“The development and use of the calutron to produce enriched ura-
nium for the first atomic bomb that was exploded in warfare, and
then to produce the full spectrum of separated isotopes for uses in
peacetime, is the greatest example of beating swords into plowshares
in the history of mankind. For its contribution to both wartime and
peacetime, the physics profession can be proud” [p. 51].
To write in such glorious terms about the science that enabled one of the
most tragic events in History, an act that is qualified by many as a crime against
humanity, only one year after Gulf War II began, is most disturbing, not just to
myself but to many people as well, including yesterday’s Japanese victims, and
today’s Iraqi victims of the development of calutron technology.
If war is the mother of all necessities, as is sometimes said, there is no reason for
publishing such apologetic sentences in a prominent scientific journal, especially
since people like William E. Parkins were very young at the time, and probably
totally blinded by years of propaganda in one of the most overtly patriotic countries
in the world.
But if that type of blindness (i.e., that lack of historical and philosophical
distance and judgment with regards to ongoing events) could be excused to some
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extent at the end of a major world war, there is no excuse for presenting these
events in heroic terms at a time when an all powerful Western coalition is trying
to use its overwhelming military power to convert to democracy a country that is
wrongly accused to have secretly resumed its calutron program.
Moreover, it is highly disturbing that this article contains a number of scientific
claims that are only partially correct, which suggests that it was more important
to the Editors of Physics Today to print a very positive and politically correct
apology of the wartime calutron effort on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of
its technically successful end, than to make sure that the paper was factually and
historically correct as far as its scientific and technical contents are concerned.
Indeed. While on the one hand Parkins’s paper does not contain any striking
new technical information, it does give a unique qualitative and quantitative ap-
preciation of the relative importance of the key elements and ideas which made
the US calutrons feasible. In particular, on page 50, Parkins claims that the impact
of space-charge neutralization was a factor of 400 on productivity, much more
than I would have thought. On the other hand, however, Parkins claims on page
46 to deserve “credit for having discovered and explained the automatic self-
neutralization of intense ion beams” propagating through the residual air left in
the calutron chambers. Moreover, most of Parkins paper is more or less structured
around the pretense that the development of the calutron was a major contri-
bution to basic science (e.g., plasma physics), as well as a major technological
development with numerous unique applications in the non-military domain.
As a matter of facts, as I got interested in the question of particle beam
weapons7 in 1978 already8 (one year before the question of calutrons), I have
always been aware of the importance of space-charge neutralization for overcom-
ing detrimental beam self-space-charge effects. I therefore knew that this effect
(for both electron and ions beams) was already known before World War II, as is
confirmed (in particular) by theoretical papers such as by W.H. Bennett,9 as well as
by photographs such as those taken on 26 March 1936 of a high current cyclotron
beam injected into the atmosphere at E.O. Lawrence’s laboratory at Berkeley.10
As for the space-charge neutralization of ion beams in calutrons, the last chapter
of Koch’s book (pages 274–300 of Ref. [23] cited on page 60) is discussing both
the work of Parkins et al. and the wartime contributions by German scientists (e.g.,
7See Ref. [71] on page 63, available at http://arXiv.org/pdf/physics/0409157 .
8See the postface, An afterword — twenty years after by Robert Jungk, in: Robert Jungk, “Die
Grosse Maschine — Auf dem Weg in eine andere Welt” (Goldmann Verlag, Second edition with
a 20 page-long postface, ISBN 3-442-11373-3, 1986) 251–284; French translation available at
http://cui.unige.ch/isi/ssc/phys/Jungk-postface.html .
9W.H. Bennett, Magnetically self-focusing streams, Phys. Rev. 45 (1934) 890–897.
10See Ref. [8] cited on page 59.
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F.G. Houtermans,11 K.H. Riewe, and W. Walcher) which were published in 1941
and 1943 already.
But, when I read Parkins’s paper in June 2005, I was less concerned by these
technical inconsistencies than by the possibility that this paper could offer to Dr.
Jafar an opportunity to express his views in the form of a letter to the Editors of
Physics Today. I therefore sent him, on June 24, a paper copy of Parkins’s article,
together with as a cover letter saying:
“The main purpose of my letter is to suggest that the publication of
Parkins’s paper in Physics Today gives you an opportunity to respond
to it, and therefore to put on record some of the facts that you think
should be made available to physicists and historians about what
happened in Iraq. I know that you are writing a book on this, but it
may also be useful to state in a shorter form some of the most important
facts. In particular, as a pacifist, I do not see why the US calutron
effort should be presented as a success sorry, while what was done in
Iraq is actually not very different from what was done in Switzerland
(before and after becoming a party to the NPT), not to mention other
countries.”
Jafar chose not to write such a letter to the Editors. But some American
readers did, and three letters were published together with a reply by Parkins on
pages 13 to 15 of the November 2005 issue of Physics Today. Unfortunately, the
purpose of all three letters was just to correct (or comment on) some factual details,
such as Parkins claim to have discovered the self-pinch effect, which according to
H.F. Ivey’s letter12 was apparently known in the 1920s already. In other words,
just like Parkins’s paper, the three letters were purely “scientistic,” i.e., typical of
the dominant quasi-religious attitude of contemporary scientists, who believe that
science and technology should be blindly pursued and developed, irrespective of
their social, political, and philosophical consequencies.
11Professor Houtermans, who encouraged Robert Jungk to write his book “Brighter than Thou-
sands Suns” on the political and moral problems faced by those who built the first atomic bombs,
is mentioned in the preface of “La Quadrature du CERN,” Ref. [47] cited on page 62.
12Physics Today (November 2005) 13.
Postface: Nuclear weapons and
Western democracy
The main document in this collection, Paper 2, was written in 1995 because that
year Andre Gsponer restarted working in Geneva after a long convalescence for
a cancer treatment.13 That same year Gsponer postulated for a job opening at
the Swiss Federal Office of Energy (OFEN14): The position of Vice-director for
Non-proliferation affairs.
Gsponer thought he was almost the ideal person for that job, since he could
not think of any Swiss citizen with better training (in nuclear physics and in
international affairs), experience, and motivation than him. Moreover, he easily
obtained the support of personalities such as Prof. Maurice Cosandey, former
President of the council of the Swiss Federal Schools of Technology, and Prof.
Claude Zangger, best known in the world as the initiator of the “Zangger list” of
dual-purpose nuclear equipments put under international control by the so-called
London Club of nuclear suppliers.
Gsponer was therefore interviewed by Dr. Eduard Kiener, Director of OFEN, as
well as by Dr. Alec-Jean Bear, the retiring Vice-director that he hoped to replace.
To Gsponer’s surprise, Baer asked him a number of embarrassing and vicious
questions. In particular, Baer wanted to know how, as a pacifist and well-known
outspoken nuclear-skeptic, Gsponer could be in favor of the abolition of nuclear
weapons while at the same time working in an Office whose duty is to promote
nuclear energy as one of the main sources of Switzerland’s energy supply.
Gsponer replied that he did not see any contradiction. As Vice-director for
Non-proliferation affairs his duty was to promote the non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons, and to represent the interests of Switzerland at the Board of Governors
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, two things that as a
13Although written in the third person, this postface is by Andre Gsponer.
14Office fe´de´ral de l’e´nergie.
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convinced democrat he could perfectly do, since his opposition to nuclear energy
was subordinated to his duties as a Swiss citizen.
But Dr. Baer kept similing and asking nasty questions, implying that Gsponer
was naive for the job, and that Gsponer did not appreciate that one cannot defend
the case for nuclear energy if one is not in favor of nuclear weapons as well! For
this, and most probably other reasons, Gsponer was not selected for the job.
The following year, on 25 April 1996, at 14.30 precisely, the Swiss Fed-
eral Council declassified a previously secret report: The official history of the
Swiss nuclear weapons program, from its initiation on February 5, 1946, until its
termination on November 1, 1988 — i.e., eight years before its mere existence
was formally recognized and its termination announced to the Swiss parliament
and people.15 Gsponer immediately wrote to the History section of the Military
department, and got a copy of the report.16
In this report, to his great surprise, Gsponer discovered that Alec-Jean Baer
had been, since January 1, 1986, a member of the highly secret AAA17 study group
whose duty was to make sure that Switzerland had the capability to produce nuclear
weapons on short notice, if so requested by the Federal Council.18 Therefore,
the Swiss representative at the IAEA had the doubtful duty to pretend that his
country was in favour of non-proliferation, while in fact Switzerland had not truly
renounced to nuclear weapons for at least 19 years after it had signed the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (in 1969), and 11 years after it had ratified it (in 1977).19 Even
15Gsponer was among the people who strongly suspected the existence of this program, and
wrote several papers about it. See, A. Gsponer, La Suisse et la bombe, Le Rebrousse Poil, No. 20,
21, 23, 25, 26 (Lausanne, 1979, 1980) ca. 21 pp., and Die Schweiz und die Atombombe, Virus,
No. 31, 32, 33 (Zurich, 1980) ca. 14 pp. The first in-depth academic investigation of the full
motivations of the development of nuclear energy in Switzerland is by Peter Hug, Geschichte
der Atomtechnologieentwicklung in der Schweiz, Lizentiarbeit in Neuerer Allgemeiner Geschichte
(Historischen Institut der Universita¨t Bern, Bern, April 1987) 390 pp.
16J. Stu¨ssi-Lauterburg, Historischer Abriss zur Frage einer Schweizer Nuklearbewaffnung (Swiss
Military Department, Federal Military Library and Historical Service, Spring 1995, secret, de-
classified 25 April 1996) 99 pp. This report is non-technical and mainly a chronology of the
administrative history of the high-level committees supervising the program since 1966. A rough
English translation of its introduction and conclusion are available at:
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Library/Swissdoc.html .
17Arbeitsausschuss fu¨r Atomfragen
18Actually, A.-J. Baer was only one of several members of AAA that Gsponer unknowingly met
during the past 25 years. The first one was Deputy foreign minister Herbert von Arx, whom he
met in 1983 at the Federal palace on the recommendation of Claude Zangger, and who declined to
support a non-proliferation project presented by Gsponer, possibly because it was truly motivated
by disarmament considerations.
19Switzerland was in no way unique in this respect: The first head of IAEA, Dr. Sigvard Eklund,
was at the same time the head of Sweden’s secret nuclear weapons program.
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worse, according to the declassified report, Switzerland, among other things, kept
a secret stockpile of uranium which was hidden from the IAEA.20 Thus, although
safeguards agreements with the IAEA came into force on September 6, 1978,
unlawful nuclear weapons activities continued until November 1, 1988.
Apart from these political facts, over the 42 years of existence of the Swiss
nuclear weapons program, many nuclear weapon related technologies were indige-
nously developed21 and exported to other countries.22 For example, heavy water
separation plants were exported to India where heavy water is used as moderator in
plutonium and tritium breeding reactors; centrifuge enrichment components were
exported to Pakistan where they are used in weapons-grade uranium enrichment
facilities; and, of course, various sensitive high-technology machine-tools and
components were exported to Iraq during the 1980s...
The question therefore arises as to why Switzerland, contrary to Iraq and
former Yugoslavia (which like Switzerland had nuclear weapons ambitions), was
not invaded by a Western-led armada, or at least sanctioned for having violated its
obligations under the NPT?
The answer may lie in the naive observation that the Swiss political lead-
ership has in fact abandoned its nearly 200 years old policy of neutrality23
at about the same time it definitely renounced to nuclear weapons, so that
Switzerland does not have any independent foreign policy any more since
around the year 1988...
In the case of Yugoslavia the challenge to the major European countries (and
especially to Germany, who was the first state to recognize Slovenia at the begin-
ning of the break-up of Yugoslavia) was that a large and culturally strong country
could emerge in southern-eastern Europe — a country that would not automat-
ically align on the European Union, but rather remain independent from it and
collaborate with eastern European countries that were part of the former Soviet
Union. As Yugoslavia was ready to defend its identity, and capable of making
20Moreover, Switzerland had, albeit under IAEA safeguards, almost 100 kg of separated
weapons-grade plutonium on long-term loan from England (see, R. de Diesbach, Une bombe
A suisse en quelques jours ?, Tribune - Le Matin, Lausanne, 6 aouˆt 1980), that it very reluctantly
returned to England after considerable delay.
21Switzerland also published what are possibly the most detailed computer simulations ever
published of the explosion of an uranium implosion bomb. See A. Pritzger and W. Ha¨lg, Radiation
dynamics of nuclear explosion, J. of Appl. Math. and Phys. (ZAMP) 32 (1981) 1–11.
22See, in particular, the chapter Weitere CH-Beihilfen sur Bombe, in: P. Hug, ed., Sulzers
Bombengescha¨ft mit Argentinien — Schweizer Beihilfe zum Atomkrieg (Arbeitsgemeinschaft
gegen Atomexporte, Zu¨rich, Juli 1980) 60–66.
23Which lasted since the Treaty of Vienna, 1815.
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nuclear weapons,24 the major European countries and the United States felt that
there was no other option than to destroy the federal republic of Yugoslavia, rather
than to keep it as a single entity...
For this reason, when IAEA officers flanked by US and Russian special forces
raided, on 22 August 2002, the nuclear center of Vinca in the suburbs of Belgrade,25
as soon as they could after the war against Serbia, to remove the 48 kg of highly-
enriched uranium that were stored there,26 many countries in the world understood
that with the collapse of the Soviet Union the world had entered not just an era
of denial of self-identity, but also an era of unrestricted military intervention and
active counter-proliferation.
In particular, North Korea was among the first to draw the lesson from what
happened in Vinca, and soon afterwards resumed operation of its plutonium breed-
ing reactor.
Similarly, now that Iran is having US-led forces in two neighboring countries
(Afghanistan and Iraq), the continuation of its independent nuclear energy program
becomes more and more suspicious: It is as if Alec-Jean Baer’s message to Andre
Gsponer that “nuclear energy cannot be dissociated from nuclear weapons” was
suddenly discovered by the international community, and more particularly by the
three largest European countries: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany!
But this is not the case: Nuclear energy, nuclear science, and nuclear weapons
have always been part of the same foreign policy,27 and this at least since US
President Dwight Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” initiative, presented in a speech
before the United Nations General Assembly on December 8, of 1953.28
24Former Yugoslavia, who fiercely defended its non-alignment on both the Soviet and Western
blocks, has always been on the list of countries suspected to have a latent nuclear weapons program,
because it had significant nuclear facilities and activities over the full range of possibilities.
25See, R. Stone, Belgrade Lab Sets New Course After Top-Secret Uranium Grab, Science (30
August 2002) 1456.
26This was just sufficient for two uranium-bombs. However, in collaboration with CERN, Serb
scientists at Vinca were considering since some years the use of a small accelerator as a sub-critical
neutron multiplier, which would have enabled to convert these 48 kg of uranium-235 into enough
plutonium-239 for at least twenty plutonium-bombs. This technique, in which a secondary target
made of U-235 is used to multiply the spallation neutrons produced in a primary target bombarded
by a proton beam from an accelerator is in use at Los Alamos since more than thirty years.
(See A. Gsponer, B. Jasani, and S. Sahin, Emerging nuclear energy systems and nuclear weapon
proliferation, Atomkernenergie · Kerntechnik 43 (1983) 169–174. See also end of Sec. 4.7.)
27Henry Kissinger’s major book, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, should therefore be
rewritten and entitled: Nuclear Power and Foreign Policy.
28Concerning the lesser known foreign policy implications of nuclear science, see in particular
A. Gsponer et J. Grinevald, CERN — La physique des particules pie´ge´e par l’OTAN, La Recherche,
No. 381 (Paris, de´cembre 2004) 6, available at
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Indeed, as is shown by the political analysis of this initiative, and of the Western
Europe reaction to it, the atoms-for-peace policy of the United States was a foreign
policy concept — neither an energy policy nor a trade or economic policy.29 Its
first rationale was to demonstrate ‘world leadership’ in order to bind neutral or
politically indifferent countries to the West. But its long-term goal, of which we
see the major effects today, was to use nuclear power as a double-edged sword,
by which access to nuclear energy would give to non-nuclear-weapon states the
impression to get closer to nuclear-weapon-statehood, while at the same time
the further development of nuclear technology by such states would become a
justification for preventive intervention if at some point it was getting too close to
the next step: the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
The same implicit foreign policy concept was enshrined in the Non-Proliferation
Treaty which came into force in 1970. Those who joined the NPT as non-nuclear-
weapon states were still able to pursue some ambiguous nuclear-weapons-related
activities (as is remarquably well explained in the declassified 1996 report on
Switzerland’s nuclear weapons program, op. cit., footnote 16), but as soon as these
activities would no more be tolerable to the now official nuclear-weapon states,
they would become a justification for immediate sanctions, and possibly military
intervention. In other words, if the hidden agenda of the official nuclear-weapon
states was to give access to nuclear energy to as many small states as possible in
order to be sure that themselves could keep their nuclear weapons for ever, one
could say today that they have succeeded!
In this perspective, it is clear that what happened in Iraq over the past thirty
years should be seen much more as a nuclear-armed “cat and mouse” game than
as a story about a dangerous dictator in search of nuclear weapons to conquer the
world. For those who have read the various parts of this report there should be
no doubt that Iraq’s nuclear ambitions could have been easily stopped long before
Iraq invaded Koweit in 1990: There is no doubt that if CERN physicist Andre
Gsponer, Harvard professor Richard Wilson, and many others, knew about Iraq’s
intentions long ago, the secret services of the official nuclear-powers must have
known much more for a much longer time.
As a matter of fact it is mostly Western countries, such as the United Kingdom,
France, and the United States, who trained Iraq’s scientists and provided Iraq with
http://www.larecherche.fr/special/courrier/courrier381.html .
29See, for example, R. Kollert, Die Politik der latenten Proliferation. Milita¨rische Nutzung
‘friedlicher’ Kerntechnik in Westeuropa, Dissertation (Deutscher Universita¨tsverlag, Wiesbaden,
1994) 551 pp., ISBN-3-8244-4156-X;and R. Kollert, “Atoms-for-peace:” A foreign policy concept
of the Cold War gets into a clue to latent proliferation, INESAP-Information Bulletin, No. 9 (May
1996) 22–24.
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all the hardware it needed to try building a nuclear deterrent. It is also for this
reason that these countries knew that Iraq’s nuclear weapons program was in fact
quite different from that of Israel or Pakistan, for example. Its purpose, which is
amply documented in the UNSCOM30 inspection reports written between 1991
and 1996, was not just to make nuclear weapons by the shortest possible path, but
also to turn Iraq into a modern industrialized state following the model set forth by
the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Just like Yugoslavia in south-
eastern Europe, such a state in the heart of the Middle East, which after Saddam
Hussein could have emerged as a powerful, independent, modern, secular, and
possibly democratic country, with a high standard of living and plenty of natural
resources, was a far bigger danger to Western’s interests than Saddam Hussein.
In conclusion, a non-superficial analysis of the origin and consequencies of
Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, and its comparison to similar developments
in other countries, clearly shows that nuclear energy and independent statehood
are more then ever intimately related, as much for the official nuclear-weapon
states (and the non-nuclear-weapon states who have definitely renounced to full
sovereignty by strictly adhering to the NPT) as for the countries who are struggling
to exist as truly independent nation-states. This means that nuclear energy, whose
abolition is the prerequisite to the elimination of nuclear weapons, is the largest
single obstacle to the abolition of nuclear weapons — contrary to the pretense of
“Atoms for Peace,” NPT, and IAEA, which is the hypocrisy that nuclear energy
could in some way bring freedom and peace on Earth.
The tragedy, in the over fifty-years-long enforcement of this hypocrisy, is that
it is the so-called democratic countries which are precisely at its origin. It is also
because the leading Western countries are precisely those which most strongly
oppose giving up nuclear energy and nuclear weapons, whose mere possession
is a crime, that one has many reasons to be pessimistic. It is therefore very
disappointing to discover, after 25 years of work on peace research and nuclear
disarmament, that there is no sincere interest in either of these topics in any Western
state, and that their dealing with Iraq’s calutrons is just one illustration of their
hypocrisy with regards to the true meanings of liberty and democracy.
30United Nations’s Special Commission in Iraq.
Appendix 1: Annex 1 of UN Security
Council document S/22872/Rev.1
DEFINITIONS
For the purpose of UN Security Council Resolutions 687 and 707, the
following definitions will be adopted:
NUCLEAR MATERIAL
1.1 “Source material”
Uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium depleted
in the isotope 235; thorium; any of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy,
chemical compound or concentrate.
1.2 “Special fissionable material”
Plutonium-239; uranium-235; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235
or 233; any material containing one or more of the foregoing.
1.3 “Nuclear-weapon-usable material”
Nuclear material that can be used for the manufacture of nuclear explosive com-
ponents without transmutation or further enrichment, such as plutonium contain-
ing less than 80 % plutonium-238, uranium enriched to 20 % uranium- 235 and
uranium-233 or more; any chemical compound or mixture of the foregoing. Pluto-
nium, uranium-233 and uranium enriched to less than 20 % uranium-235 contained
in irradiated fuel do not fall into this category.
NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES
2.1-2.9 (inclusive) refer to activities prohibited under both Resolutions 687
and 707.
Any activity such as research and development, design, manufacturing, im-
port of systems, equipment and components, pilot plant and plant construction,
commissioning and operation, or utilization in one or more of the following:
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2.1 Production of nuclear weapons
2.2 Production and any use of nuclear-weapon-usable material
2.3 Production of metals and alloys containing plutonium or uranium
2.4 Weaponization
This covers the research, development, manufacturing and testing required to make
nuclear explosives from special fissonable material.
2.5 Nuclear fuel fabrication using plutonium, uranium-233, uranium enriched
to 20 % or more in uranium-235.
2.6 Import, construction or use of research and power reactors of any kind
utilizing uranium enriched to ≥ 20 % in uranium-235, uranium-233, plutonium
or MOX as a fuel or any reactor designed specifically for plutonium production.
This includes critical and subcritical assemblies.
2.7 Reprocessing of irradiated fuel
Including the use of hot cells and the associated equipment
2.8 Enrichment of uranium in the isotope 235 and any preparatory steps in
this process, including the preparation of UCl4 and UF6.
2.9 Production and separation of the isotopes of plutonium, hydrogen,
lithium and boron
2.10-2.18 (inclusive) refer to activities, permitted under resolution 687 but
prohibited under 707.
Any activity such as research and development, design, manufacturing, import
of systems, equipment and components, pilot plant construction, commissioning
and operation, or utilization in one or more of the following:
2.10 Import, construction or use of research and power reactors of any
type utilizing natural uranium or uranium enriched to less than 20 % in uranium-
235 as fuel. This includes critical and sub-critical assemblies, but excludes reactors
specifically designed for plutonium production.
2.11 Prospecting, mining or processing of ores containing uranium and/or
thorium
2.12 Preparation of chemical compounds containing uranium enriched to
less than 20 % in uranium-235 and thorium, excluding the preparation of UCl4
and UF6.
2.13 Nuclear fuel fabrication using natural uranium or uranium enriched to
less than 20 % in uranium-235.
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2.14 Processing and disposal of radioactive wastes
2.15 Nuclear fusion experimental devices based on magnetic or inertial
confinement, including diagnostics
2.16 Production of isotopes both radioactive and stable. The production of
the isotopes of plutonium, hydrogen, lithium, boron and uranium is prohibited.
2.17 Import, construction and use of neutron sources, electron accelera-
tors, particle accelerators, heavy ion accelerators
2.18 Research on radiation physics and chemistry and on the physical and
chemical properties of isotopes except in area relevant to items 2.19, 2.20 and
2.21
2.19-2.21 (inclusive) refer to activities permitted under resolution 707
2.19 Application of radiation and isotopes in food and agriculture
2.20 Applications of radiation and isotopes in medicine
2.21 Application of radiation and isotopes in industrial processes
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Appendix 2: Original of Paper 1
Bombe Atomique: L’Irak est passe´
par le CERN
by Suren Erkman, published in the weekend edition of Le Journal de Gene`ve,
Saturday 22 - Sunday 23 April 1995, pages 1 and 5.
NUCLÉAIRE — Re´ve´lations d’un chercheur
Dans les anne´es 70, des Irakiens se sont rendus a` plusieurs reprises au CERN pour
collecter des informations dans le cadre de leur programme de bombe atomique.
Durant les anne´es 70, le patron du programme de la bombe atomique iraki-
enne, Jafar Dhia Jafar, a effectue´ plusieurs se´jours au CERN a` Gene`ve alors qu’il
e´tait rattache´ a` l’Imperial College de Londres. A une reprise au moins, en 1979,
il a de´peˆche´ au CERN l’un de ses inge´nieurs pour obtenir des renseignements
techniques sur un type d’aimant particulier. Parmi plusieurs voies possibles pour
obtenir de l’uranium enrichi, les Irakiens avaient en effet de´cide´ d’utiliser et de per-
fectionner les calutrons, une technique qui consiste a` se´parer, a` l’aide de puissants
aimants, les atomes d’uraniun 235 (d’inte´reˆt militaire) des atomes d’uranium 238
(peu fissiles) qui se trouvent me´lange´s dans l’uranium naturel. C’est pour cette
raison qu’ils s’inte´ressaient pre´cise´ment aux aimants du type de celui de´veloppe´
pour une expe´rience du CERN. Finalement, les Irakiens ont choisi un design
diffe´rent de celui du CERN pour les aimants de leurs calutrons, mais l’e´pisode
montre qu’ils exploraient cette technique d’enrichissement de l’uranium il y a une
quinzaine d’anne´es de´ja`.
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Figure 5.2: Affiche annonc¸ant l’article sur les calutrons irakiens.
Un chercheur genevois, qui avait a` l’e´poque tente´ en vain d’alerter les milieux
scientifiques et du de´sarmement, rend aujourd’hui public cet e´pisode, en marge
de la rene´gociation du Traite´ sur la non-prolife´ration nucle´aire qui se de´roule
actuellement a` New York. (Re´d. Lire les articles de Suren Erkman en page 5.)
Gene`ve, berceau de la bombe irakienne
A Gene`ve, l’Irak a collecte´ des informations techniques en vue de sa bombe
atomique. Le grand patron du programme militaire nucle´aire irakien a lui-meˆme
effectue´ plusieurs se´jours au CERN, le Laboratoire europe´en pour la physique des
particules.
Un jour de 1979, un inge´nieur irakien se rend au CERN, a` Gene`ve, le Lab-
oratoire europe´en pour la physique des particules. Bien qu’il ne participe pas a`
un programme de recherche du CERN, sa visite n’a rien d’anormal, le laboratoire
europe´en e´tant un lieu d’e´change scientifique ouvert a` tous, sans distinction de
nationalite´. Il approche l’un des physiciens de l’expe´rience NA10, et pose des
questions sur les de´tails de construction de l’aimant tout a` fait particulier qui
constitue l’e´le´ment central de l’appareillage de cette expe´rience. Ce physicien,
responsable de l’aimant, mentionne lors d’une conversation cette visite a` l’un de
ses colle`gues, Andre Gsponer, un jeune chercheur qui se pre´occupe du roˆle de la
recherche scientifique dans la course aux armements.
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Les relations de Jafar Dhia Jafar
Apre`s une bre`ve analyse, Andre Gsponer parvient a` la conclusion que, selon toute
vraisemblance, les Irakiens sont manifestement inte´resse´s a` produire de l’uranium
enrichi par le biais d’une technologie connue sous le nom de “se´paration isotopique
e´lectromagne´tique”. Dans son principe, cette technique consiste a` se´parer, a` l’aide
d’un puissant aimant, les atomes d’uranium 235 (d’inte´reˆt militaire) des atomes
d’uranium 238 (peu fissiles) qui se trouvent me´lange´s dans l’uranium naturel.
Cette technique est connue depuis longtemps, puisque c’est ainsi que les Etats-
Unis, entre juin 1944 et juillet 1945, ont fabrique´ la charge nucle´aire de la bombe
laˆche´e sur Hiroshima. Ce dispositf, mis au point a` l’Universite´ de Californie, est
connu sous le nom de “calutron”, contraction de “California University Cyclotron.”
Les de´tails de cette technique, rudimentaire a` certains e´gards, ont e´te´ ren-
dus publiques entre 1946 et 1956. Parmi plusieurs voies possibles pour obtenir
de l’uranium enrichi, les Irakiens avaient donc de´cide´s d’utiliser les calutrons
mais en les modernisant et en les perfectionnant. C’est pour cette raison qu’ils
s’inte´ressaient pre´cise´ment aux aimants du type de celui de´veloppe´ pour l’expe´ri-
ence NA10 au CERN.
Les Irakiens ne venaient pas par hasard a` Gene`ve. Le CERN a toujours e´te´
conside´re´ comme le centre d’excellence mondial en matie`re de grands aimants.
Surtout, le patron du programme de la bombe irakienne, Jafar Dhia Jafar, avait
effectue´ plusieurs se´jours au CERN durant les anne´es 70, alors qu’il e´tait rattache´
a` l’Imperial College de Londres. Entre 1967 et 1976, il a publie´ douze articles
scientifiques portant sur des recherches mene´es aux synchrotrons de Birmingham
et du CERN.
Naturellement, Jafar a utilise´ ses relations personelles, noue´es lors de ses
longs se´jours en Europe, pour envoyer ses collaborateurs puiser des informa-
tions cruciales aux meilleures sources. C’est ainsi que l’inge´nieur irakien s’e´tait
explicitement recommande´ de Jafar pour interroger le responsable de l’aimant
de l’expe´rience NA10. Toutefois, estime ce dernier (qui souhaite conserver
l’anonymat), cette visite ne reveˆt pas d’importance particulie`re, car “les infor-
mations que cet inge´nieur a` re cues se trouvaient dans la lite´rature scientifique
publique. A ma connaissance, il n’a pas eu acce`s aux plans d’inge´nieurs origin-
aux, ni a` certain proce´de´s particuliers de´velope´s par le CERN pour fabriquer cet
aimant.”
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Figure 5.3: Journal de Gene`ve, page 1: “Bombe Atomique: L’Irak est passe´ par
le CERN.”
Technologie prolife´rante
Lorsque a e´clate´ la guerre du Golfe, Jafar Dhia Jafar, qui re´side aujourd’hui
sous haute protection a` Bagdad, assumait officiellement les fonctions de ministre
adjoint de l’Industrie et de l’Industrialisation militaire, de vice-pre´sident de la
Commission irakienne pour l’e´nergie atomique, et de directeur de la physique
des re´acteurs au Centre de recherches nucle´aires de Tuwaitha. [On trouvera une
compilation d’informations au sujet de Jafar Dhia Jafar, y compris la mention de
ses se´jours au CERN, dans l’ouvrage de William E. Burrows & Robert Windrem:
“Critical Mass, The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World”,
Simon & Shuster, New York 1994. Malheureusement, cet ouvrage comporte de
nombreuses erreurs techniques.]
Pour sa part, Andre Gsponer prend cet incident tre`s au se´rieux. Il quitte le
CERN et devient en 1980 le premier directeur du GIPRI, l’Institut international
de recherches pour la paix a` Gene`ve. Son objectif est d’e´valuer, de manie`re
rigoureuse, les retombe´es militaires possibles des recherches effectue´es dans le
domaine de la physique nucle´aire et des particules. En 1980, a` l’occasion de
la deuxie`me Confe´rence de re´vision du Traite´ sur la non-prolife´ration (TNP), a`
Gene`ve, il re´dige un document dans lequel il montre que la technologie de la
se´paration e´lectromagne´tique, be´ne´ficiant de nombreux progre`s techniques, est
devenue une technologie potentiellement tre`s prolife´rante, et il mentionne meˆme
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explicitement l’Irak.
Apre`s avoir essaye´ en vain d’e´veiller l’inte´reˆt des milieux du de´sarmement sur
ce proble`me, et apre`s avoir e´te´ averti par des spe´cialistes des dangers que pouvaient
repre´senter pour lui et ses anciens colle`gues du CERN la re´ve´lation d’une telle
information, il de´cide de ne plus mentionner en public l’inte´reˆt soutenu des Irakiens
pour les calutrons. Il quitte la Suisse en 1987 et retourne a` ses premie`res amours:
la recherche the´orique en physique fondamentale.
La confirmation des calutrons
Mais en 1991, apre`s la guerre du Golfe, il sursaute en voyant les images en
provenance d’Irak: pre´cise´ment des calutrons utilise´s dans le programme de la
bombe irakienne! Andre Gsponer collecte alors toute l’information disponible
sur les calutrons dans la litte´rature scientifique et dans les rapports des missions
de l’ONU en Irak. Il termine actuellement une e´tude technique sur les calutrons,
dans laquelle il de´crit en de´tail la manie`re dont l’Irak entendait fabriquer l’uranium
enrichi ne´cessaire a` la bombe. [Andre Gsponer et Jean-Pierre Hurni, “Calutrons:
1945-1995”, ISRI, Case postale 30, 1211 Gene`ve-12.] Les e´ve´nements lui ont
donne´ raison: l’Irak, comme d’autres pays, a bel et bien emprunte´ la voie des
calutrons, confirmant ainsi le potentiel de prolife´ration de cette technique. “Si
on avait pris cette affaire au se´rieux a` l’e´poque, le cours des e´ve´nements aurait
peut-eˆtre e´te´ diffe´rent”, estime Andre Gsponer.
Mais il reste une e´nigme de taille. Les Services de renseignements occidentaux
ont pre´tendu avoir e´te´ surpris de de´couvrir un important programme de calutrons
en Irak: “Je n’arrive pas a` croire que j’ai e´te´ seul, avec quelques autres, a` savoir
que les Irakiens s’inte´ressaient de pre`s aux calutrons de`s la fin des anne´es 70,
s’interroge Andre Gsponer. Les Services secrets occidentaux devaient eˆtre au
courant. Pourquoi avoir alors tellement attendu pour re´agir, et pourquoi avoir feint
de de´couvrir ce programme apre`s la guerre du Golfe?”
“Pour se prote´ger de la menace de prolife´ration nucle´aire,
il faudra utiliser la force”
Dans l’un des chapitres d’un re´cent ouvrage collectif consacre´ a` la possibilite´
d’une e´limination comple`te des armes nucle´aires, on trouve une ide´e inte´ressante:
tout citoyen devrait conside´rer comme son devoir d’alerter l’opinion publique
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Figure 5.4: Journal de Gene`ve, page 5: “Gene`ve, berceau de la bombe irakienne.”
s’il venait a` prendre connaissance d’un quelconque e´ve´nement laissant a` penser
qu’un groupe ou un pays cherche a` acquerir la bombe atomique. [Joseph Rotblat,
Jack Steinberger et Bhalchandra Udgaonkar (sous la direction de): “Un monde
sans armes nucle´aires” Editions Transition, Paris, 1995.] Or c’est pre´cise´ment ce
qu’Andre Gsponer dit avoir tente´ de faire au de´but des anne´es 80 lorsqu’il s’aper cu
que l’Irak s’inte´ressait de pre`s aux calutrons, et plus encore lorsqu’il a re´alise´
que les technologies lie´es aux acce´le´rateurs de particules risquaient de donner
naissance a` de nouvelles ge´ne´rations d’armes nucle´aires. [Andre Gsponer et al.:
“La Quadrature du CERN”, Editions d’En-Bas, Lausanne, 1984.] “Mais personne
n’a voulu m’e´couter, y compris dans les milieux scientifiques, regrette Andre
Gsponer. Peut-eˆtre faudra-t-il qu’une grande ville dans un pays occidental soit
volatilise´e par une bombe atomique pour que l’on se de´cide a` re´fle´chir se´rieusement
sur une nouvelle politique de la science et de la technologie, qui prenne en compte
de manie`re vraiment responsable les retombe´es de la recherche fondamental.”
Comme en confirmation de cette analyse, la re´solution 707 du Conseil de
se´curite´ de l’ONU, adopte´e le 15 aouˆt 1991, spe´cifie clairement que l’Irak a
l’interdiction non seulement de fabriquer, d’importer, et d’utiliser, mais e´galement
de conduire “toute activite´ de recherche et de de´veloppement” dans le domaine “des
sources de neutrons, d’acce´le´rateurs d’e´lectrons, d’acce´le´rateurs de particules,
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d’acce´le´rateurs de ions lourds” ainsi que dans le domaine des “dispositifs de
fusion nucle´aire expe´rimentale.”
D’autres spe´cialistes voient e´galement dans le de´velopement incontroˆle´ de la
recherche un facteur cle´ de la prolife´ration nucle´aire. Une prolife´ration d’autant
plus ine´vitable que le Traite´ sur la non-prolife´ration nucle´aire, rene´gocie´ ces jours
a` New York, ne concerne que les technologies lie´es aux re´acteurs nucle´aires.
Dans un article re´cemment publie´ par la revue “Science”, John Nuckolls, directeur
associe´ d’un des plus grands laboratoires militaires ame´ricains (le Lawrence Liver-
more National Laboratory), affirme que “la disse´mination des progre`s scientifiques
et technologiques ainsi que la croissance e´conomique offrent a` un nombre toujours
croissant de nations la capacite´ de de´velopper des armes nucle´aires”. P.K. Iyengar,
ancien directeur de l’Institut Bhabha de recherches atomiques a` Bombay et ancien
pre´sident de la Commission indienne pour l’e´nergie atomique, exprime un opinion
semblable dans un e´ditorial de la revue scientifique indienne “Current Science”:
“Au fur et a` mesure que la science nucle´aire progresse, la technologie nucle´aire
e´volue, aussi bien pour des usages pacifiques que militaires. (...) Il est impor-
tant que les physiciens en tiennent compte et qu’ils informent les responsables
politiques et le grand public.”
Mais pour l’instant, on assiste a` la mise en oeuvre d’une toute autre strate´gie:
la contre-prolife´ration, qui consiste a` laisser aller un pays jusqu’a` un certain
point, puis a` le stopper, manu militari s’il le faut. Pour Robert Kupferman,
spe´cialiste des questions de de´fense au Center for Strategic and International
Studies a` Washington, interroge´ par te´le´phone quelques heures apre`s l’attentat
d’Oklahoma City, “il ne fait aucun doute que les armes nucle´aires vont prolife´rer
de manie`re terrifiante. Pour se prote´ger de cette menace, il faudra utiliser la force.”
